The Wehrmarcht: Soldiers and Germans During the Second World War by Varble, Neil
Western Kentucky University
TopSCHOLAR®
Masters Theses & Specialist Projects Graduate School
12-1-2007
The Wehrmarcht: Soldiers and Germans During
the Second World War
Neil Varble
Western Kentucky University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses
Part of the European History Commons, and the Military History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by TopSCHOLAR®. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses & Specialist Projects by
an authorized administrator of TopSCHOLAR®. For more information, please contact topscholar@wku.edu.
Recommended Citation
Varble, Neil, "The Wehrmarcht: Soldiers and Germans During the Second World War" (2007). Masters Theses & Specialist Projects.
Paper 384.
http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/384
THE WEHRMACHT: SOLDIERS AND GERMANS DURING THE SECOND 
WORLD WAR 
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of History 
Western Kentucky University 
Bowling Green, Kentucky 
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts in History 
By 
Neil Franklin Varble 
December 2007 
THE WEHRMACHT: SOLDIERS AND GERMANS DURING THE SECOND WORLD 
WAR 
Date Recommended 
\ 7 c L < J j f . - S ^ / dec} 
Dean, Graduate Studies and Research Date 
I would like to thank my parents, Franklin and Margaret Varble, for all their 
support and patience during this process. None of this would have been possible without 
their constant support and belief in my work and abilities. I would also like to thank my 
sister for all her help organizing my mounds of research material as well as listening and 
offering advice on a topic outside her field of expertise. Thank you to the WKU Office of 
Graduate Studies and Research for their financial support to provide me with sufficient 
funding for research in Washington, D.C. I would like to thank Dr. Jack Thacker for all 
his support and belief in my work and determination to attack this difficult topic. Much 
thanks to Dr. Eric Reed for his comments and willingness to help me examine the 
numerous angles of this immense topic. I am also grateful to Dr. Carole Bucy for 
introducing to Felicia Anchor who works with the Tennessee Holocaust Commission. A 
special thanks to Dr. William Meinecke at the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum in Washington, D.C. for his willingness to provide invaluable sources and 
information. Last but not least, I would like to thank my close friends who listened to my 
every concern, anticipation, and excitement throughout the past year. 
Table of Contents 
Introduction 3 
Chapter 1- Primary Source Material 14 
Chapter 2- The Wehrmacht 29 
Chapter 3- Verbrechen der Wehrmacht ("Crimes of the Wehrmacht") 44 
Chapter 4- Propaganda Directed Towards the Millions of German Soldiers 91 
Chapter 5- Honor, Guilt, and the Myth of the Wehrmacht 119 
Conclusion 138 
Appendix 143 
Bibliography 147 
n 
THE WEHRMACHT: SOLDIERS AND GERMANS DURING THE SECOND 
WORLD WAR 
Neil Franklin Varble December 2007 154 Pages 
Directed by: Dr. Jack Thacker, Dr. Eric Reed, and Dr. Robert Dietle 
Department of History Western Kentucky University 
The German Army, also known as the Wehrmacht, fought a brutal war on the 
Eastern Front during the Second World War. These soldiers, under the command of 
military officials of the Nazi state, vowed to destroy Bolshevism and Jewish populations. 
By examining letters from soldiers to family members on the German home front as well 
as letters from families to the men on the front lines, a better understanding of the 
motivations of war is revealed. Letters of these men and family members present insight 
into a vast area of research in German twentieth century history. An estimated 20 to 40 
billion letters circulated throughout the German armed forces from 1939 until 1945. 
In addition to letters, Nazi propaganda and the Hitler Youth greatly contributed to 
the influx of anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik mindsets throughout the military ranks. Due 
to the events surrounding the end of the First World War, Hitler was successful in 
creating a vendetta against his European neighbors who betrayed Germany in 1918-1919. 
Revenge against Germany's enemies was constantly preached to the German population 
as well as soldiers serving in the Wehrmacht. These individuals would take their revenge 
against civilian populations and prisoners of war. The majority of German atrocities took 
i i i 
place on the Eastern Front in Russia after the launch of Operation Barbarossa in June 
1941. 
The following research does not attempt to describe every German veteran of the 
Second World War; rather, it is important to realize that war is horrendous under any 
circumstance and the Second World War proved no different. Additional research, 
namely in Germany, is necessary in order to develop an even more detailed perspective 
of the average soldier of the Wehrmacht 
IV 
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Introduction 
The Wehrmacht, or German Army, presents a controversial area of debate among 
historians due to the recent evidence surrounding these soldiers of the Nazi era. These 
"ordinary men", to borrow terminology from author Christopher Browning, are the 
primary topic of this thesis. Popular post-war opinion of these men placed them into a 
separate category, away from the malevolent SS forces. The truth is that members of the 
Wehrmacht were indeed involved with the Final Solution as well as countless atrocities 
and murders against numerous ethnic groups throughout the Eastern Front. Upon a close 
examination of memoirs and letters from the front, it is possible to obtain a glimpse into 
the psyches of these men as well as attempt to understand their brutality toward 
Untermenschen ("subhumans"). As historian Omer Bartov claims, "the Wehrmacht was 
the army of the people, and the willing tool of the regime, more than any of its military 
predecessors."1 This is not to suggest that all of the 20 million men who served in 
German Armed Forces during the Nazi regime were dedicated, indoctrinated Nazis; 
however, evidence available leads one to imagine that Nazi propaganda did lead many to 
lead astray from generally accepted codes of military conduct on and off the battlefield. 
Letters from German soldiers present valuable insight into the everyday lives of 
these men who fought on the front line. Analysis from the average soldier presents a 
unique view in which the Second World War is perceived. Therefore, this study attempts 
to explain the reasoning behind these men's violent behavior as well as the stressful 
1
 Bartov, Omer, Hitler's Anny: Soldiers. Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 10. 
" Wette, Wolfram, The Wehrmacht: History. Myth. Reality, translated by Deborah Lucas Schneider 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2006), viii-ix. 
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conditions at the Eastern Front. This relatively recent exploration into the common 
German soldier is a vast area of research, blending both military and social perspectives 
into this historical study. While letters present an excellent account of the war, many 
soldiers who were emotionally scarred from the death and destruction that surrounded 
them on a daily basis found it difficult to properly express themselves. Stephen Fritz 
explains, "the very soldiers with the most direct experience of battle remain least able to 
reflect on that experience in writing, whether because of the magnitude of the trauma 
they suffered or because of the inadequacy of language... to express what it was they saw 
and experienced." This is not to suggest that there are no accounts of murder and the 
horrendous activities on the front; rather, the difficulty was present in many soldiers' 
mindsets to distance themselves from such experiences resulting in few explanations in 
letters. 
While many of the excerpts presented in this analysis are borrowed from 
historians such as Stephen Fritz and Omer Bartov, others represent material that has not 
yet been published. An estimated 40-50 billion letters were written to and from the front 
during the course of the war.4 The letters obtained for this study are from the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. as well as from the National 
Archives and Research Administration (NARA) located in Maryland. Many of the letters 
from the Holocaust Museum were translated by Dr. William Meinecke, while the 
microfilmed letters found at NARA required translation. While hundreds of letters were 
obtained at NARA, many simply discussed the current situation of the soldier including 
the weather and his longing for his wife, girlfriend, or family. Emotional discussions 
3 
Fritz, Stephen G., Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in World War II (Lexington: The University 
Press of Kentucky, 1995), 8. 
4
 Fritz, 9. 
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from the soldiers were sparse, which is understandable when placing the letter in this 
familial context. Most likely, these men did not wish to burden their family and friends 
with gruesome details from the front line. What remains a constant theme throughout the 
majority of letters was a description of the weather situation and brief accounts of enemy 
engagements. 
Other letters obtained from NARA were written from the families of German 
soldiers. These sources, which are primarily from the later portion of the war, provide an 
understanding into the daily lives of German people under constant bombardment from 
Allied aircraft. By February 1945 approximately 350,000 German civilians were killed 
during air raids conducted by the Allies.? There is little doubt that this news from the 
home front enraged soldiers who were unable to defend their own families. Fueled with 
revenge and helplessness to aid their fellow Germans, soldiers entered into a disgruntled 
frame of mind on the battlefield. In this context, reports of murderous rampages from 
other soldiers demonstrate the desperation prevalent at the front. In addition, the pressure 
of bombing campaigns in their hometowns, German soldiers continued the fight against 
the Allies for fear of what would enter into their world if they lost the war. The 
propaganda spreading horrendous scenarios of death and destruction of the German 
people was now realized as the bombs continued to drop. 
Another common theme throughout many of the letters from family members 
focused on the tremendous concern for their son or husband fighting. In a letter to Willy 
Hiibner, his family explained: "The main thing is [that] you remain healthy and return 
5
 Mosier, John, Cross of Iron: The Rise and Fall of the German War Machine, 1918-1945 (New York, 
Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2006), 253. 
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soon to your family."6 It is evident that German families, even though they were 
concerned with the frequent bombing campaigns toward the end of the war, desired to 
have their loved ones return unharmed by the brutality of the war. Thus, soldiers and their 
families did not wish to inflict more stress upon one another. This evoked true human 
compassion between family members during a truly bloody era of German history. As 
difficult as it must have been, German families remained diligent evoking little evidence 
of complaints of war time conditions. 
Memoirs are important additional sources but require careful evaluation. This is 
due to a myriad of reasons, such as the current political situation, fear of exposing 
experiences that could damage the integrity of fellow comrades, and the amount of 
elapsed time since a particular event occurred. Even though memoirs are valuable sources 
into this particular area of history, much scrutiny is required when examining them. 
Many of these works were composed many years and even decades after the conclusion 
of the Second World War. There is the distinct possibility that an individual's memory of 
events could have distorted his experiences, especially when dealing with the violent and 
brutal nature of war. Guy Sajer's memoir is one of the most celebrated and debated works 
from this era, yet Fritz and Bartov use substantial quotations not as a necessary truth of 
the battles but rather for the emotional and psychological analysis prevalent throughout 
Sajer's text. 
The Wehrmacht's innocence remains a difficult topic when studying the Second 
World War. This was largely due to a myriad of reports that surfaced in the years 
immediately after the end of the conflict in Europe. John Mosier states that German 
6
 Letter to Willy Hiibner. November 4, 1944. Captured German Soldiers' Mail (Feldpostbriefe) in Records 
of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1940-1945. College Park, MD: NARA. Microfilm 
(M2112: Roll 1. Frame 668-669). 
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senior military officials may not have fully recognized the horrendous scale of mass 
murder of the Nazi regime, "it is impossible to argue that they were unaware of the 
crimes German soldiers under their command committed against their uniformed 
opponents."7 Directives from Hitler demanded a brutal war in the East, a war in which 
these officers and generals ordered unto their men. The facts of recorded orders from 
Berlin, such as the "Leaflet for the Conduct of German Soldiers in the Occupied Territory 
of Poland" and "Guidelines for the Conduct of Troops in Russia", support this analysis. 
Historians have been required to reexamine past opinions and facts about the 
conception of the German soldier as a "heroic man for his homeland". Difficulty lies in 
separating truth from propaganda that Goebbels constantly spewed forth from Berlin. 
Siegfried Knappe, in his memoir Soldat: Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936-1949, 
explained that the news available to the German populace was laced with fabrications, 
such as explaining "heroic actions" which translated to heavy casualties. As a family 
member of Gefreiter Friedrich Schiiller wrote on December 14, 1944, "You will have 
received the sad report...that our dear brother Karl died in a 'heroic deed' in the East."8 
The use of such symbolic terminology, which was apparently understood by the German 
masses, signified terrible losses for the German military. 
Accounts and studies from the Eastern Front lay waste to the "clean hands" myth 
of the Wehrmacht and, instead, replace it with a far more unpleasant perspective of 
events. Atrocities and dishonor appear to line pages of historians' texts who now 
investigate the true motives and deeds of the Wehrmacht soldiers fighting in the Russian 
7
 Mosier, 7. 
8
 Letter to Friedrich Schiiller. December 14, 1944. Captured German Soldiers' Mail (Feldpostbriefe) in 
Records of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1940-1945. College Park, MD: NARA. 
Microfilm (M2112: Roll 3, Frame 193-194). 
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lands. The fact that a false myth was propagated after the conclusion of the war indicates 
that dissolving this fabrication has been the topic of much dispute and discussion between 
scholars. While researching the Wehrmacht, it has been difficult to fight the 
preconceptions of a noble German fighting for his family rather than for Nazi ideology. 
Yet, the latter tends to be exactly what these men truly fought for. 
Only in the recent two decades have historians begun to examine German soldiers 
more closely which has led to much controversy concerning the actions and involvement 
of the Wehrmacht. In 1995, the Hamburg Institute for Social Research traveled 
throughout Germany with their controversial exhibit entitled "War of Extermination: 
Crimes of the Wehrmacht, 1941-1944." Due to the immense photographic evidence of 
Wehrmacht soldiers involved in murderous activities in Eastern Europe, the Wehrmacht 
entered a new understanding among public opinion.9 The obvious question arises as to 
why this new information would disrupt so many Germans. Due to politics after the 
Second World War, it appeared that many Germans as well as the global community 
desired to view the men of the Wehrmacht in positive terms rather than fanatical Nazis. 
Omer Bartov, in his book Hitler's Army, provided a new understanding of the 
ferocity that existed in Russia from 1941-1945. In addition, he argues that the Wehrmacht 
was indeed indoctrinated by Hitler and the Nazi propaganda machine, rather than 
adhering to the popular myth that the horrendous actions of Germany were committed 
solely by the SS or Einsatzgruppen. Through an extensive reliance on letters from the 
front, Bartov demonstrates the ferocity and commitment of average German soldiers to 
the Nazi regime. Bartov represents an early attempt by historians to explain the darker 
side of the Wehrmacht as well as disprove the popular myth that these soldiers were 
9
 Wette, 296-297. 
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serving Germany and not the Nazi regime. To a certain degree, Bartov's central argument 
laid a sturdy foundation for Daniel Goldhagen's book Hitler's Willing Executioners 
through the indictment of average Germans' murderous actions during the Second World 
War. 
Stephen Fritz's book Frontsoldaten elaborates on Bartov's approach to the 
Wehrmacht via letters. However, Fritz attempts to analyze the men from the grass roots 
approach that follows soldiers from training to the front line of combat. His primary 
objective is to analyze the men from the most personal perspective via letters. 
Interestingly, Fritz's research leads him to a similar conclusion as that of Bartov 
concerning the Wehrmacht. Nazi propaganda, harsh training, and brutal conditions at the 
front combine to create the Nazified Wehrmacht force which committed horrendous 
atrocities throughout the course of the war. Fritz explains that he was shocked at the 
evidence (specifically in the title of his last chapter A Bitter Truth), but there is little room 
for apology in his convincing analysis of these men. His work represents one of the most 
in-depth studies concerning the men of the Wehrmacht. 
Wolfram Wette's book, entitled The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality, follows 
alongside Bartov in which the Wehrmacht is indicted for its mistreatment of POWs and 
civilians. Much of the reasoning behind this fascinating book was due to the outrage 
concerning the controversial exhibit entitled The German Army and Genocide in March 
1995 by the Hamburg Institute for Social Research. Wette provides an excellent history 
of the Wehrmacht and its transformation during the Second World War as well as how 
Hitler was able to control the military. Wette approaches the important issue of the myth 
of the clean hands of the Wehrmacht that is just now becoming a topic of interest among 
10 
historians. Therefore, he attempts to argue that the Wehrmacht was not innocent in terms 
of the crimes committed by the Nazi regime; rather, the military willingly worked 
alongside SS and Einsatzgruppen forces to destroy Jews, POWs and anyone else who was 
not Aryan. 
John Mosier explains in detail the German war machine and the Wehrmacht in 
particular throughout his book Cross of Iron. One of his central arguments illustrates the 
brutality of the Wehrmacht directed toward their enemy forces. Citing atrocities as early 
as 1939 in Poland, Mosier demonstrates that the German military lost its honor when 
officers allowed their men to murder indiscriminately. Although he focuses much more 
on the militarization of Germany after the First World War, Mosier does create an 
interesting dialogue dealing with the myths and realities of the Wehrmacht that emerged 
after the conclusion of the war. Wette and Mosier set out to disprove the popular myth 
that the Wehrmacht was an innocent force misled by Nazi leadership. He claims that 
there guilt was far more widespread than once believed and that due to the inadequate 
indictments of German soldiers at Nuremberg we will never truly know the extent of the 
Wehrmacht7s guilt. 
The men who are presented in this analysis represent the darker side of the war. 
By no means does this paper attempt to categorize all Germans who fought during the 
Second World War. Assumptions upon whole groups of individuals lead directly to 
misconceptions as well as stereotyping. Therefore, this research does not attempt to place 
a simplistic label on members of the Wehrmacht; rather, an understanding of the men on 
the front line via correspondence is the primary theme of this analysis. Much of this 
newly examined material comes from a heavy influence from Steven Fritz's 
11 
groundbreaking work Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in World War II, which deals 
directly with the men of the Wehrmacht. When understanding the violence that erupted 
all across the vast Eastern Front, it is vital to have knowledge of the men's training and 
experiences that would lead them to commit such atrocities when Operation Barbarossa 
was launched on June 22, 1941. Dr. Fritz's sources were primarily focused on letters and 
diaries of the average German soldier during their combat and training experiences. Thus, 
by examining numerous letters and memoirs of former soldiers presents an interesting 
insight into the mental and physical struggles of the average Landser ("German soldier 
on the Eastern Front"). 
When first addressing this difficult topic, the attempt was made to examine the 
Wehrmacht soldier in a more positive perspective. This has proven difficult when reading 
numerous eyewitness accounts of their murderous directives towards Jewish populations 
and Slavic peoples. Throughout the 1930s, the Nazi regime bombarded German civilians, 
Hitler Youth, and future soldiers with concepts of racial superiority and the notion of the 
Volk. Nationalism thus strengthened the sense of communal welfare rather than 
individualism throughout Germany, providing the foundation for murder in the name of 
the Reich. 
The incredibly brutal war in the East fully erupted with the onset of Operation 
Barbarossa (the codename given to the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941). 
However, it remains important to realize that the invasion of Poland on September 1, 
1939 served as a training ground for German soldiers as well as members of the 
Einsatzgruppen. Wehrmacht forces aided the SS in the capture of partisans, Jews, and 
other undesirables. In turn, these individuals were transferred to SS and Einsatzgruppen 
12 
units. Therefore, without the aid of the German Army, millions of Jews and Soviet POWs 
would not have been brutally treated by their German subjugators. 
A decisive perversion toward military discipline along with ideological 
propaganda allowed the Wehrmacht, SS, and Einsatzgruppen to murder millions of 
civilians and Jews. In a system that promoted hatred of individuals based solely on their 
race, extermination became a usual commonplace among soldiers. How can these men be 
held accountable to their action when those in charge encouraged and even ordered such 
behavior? It proves vital when confronting this issue to read the letters and personal 
beliefs of the soldiers who committed these horrendous crimes. However, there are those 
soldiers who did not speak of such atrocities due to the demoralizing effect this would 
have had upon their families. Others, though, described these crimes in great detail to 
loved ones which served a very important purpose of maintaining support for the war out 
of fear of Bolshevism. 
How does one define honor and discipline among the army? The Wehrmacht 
reflected their constant concern for honor and discipline among the soldiers, yet this 
military ideal systematically broke down as soon as the invasion of Poland on September 
1, 1939 was initiated. Thus, for the generals of the German Army to concern themselves 
with military honor is in itself a preconceived fabrication of Nazi ideology. Hitler deemed 
it necessary to rid Europe of Untermenschen, which provided the foundation for military 
corruption on the battlefield. How can one group, such as the Einsatzgruppen, commit 
horrendous atrocities while the other, the Wehrmacht, be expected to fight a noble battle 
for the good of the Fatherland and continental Europe? This dilemma proved difficult to 
maintain on the battlefield where murder was encouraged and a daily occurrence. 
13 
Numerous accounts of German soldiers refer to encounters with partisans 
throughout the Eastern Front. Many of these partisan forces, thanks to the well 
orchestrated Nazi propaganda machine, were believed to be Jewish Bolsheviks. This term 
partisan proved a popular reference to the civilians who resisted the German invader. In 
essence, the way in which the Germans envisioned their enemies of civilian rank 
provided many with the excuse to execute these individuals on the spot without any trial 
whatsoever. 
A controversial aspect of the actions of the Wehrmacht needs to be addressed in 
which many scholars tend to place blame upon the shoulders of the high-ranking Nazi 
officials operating from offices within the Reich. It is one thing to direct orders from a 
desk hundreds of miles from the front; however, it is something else to actually perform 
the ideological programs in the battlefield. As Mosier elucidates, "the officers of the 
Wehrmacht allowed one of the oldest and greatest armies in the world to descend to the 
level of thugs in uniform."10 Therefore, without the men of the Wehrmacht, the supposed 
answer to the Jewish Question would never have been attempted. Soldiers who lived and 
died at the front must have been swayed by their own personal convictions or biases to 
execute the orders from Germany. It also seems natural from our [western] perspective to 
place blame on those in high-ranking positions, yet this would incorrectly assign the Nazi 
regime's philosophy to those who directed such brutal pogroms. In the end, it was the 
men of the Wehrmacht who ultimately destroyed the honor and discipline of the military. 
Only through their actions, and their actions alone, could the crimes that befell millions 
of Jews, Slavs, and other Untermenschen have been implemented. 
10
 Mosier, 256. 
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Chapter 1: 
Primary Source Material 
The letters obtained for this study are from the United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum in Washington, D.C. as well as from the National Archives and Research 
Administration (NARA) located in Maryland. Many of the letters from the Holocaust 
Museum were translated by Dr. William Meinecke, while the microfilmed letters found at 
NARA required translation. While hundreds of letters were obtained at NARA, many 
simply discussed the current situation of the soldier including the weather and his longing 
for his wife, girlfriend, or family. Emotional discussions from the soldiers were sparse, 
which is understandable when placing the letter in this familial context. Most likely, these 
men did not wish to burden their family and friends with gruesome details from the front 
line. What remains a constant theme throughout the majority of letters was a description 
of the weather situation and brief accounts of enemy engagements. 
While NARA does offer a glimpse into the immense research possibilities of 
Feldpostbriefe [translated as "letters from the front"], the majority of German soldiers' 
letters remain in German archives. The main problem with these sources is the limited 
amount of information available to create a clearer understanding of the circumstances 
surrounding each letter or group of letters. Thus, the letters are preserved in microfilm in 
their most basic uncensored condition. While this allows researchers to expose the 
pureness of this information, little more is known concerning the authors of the 
15 
correspondence. According to NARA, the letters were captured during the fall and early 
winter 1944-1945. They were dated anywhere from September 1944 to January 1945. 
The addresses provided the destinations which included Germany, occupied Poland, 
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. 
The postal system caused much concern for the families of soldiers due to the 
increased bombing campaigns throughout Germany as the war prolonged. It was difficult 
for many family members to determine if their loved ones ever received their letters. 
Whether this was due to censorship or just circumstantial remains difficult to effectively 
determine. In a letter to Gefreiter Manfred Schramm, one of his children wrote: "I have 
not heard anything from you since October 30. I wrote you each week and still nothing 
has come back."11 The postal system was interrupted by the constant bombing of major 
German cities as well as the flow of information to and from the immense front. 
Many soldiers' letters speak of a longing to see their loved ones. One soldier, 
Obergefreiter Alfred Radner, wrote to his wife on November 27, 1944 that ".. .it seems so 
long until I will get to see you on my brief vacation.... [T]he distance gnaws at me the 
longer I am away from you my dear."12 As the war progressed, fewer military leaves 
were granted unto the men at the front which produced these immense feelings of 
yearning of reunions with loved ones. Another soldier explained to his wife in a letter 
from November 3, 1944, "Darling, I have a very large longing for you and I always think 
of you.... I love you so."13 These emotions emitted from German soldiers are typical of 
" Letter to Manfred Schramm. December 17, 1944. Captured German Soldiers' Mail (Feldpostbriefe) in 
Records of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1940-1945. College Park, MD: NARA. 
Microfilm (M2112: Roll 3, Frame 196-197). 
12
 Radner, Alfred. November 27, 1944 ["?].Captured German Soldiers' Mail (Feldpostbriefe) in Records of 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1940-1945. College Park, MD: NARA. Microfilm 
(M2112: Roll 3, Frame 56-57). 
1J
 Illegible name. November 3, 1944. Captured German Soldiers' Mail (Feldpostbriefe) in Records of the 
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men away at war and far from their loved ones. In essence this evidence provides the 
reader with a better understanding of these men who fought for Nazi Germany. The 
average soldier had families who loved them, missed them, and longed to be reunited 
with them after the war concluded. 
Censorship of letters presents a difficult issue when examining letters from the 
front. As the war progressed, the military and government censor was too busy and 
overwhelmed with the approaching enemy to read every letter before they were entered 
into the postal service. Since the majority of the letters obtained from NARA are from 
late 1944, soldiers and family members were able to express discontent or dread 
concerning the deterioration of the war effort. Thus, many letters speak frankly about the 
conditions at home and on the front, but there is little criticism directed toward the Nazi 
regime. However, the hopelessness of the war and the inevitability of defeat were evident 
in this correspondence during the latter portion of the war. In late November 1944, 
Joseph Surmely explained somberly: "Nobody knows what the next morning will bring. 
If we will still be able to stop the enemy...that is the question.... Do we have to flee and 
where then?"14 As the Allies encircled the remaining German forces, many soldiers 
wondered what the next course of action would be. 
The ideological war that ensued was well ingrained upon the minds of most 
Wehrmacht soldiers. Joseph Surmely wrote on November 20, 1944 "I really have no time 
for thinking. This is the routine from 7 to 7 o'clock [each day]. Thus one is fully used for 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1940-1945. College Park, MD: NARA. Microfilm (M2112: 
Roll 1, Frame 563). 
14
 Surmely, Joseph. November 20, 1944. Captured German Soldiers' Mail (Feldpostbriefe) in Records of 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1940-1945. College Park, MD: NARA. Microfilm 
(M2112: Roll 1, Frame 678-679). 
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the final victory."15 Even at this late stage of the war, Surmely still believed in victory 
over Germany's enemies. One soldier, Alfred Trost, wrote in December 1944: "For the 
sixth time we are committed to the war. One of the hardest years of struggle lies behind 
us once again. At all fronts the fight has inconceivably increased."16 Even as defeat 
loomed on the horizon, the Nazi regime still maintained the propagandistic phrases in 
hopes of raising morale. The Office of Strategic Services explained how "the propaganda 
machine is...making every effort to encourage optimism among the masses, even going 
1 7 
so far as announcing victories of the German army before they have...occurred." These 
critical claims were vital when the war began its downfall after 1942. 
Some soldiers bluntly stated their views of Jews and their Russian enemies which 
were allowed even with possible correspondence censorship. The Holocaust Museum in 
Washington, D.C. provided several letters from German soldiers who viewed their 
enemies from the Nazi perspective. However, it is worth noting that these letters were 
from the early portions of the war. It would be interesting to note any differences in 
opinion or preconceived notions from these same men or others throughout the course of 
the war. Medical corporal Paul Lenz agreed by explaining rather bluntly, "Only a Jew can 
be a Bolshevik...for this blood-sucker there can be nothing nicer than to be a 
Bolshevik.... Wherever one spits one finds a Jew."18 Karl Fuchs described the Russian 
enemy in August 1941: "There is no troop morale and they are at best cannon 
15
 Surmely, Joseph. November 20, 1944. Captured German Soldiers' Mail (Feldpostbriefe) in Records of 
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). 1940-1945. College Park, MD: NARA. Microfilm 
(M2112: Roll 1, Frame 678-679). 
16
 Trost, Alfred. December 1944. Captured German Soldiers' Mail (Feldpostbriefe) in Records of the 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1940-1945. College Park, MD: NARA. Microfilm (M2112: 
Roll 3, Frame 66-67). 
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 Unknown author. 1941 [?]. Washington Director's Office Administrative Files in Records of the Office 
of Strategic Services (OSS). 1941-1945. College Park, MD: NARA. Microfilm (Ml 642: Roll 22, 
Frame 700-701). 
18
 Lenz, Paul, soldier's letter, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. 
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fodder...they are nothing but a bunch of assholes! Everyone, even the last doubter, 
knows today that the battle against these subhumans, who've been whipped into a frenzy 
by the Jews, was not only necessary but came in the nick of time... Our Fuhrer has saved 
Europe from certain chaos."19 Another soldier, writing on July 28, 1941, explained 
"recently things have been totally crazy.... All the prisoners I encounter are killed, 
there's no two ways about it. This has been our motto in the infantry for some time 
20 
now." Another soldier, Karl Fuchs, sounding more like a propaganda pamphlet, 
expressed his hatred for the Russian POWs: "Hardly ever do you see the face of a person 
who seems rational and intelligent. They all look emaciated and the wild, half-crazy look 
in their eyes makes them look like imbeciles. [How] could these scoundrels, led by Jews 91 
and criminals, want to imprint their stamp on Europe?" Fuchs' appeared astounded that 
these so-called criminals could actually believe they could control the European 
continent. Private Fred Fallnbigl wrote in July 1941, "Now I know what war really 
means. But I also know that we had been forced into the war against the Soviet Union. 
For God have mercy on us, had we waited, or had these beasts come to us. For them even 
the most horrible death is still too good. I am glad that I can be here to put an end to this 
99 
genocidal system." 
When examining the Wehrmacht's correspondence, one comes to realize that the 
men dealt with suffering, horrible front line conditions, fatigue, and an incredible amount 
of stress. One soldier wrote from the front late in the war that "one must resign oneself. 
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Each man is used for the defense of German soil. But...first the enemy must conquer the 
mountains." In addition to the conditions at the front, news from home was usually 
somber particularly in the latter portion of the war. As a family member of Gefreiter 
Friedrich Schiiller wrote on December 14, 1944, "You will have received the sad 
report...that our dear brother Karl died in a 'heroic deed' in 
the East." This "heroic 
deed" was the Nazi propaganda equivalence of heavy losses, such as at Stalingrad during 
the winter of 1942-1943. Families familiarized themselves with these statements from the 
Nazi-controlled press which prepared them for news of horrendous losses of German 
soldiers. 
Lack of materiel resulted with the Wehrmacht entering into stalemate trench 
warfare. It is evident through letters from family members that they knew of the scarcity 
of accommodations available for the average soldier. In a letter to Karl Wohlfarth, his 
family inquired: "The place you are now is, as you wrote, a Kaff ["dump" or "hole"]. Is 
that a small village at the front? What do you have for accommodations or privacy? And 
how is the food supply?"25 It is important to understand that this particular individual 
wrote to Wohlfarth in the latter portion of the war in which basic necessities were in short 
supply. One soldier explained the living conditions when he stated "since we have no 
beds, we remained exempted from quartering. As soldiers, we had to accept our 
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situation." Although this particular soldier willingly dealt with his current situation as a 
trained soldier, there is a tinge of depression evident in his current state of affairs on the 
front. 
Weather appears many times in letters as a main topic for many soldiers situated 
on the Eastern Front. Since it is well-known that the brutal Russian winter effectively 
halted the German advance in late 1941, it is no surprise that weather is discussed at great 
lengths in numerous letters from average soldiers. One soldier wrote that "the weather is 
somewhat better. [H]ere it rains this afternoon, but it is okay as long as I can hopefully 
97 
sleep at night." As many historians have concluded, weather during the Second World 
War played an integral part of German operations in Russia. The horrendous cold of 
winter or torrential downpours could halt troop movements, advances, or retreats. 
The psychology of warfare and its effects on soldiers drove many men to become 
products of their environment. Actions that would have normally appalled these men 
were not completed without hesitation. One soldier wrote during the initial stages of the 
invasion into the Soviet Union in 1941: "It's like growing a shell around what's almost 
impenetrable. But what happens inside this shell? You become part of a mass, a 
component of a relentless whole which sucks you up and squeezes you into a mold. You 
9X 
become gross and insensible. You cease to be yourself." These men lived a harsh and 
demanding life on the front lines as death surrounded them on a daily basis. One 
unnamed soldier on November 17, 1944 wrote how the war "happens in our proximity. 
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Nevertheless, we have good hope that we can hold the positions until our counterstrike 
comes. Then you will see what happens with our opponents. We are naturally prepared 
9Q 
for everything here." As one soldier explained regarding the constant explosions and 
death surrounding him on a daily basis: "You see, one simply changes due to the given 
OA 
state of affairs and then moves on!" Soldiers on the Russian Front were forced to stay 
together due to the situation created early in the campaign as well as the fact that they 
were isolated in the vastness of Russian territory. An unnamed soldier wrote simply that 
o | 
"cannon thunder is our daily companion." 
While violence towards civilians, partisan forces, and prisoners of war is the main 
emphasis of this analysis, letters of German soldiers provide a much-needed evaluation of 
the average man during a time of war. Letters, rather than memoirs, allow researchers to 
gain valuable evidence into the mindset of men who committed horrendous atrocities. 
Due to the sheer volume of letters scripted during the Second World War, my initial 
primary research is relatively limited when considering the information that has yet to be 
discovered. However, there are clues in the letters from NARA and the Holocaust 
Museum which allow for analysis on this difficult and expansive topic. 
The most important pieces of evidence are those in which German soldiers openly 
discuss atrocities by their fellow comrades. Letters and diary entries that deal with this 
topic provide vital insight into the men of the Wehrmacht. In 1943, Greek civilians were 
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massacred by German forces. A soldier from this event who served in the elite 1st 
Mountain Division was questioned in 1971 concerning this event: "[M]ost of the soldiers 
did not agree with this action...Many said openly that it was nothing but a disgrace 
[Schweinerei] to shoot unarmed civilians. Others, rather fewer, took the view that they 
were all a potential enemy so long as they supported the partisans against us soldiers. The 
argument was so heated that I might almost speak of a mutiny."32 While this piece of 
evidence is important in the realm of this particular topic, the interview should be 
scrutinized just as much as memoirs in terms of reality and circumstances after the war. 
This is not to suggest that this evidence is not valid, though; rather, because this 
individual disclosed this information more than twenty years after the conclusion of the 
war, his analysis requires more scrutiny. This is why letters and diaries provide such an 
important source when gathering data concerning the current mindset of people involved 
in specific circumstances. 
An unnamed soldier fighting on the Eastern Front in July 1941 explained: "This 
time an end will certainly be put to this God-hating power...evidence of Jewish, 
Bolshevik atrocities, the likes of which I have hardly believed possible.... You can well 
imagine that this cries for revenge, which we certainly also take." Albert Rodenbusch of 
the 635th Training Regiment involved in an anti-partisan campaign in Belorussia 
explained an interesting circumstance: 
The people from the village provided us with heated rooms and gave us 
food, so we were very surprised when the company commander later 
ordered us to burn down the village and arrest the village people...Our 
company commander ordered us to occupy the village and to kill on sight 
anyone offering resistance or attempting to flee....We shot about 70 
people. Among them also women, old people and children. And then we 
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burnt down the village. From the first village we took 14 head of cattle 
and from the second village 10 head of cattle.34 
He continues with more details of another anti-partisan campaign: 
On the evening of 29 December 1942 we started our operation in a village. 
There were no partisans in this village. The people from the village 
provided us with heated rooms and gave us food, so we were very 
surprised when the company commander later ordered us to burn down the 
village and arrest the village people. So 50 inhabitants were taken 
prisoner.... We were then moved on to another village. It was about 10 or 
11 kilometers away. On our arrival we came under fire from rifles. Our 
company commander ordered us to occupy the village and to kill on sight 
anyone offering resistance or attempting to flee.... We shot about 70 
people. Among them also women, old people and children. And then we 
burnt down the village. From the first village we took 14 head of cattle 
and from the second village 10 head of cattle. We then proceeded to the 
third village. We didn't come across any partisans there. But we still burnt 
down the village and shot around 50 people. Even women and children. 
And then we moved on to the fourth village and did exactly the same as 
we had done in the other villages. There we shot about 100 people, burnt 
down the village and made 80 arrests. We took them with us. After we had 
destroyed all these villages we moved on towards Osipovichi. On our way 
there we combed the woods in search of partisans.35 
Rodenbusch explained in detail the murderous campaign without much emotion 
concerning those criminals who were executed. His account reads similar to an outline of 
events with no reflection of the deeds in which he was involved. 
After the Second World War, veterans of the Wehrmacht were interviewed 
concerning their tour of duty. One such veteran stated in an interview: 
I was...more inclined to say, alright, it's not to your taste what they are 
expecting of you,...but if from the point of view of the state and our 
philosophy this is required, well for God's sake, you'll have to do your 
duty, you must summon up the necessary understanding to say that this 
just has to be done. Fulfilling your duty is very close to the spirit of 
sacrifice...There were things where you simply accepted that you have to 
j 4
 Meinecke and Skidmore, Examining the role of the German military, letters from German soldiers on the 
Eastern Front. 
j 5
 Rodenbusch, Albert, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. 
24 
participate, because the whole thing, the collective purpose, just requires 
you to do it.36 
Another veteran who was interviewed after the war explained, "Well for me, being a 
soldierly person means encountering another man with a clean and decent attitude, it 
means representing viewpoints which conform with universal moral laws. But 
soldierliness also means showing...courage..., not in the sense that you are brave if you 
kill your enemy before he kills you, but as a strong inner conviction towards problems 
you encounter in private and personal life." 
Many of the letters from the soldiers convey extreme thanks to their families and 
friends for their letters. Any news from home must have greeted these individuals with 
happiness which could temporarily displace their horrors of battle. Sometimes the 
thought of knowing ones loved ones were safe and healthy could mean the most to men 
fighting on the front lines. As one soldier explained in the opening of his letter from 
November 11, 1944, "Your letter from the 11th was received with much thanks."38 One 
can imagine how difficult it would have been for these men to write to their families if 
they were constantly engaged in combat with enemy forces. Yet, as the war progressed 
and bombings of German cities were conducted on a daily basis, letters from home 
contained frightening realities for the average soldier. More research is required, but this 
information from the German home front to the soldiers was certainly capable of 
damaging morale during the latter portions of the war. 
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A large majority of letters obtained from NARA were written from the families of 
German soldiers. These sources, which are primarily from the later portion of the war, 
provide an understanding into the daily lives of German people under constant 
bombardment from Allied aircraft. By February 1945 approximately 350,000 German 
QQ 
civilians were killed during air raids conducted by the Allies. There is little doubt that 
this news from the home front enraged soldiers who were unable to defend their own 
families. The families of soldiers presented members of the Wehrmacht with a motive for 
revenge. The bombing conducted by the Allies weighed heavily upon the average 
German soldier who was helpless to aid his family and friends. In a letter to Klaus 
Willems, the author states: "All life is in disorder. We had to move to the ditches at the 
barrack. Before we were there, we could have been killed by the bombs.... Fortunately 
no bombs fell."40 In another example, Karl Wohlfarth's family wrote to him of the 
terrible news concerning the aftermath of an air raid: "We just saw in the newspaper the 
attack yesterday on Braunschweig was a very strong Terrorangriff^terror attack", which 
described bombings] with apparently very heavy damage and many victims; [there] are 
many dead and thousands of people are homeless."41 
Upon hearing news of the conditions at home, soldiers were surely disheartened 
and strengthened to fight harder against enemy forces. Alfred Trost wrote "the homeland 
became the front than in the past war...still victims were added at lives and 
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property...afflicted by hostile air terror."42 In addition, the pressure of bombing 
campaigns in their hometowns, German soldiers continued the fight against the Allies for 
fear of what would enter into their world if they lost the war. In a letter from the familiy 
of Oberjager Karl Wohlfarth, they speak of a terrifying experience: "Last night at 8:00 
enemy aircraft quickly approached and the announcement came on saying that south of 
Hanover bombs already cracked. Doors and windows were shut and we had to expect the 
worst. Thank God that we and our environment remained spared."43 News such as this 
caused great concern for soldiers far from home engaged with enemy forces. Since air 
superiority was lost over Germany, the families of these men were vulnerable to daily 
bombardments by Allied bombers. 
Another common theme throughout many of the letters from family members 
focused on the tremendous concern for their son or husband fighting. In a letter to Willy 
Hiibner, his family explained: "The main thing is [that] you remain healthy and return 
soon to your family."44 It is evident that German families, even though they were 
concerned with the frequent bombing campaigns toward the end of the war, desired to 
have their loved ones return unharmed by the brutality of the war. In a letter to Karl 
Wohlfarth, his family inquires about his condition: "[H]ow are you? Hopefully well. Did 
your wound heal completely and do you have no more complaints? You have written 
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nothing about your personal condition."43 Thus, soldiers and their families did not wish to 
inflict more stress upon one another. This evoked true human compassion between family 
members during a truly bloody era of German history. A letter from a woman in Berlin to 
her husband on the Eastern Front, explained: "We think so often of you now when we 
read about the heavy defensive fights in the newspapers. We are always in constant 
concern for you!"46 As difficult as it must have been, German families remained diligent 
to expose little evidence of complaints of war time conditions. One unnamed soldier 
wrote home to his wife about his wound and how it was healing. He explains that "my 
hand is now green and blue.. .but today it does not cause me too much pain."47 
Surrender also proved difficult for German civilians who had been indoctrinated 
by the Nazi regime about the hardships that would follow if Russia overtook Germany. In 
a report from G. Edward Buxton at the OSS, he explained via a source in Bern the 
perspective of the average German citizen toward unconditional surrender: 
Here is what is reported to me as the views of a German woman who is a 
servant in a private family. This person imagines...that the chaos she saw 
in Germany after the last was will be repeated, plus the inflation in which 
her family lost everything. In addition, she sees the Jews returning to take 
over her brother's business; she sees Russians everywhere, and joins with 
them the bad elements in her own village, who, after the war, were first 
Communists, then Nazis, and ultimately Gestapo.... It is not so much her 
pride as a German which makes her oppose unconditional surrender, as it 
is the practical certainty which she feels that under such circumstances it 
would really be better to be dead. She is personally quite sick of Goebbels' 
propaganda, but, like a vast number of women in Germany, she feels that 
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her country's only hope is to cling like death to Hitler and to pray that he 
48 
may find a way to save the Fatherland. 
Families from home wrote to soldiers explaining their fear of the invading Allies. In a 
letter to Willy Hiibner, the author explained "even if the Russian and Anglo-
Americans... should penetrate further, however, all is over.... But the fact that the 
Russians will come into our beautiful Pommerland, I do not believe it [could 
happen],... [if so] everything is lost."49 All optimism of a victory has disappeared, leaving 
the struggle to preserve Germany from the invading enemy armies from all directions. 
The letters from NARA represent a unique insight into the research that is 
required to fully extrapolate a more comprehensive assessment of the Wehrmacht's role 
in atrocities. This preliminary research examines an extremely minute sample of letters 
considering the billions which were written during the course of the war. The sheer 
volume of German soldiers' letters from the front during the Second World War helps to 
demonstrate the immensity of this fascinating research. 
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Chapter 2: 
The Wehrmacht 
By that time I belonged to the Victorious Allies, who were all heroes, like every 
French soldier I met after the war. Only victors have stories to tell. We, the 
vanquished, were all cowards and weaklings by then, whose memories, fears, and 
enthusiasms should not be remembered. -Guy Sajer50 
A good man ought to love his friends and county, and should share their hatreds 
and their loyalties. But once a man takes up the role of historian he must discard 
all considerations of this kind. He will often have to speak well of his enemies and 
even award them the highest praise should their actions demand this, and on the 
other hand criticize and find fault with his friends, however close they may be, if 
their errors of conduct show that this is his duty. For just as a living creature, if 
deprived of its eyesight, is rendered completely helpless, so if history is deprived 
of the truth, we are left with nothing but an idle, unprofitable tale... We must 
therefore detach ourselves from the actors in the story, and apply to them only 
such statements and judgments as their conduct deserves. -Polybius31 
Although there remains much debate concerning the Wehrmacht's actions during 
the Second World War, the historical context of this fighting force must first be explained 
in order to contextualize the conditions from which millions of German troops derived. 
From our modern understanding, German soldiers comprised a formidable foe for the 
Russian Red Army as well as the Western Allies comprising of British, American, and 
French militaries. The Wehrmacht's training allowed for strength in both large battalion-
sized forces as well as in smaller platoon regiments. From memoirs of soldiers along with 
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numerous letters from these men, it is evident that the Germans valued victorious 
outcomes of battle, regardless of the brutality inflicted on the enemy. It may appear 
severe when learning of the punishments and disciplinary actions of the Wehrmacht, yet 
these measures allowed the men to become battle hardened veterans of the Eastern Front. 
Another aspect when viewing the German Army relies upon our understanding that they 
had a clear objective and fought bravely for the aims of the Nazi regime. These objectives 
weighed heavily upon the hearts and minds of the soldiers fighting to preserve Germany 
and rid the European continent of Bolshevism. 
In order to completely understand the Third Reich's war against Bolshevism, it is 
vital to understand the creation of the Wehrmacht with regards to Hitler and the Nazi 
regime. Due to the initial chaos after the defeat of Germany after the First World War, 
Communists and Socialists were competing for power throughout Germany. According 
to John Mosier, "by January 1919, Germany was in the middle of a civil war, while at the 
same time it was threatened by external forces. The brutal fighting of those years would 
set the course of the Wehrmacht, giving it a taste of success and, perhaps more important, 
a thirst for blood."52 The primary actors in this tumultuous era of German history were 
the Freikorps. The men of these brutal groups of street fighters worked to bring justice to 
the streets of Berlin and throughout Germany, working alongside the recently formed 
National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP). The primary goal of the Freikorps 
was to rid Germany from the Communists and Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) and 
restore some sort of order to the streets of Germany. It is important to note that these men 
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were oftentimes veterans from the defeated German Army of 1918 who were uncertain 
about the condition of their country concerning the Versailles Treaty of 1919. 
The Treaty of Versailles inflicted a damaging toll on Germany and its people. Not 
only was Germany's active military devastated by the casualties of the First World War, 
but the number of soldiers allowed national defense was greatly reduced. This lack of 
military protection left the Germans in a state of vulnerability, especially from 
communists and socialists. In addition to the reduction of the militia, many of the 
territories occupied by Germany, including those freshly dominated during the war were 
taken away and put under control by other nations. This severely affected the economy 
and the confidence of the German people. Another detail of the economy-destroying 
penance that Germany would have to undergo was paying reparations to other countries 
that were devastated during the war. In addition to these overwhelming changes, many of 
the nation's leaders were put on trial by the Allies. 
German officials felt obliged to cooperate with the Allies and their policies due to 
the post-war economic situation. The main criminal from the Allies' perspective, Kaiser 
53 
Wilhelm II, was believed to be guilty of "having initiated a war of aggression." The 
Kaiser fled to Holland instead of remaining with his country in its desperate time of need. 
The Versailles peace treaty included "a list of 854 persons they [Allies] wanted the 
Germans to surrender.'04 Germans felt they had no choice except to agree, for an 
invasion after non-compliance would have potentially robbed them of all their freedom. 
The Belgians and the French concluded that the trails were not enough to resolve peace 
of mind to their countries. These two countries were the only representatives of the 
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League of Nations that "subsequently began trying hundreds of accused Germans in 
absentia, a process that was halted only after the signing of the Locarno treaty of 1925."55 
These war trails began in 1921 and further fueled hatred toward Germany by Belgium 
and France. A country that was once a major world power was now subjected to trials by 
other countries without sufficient ways to protect their comrades. 
At the conclusion of the First World War, Germany became susceptible to foreign 
political influences, especially those of the communist persuasion. The Freikorps were 
designed to combat the communist threat in post war Germany. Mosier explains that "it is 
difficult to find a senior officer of the German army in the Second World War who was 
not involved at some level with the Freikorps. And in these bloody struggles, the future 
officers tasted real victory."56 Ultimately, the daily brutality prevalent on the Eastern 
Front derived significant influences from street fighting during the turbulent times after 
the First World War. Therefore, the men who would comprise the Wehrmacht during the 
1930s gained military credentials in defending Germany from outsiders and fighting for a 
cause considered to decide the future of their nation. 
After Adolf Hitler obtained power in 1933, Germany initiated a massive military 
rearmament program aimed at an eventual conflict with European neighbors. The reality 
of the military buildup also required a tremendous amount of manpower. We often do not 
realize the true magnitude of individuals involved in one way or another with the German 
military throughout the Second World War. "During the Second World War," as 
Wolfram Wette makes clear, "approximately 20 million German men—that is, roughly 
50 percent of all male citizens—performed military service. Precise figures are hard to 
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come by, but if one assumes that between 1 and 2 million of them were volunteers, that 
leaves between 18 and 19 million who were drafted in other words, forced to serve. This 
means that the armed forces of the Third Reich were overwhelmingly an army of 
conscripts, with a relatively small percentage of career soldiers and volunteers."57 The 
importance of a volunteer force versus a conscripted force requires a different perspective 
toward the eventual atrocities committed on the Eastern Front. Why would numerous 
conscripts act in such a brutal nature? As John Mosier explains: 
In the eighteenth century, it was well understood that armies were 
repositories not only of military prowess and valor but also of national 
virtue...War is a dirty business, a series of slaughters in which there is 
much that is bad as well as horrific. But that does not make the men who 
wage it wicked. On the contrary; as Frederick the Great told his assembled 
officers in 1778: 'Before all things, I prescribe as you most sacred duty 
that in every situation you exercise humanity on our unarmed enemies. No 
matter how brilliant or amiable they appear, the officers of the Wehrmacht 
allowed one of the oldest and greatest armies in the world to descend to 
the level of thugs in uniform. As von der Marwitz's epitaph makes clear, 
when honor is gone, nothing remains. At some point in September 1939, 
that legacy was massacred and thrown into the ditch along with three 
hundred Polish soldiers. The army lost more than the war; it lost its 
honor.58 
Virtue and honor could not coincide with a campaign based primarily on the utter 
annihilation of an enemy force and its people. 
The German military has been considered among scholars as one of the best 
fighting forces in the twentieth century. Through rigorous training, the soldiers of the 
Wehrmacht were quick to adapt to the brutal surroundings from 1941 to 1945. As Guy 
Sajer recalled: 
Basic training in the infantry, where they send me next, is less amusing 
than the life of an aviator. The combat course is the most severe physical 
challenge I have ever experienced. I am exhausted, and several times fall 
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asleep over my food. But I feel marvelous, filled with a sense of joy which 
I can't understand after so much fear and apprehension.... Exhausted, 
soaked to the skin, we fling ourselves onto our mattresses every evening, 
overwhelmed by a crushing sleep, without even the energy to write to our 
families.59 
The intensity of training prepared the soldiers for the difficulties of the Eastern Front. 
Many of the soldiers despised their training instructors, but when they arrived in Russia 
they understood the reasoning for their harshness of the incessant military exercises. 
Initial victories in France and Poland added to the confidence of the army's 
potential. As Gottlob Bidermann explains in his memoir, "ecstatic headlines announced 
that more than 2,582 Soviet aircraft and 1,297 Soviet tanks had been destroyed. Soviet-
occupied Poland was being freed from the Bolshevik yoke."60 The illusion of 
invincibility was later shattered in Russia, but before June 22, 1941, this perspective 
reigned supreme. Even in the face of certain defeat, German soldiers were recognized for 
their relentless fighting spirit. As Guy Sajer recalls on the German Army's retreat from 
Russia: "Through our panic and despair, an order became a duty. Our adversaries were 
astonished by the courage of ordinary German soldiers...We performed deeds of 
astonishing heroism, which demonstrated once again the extraordinary resourcefulness of 
our soldiers...An army fighting for its life cannot speak of victory."61 Even though they 
knew defeat was inevitable in the last stages of the war, the Wehrmacht maintained a 
distinguished fighting spirit that remained in the historical memory. Families from home 
wrote to soldiers concerning their fear from the invading Allies. In a letter to Willy 
Hiibner, the author explained "even if the Russian and Anglo-Americans...should 
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penetrate further, however, all is over.... But the fact that the Russians will come into our 
• 6 2 
beautiful Pommerland, I do not believe it [could happen],...everything is lost.""z From 
the home front, many families express this feeling of loss concerning the war effort, 
which was thus transmitted to the soldier fighting hundreds of miles away. 
The number of Germans who were involved in the German war machine is 
astounding. One out of every four German males was in uniform. In addition, many of 
these men had direct combat experienced that had resulted in victory. On the eve of 
Operation Barbarossa, the Wehrmacht had a total strength of 5 million men, and increase 
from the 3.75 million soldiers of 1939.64 It 
was understood by military officials that this 
vast number of soldiers was necessary when embarking upon the endless Russian front. 
Victory needed to occur quickly or the army would become entrenched on a front that 
would prove too large to occupy even with five million men. Unfortunately for the 
Wehrmacht, Operation Barbarossa progressed with the dreaded stalemate that many 
veterans of the First World War recalled all too clearly. As Guy Sajer expressed, "In 
reality everyone feels considerable emotion. Despite our perfect innocence, the idea of 
war terrifies us."65 The reality of the murderous nature of war became all too clear when 
the Wehrmacht entered the Eastern Front. 
Mechanization of the military was a relatively minute factor when examining the 
German army. The majority of the military relied on horses and carts as the primary 
mode of transportation. While tanks were involved in the Blitzkrieg tactics, troops were 
62
 Letter to Willy Hiibner. November 4, 1944. Captured German Soldiers' Mail (Feldpostbriefe) in Records 
of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1940-1945. College Park, MD: NARA. Microfilm 
(M2112: Roll 1, Frame 668-669). 
63
 Keegan, John, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 174. 
64
 Keegan, 173. 
65
 Sajer, 11. 
36 
forced to rely upon long marches throughout Russia to reach their destination. As the war 
trudged on, the Wehrmacht was forced to remain dug in at the front due to the lack of 
supplies transported to the soldiers. Production levels in Germany simply could not 
compete with the Allied forces as the war progressed. This created the infamous 
stalemate that would eventually lead to the defeat of the Wehrmacht in the east. One 
German soldier, noting in September 1941, explains his feelings concerning the 
conditions experienced in Russia: "Today three months ago the campaign against Russia 
began. Everybody supposed at the time that the Bolsheviks would be ripe for capitulation 
within no more than eight to ten weeks...That assumption, however, was based on a 
widespread ignorance of the Russian war materiel...We were spoilt by the preceding 
Blitzkrieg."66 This particular soldier realized rather quickly that the fight in the east 
would continue much longer than previously believed by the high command. 
Operation Barbarossa proved costly in terms of casualties, more so than had been 
expected by Nazi leaders. The Ostheer entered Russia in 1941 with 3,050,000 men 
organized in 136 divisions. This large force experienced tremendous casualties on such a 
large scale that it is difficult to comprehend. Within the first year of Operation 
Barbarossa, approximately 1,300,000 men became casualties in Russia. This devastating 
statistic represented close to forty percent of the Ostheer's overall manpower of 3.2 
million troops. In a letter to Karl Wohlfarth, his family inquires about his condition: 
"[H]ow are you? Hopefully well. Did your wound heal completely and do you have no 
67 
more complaints? You have written nothing about your personal condition." Soldiers 
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experiencing the horrors of war would most likely not have desired to cause added strain 
to their families back home. In terms of this analysis, it is no wonder that families were 
left to wonder about the condition of their loved ones fighting for Germany. 
The question that plagued the military command was how to replenish the losses 
experienced in the beginning of the campaign. By December 1943 the Wehrmacht in the 
east contained approximately 2 million soldiers.68 Logistically determining a solution to 
replenish the evaporated soldiers was difficult for Wehrmacht leaders.69 As Guy Sajer 
angrily wrote: 
Generals have since written accounts of these events, locating particular 
catastrophes, and summarizing in a sentence, or a few lines, the losses 
from sickness or freezing. But they never, to my knowledge, give 
sufficient expression to the wretchedness of soldiers abandoned to a fate 
one would wish to spare even the most miserable cur. They never evoke 
the hours upon hours of agony, or the obvious resentment of individuals 
swamped by the herd, in which each man is lost in his own misery, and 
oblivious of the sufferings of others. They never mention the common 
soldier, sometimes covered with glory, sometimes beaten and defeated, 
burdened by the angry remonstrances of the noncoms and by the hatred of 
another herd of human beings whom it is officially permissible to hate, 
confounded by murder and degradation, and later by disillusion, when he 
realizes that victory will not return him his liberty. In the end, there was 
only the physical crime of war, and the hypocritical and intellectual crime 
of peace.70 
Sajer's attitude toward Wehrmacht commanders demonstrates a consensus of resentment 
for those who did not understand the common man in the fighting force. The grassroots 
understanding was more than likely unfathomable for those who constructed attacks 
sending men to their deaths. 
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The new recruits were quickly transferred to the front with condensed training 
with the objective of filling the recently emptied gaps of the front. Friedrich Reinhold 
Haag, a company commander, writes on July 12, 1942 from Sevastopol describing the 
new recruits: "I have experienced again how difficult it is to lead a company into a battle 
and to sacrifice men while hardly knowing any of them. Then they fall right next to you 
and one of them cries perhaps: 'Herr Leutnant, be sure to write home' -and you don't 
even know what his name is."72 The attachment many soldiers felt to their comrades was 
formed in the beginning of the fighting. When new soldiers entered their positions, it 
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became difficult to establish new relationships with men who might die the very next 
day. 
Numerous memoirs by former Wehrmacht soldiers describe the harsh stance 
towards these replacements. The true relationships between soldiers existed with those 
who fought and were wounded from the outset of battle. Many battle-hardened soldiers 
displayed indifference to those who had not experienced battle. Guy Sajer explains the 
differing opinions present on the front line: 
If for some the fall of Stalingrad was a staggering blow, for others it 
provoked a spirit of revenge which rekindled faltering spirits. In our 
group, given the wide range of ages, opinion was divided. The older men 
were, generally speaking, defeatist, while the younger ones were 
nn 
determined to liberate their comrades. 
Germans who had witnessed the defeat and repercussions of the First World War were 
hesitant to feel much enthusiasm while the younger, inexperienced men raised in the 
golden days of the Third Reich were more willing to risk their lives to destroy Russia. To 
the Wehrmacht soldier, replacements were simply another soul who would surely fall to 
an enemy's bullet. 
The Second World War formed incredibly strong bonds between German 
soldiers. As the war progressed, many soldiers felt unable to relate to those who had not 
fought on the front line. A soldier on the front line becomes a product of the harsh 
conditions. One soldier wrote during the initial stages of the invasion into the Soviet 
Union in 1941: "It's like growing a shell around what's almost impenetrable. But what 
happens inside this shell? You become part of a mass, a component of a relentless whole 
which sucks you up and squeezes you into a mold. You become gross and insensible. 
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You cease to be yourself." As in most circumstances, events are best understood by 
those who had first-hand accounts. Correspondence of the Wehrmacht proved vital for 
the maintenance of morale for battle hardened soldiers. These men wrote home to family, 
girlfriends, wives, children, and friends. Approximately forty to fifty billion letters were 
authored during the war, with as many as 500 million in some months. With this many 
letters circulating through the wartime postal service, it proved impossible for the Nazi 
regime to censor all of them. As Stephen Fritz notes, "the longer the war continued, the 
less seriously many Landsers regarded the censor. As two of the leading authorities on 
German Feldpostbriefe (letters from the field) concluded after studying thousands of such 
missives, 'the mass of soldiers expressed their opinions and views in a surprisingly open 
and uninhibited fashion."'73 This conclusion may prove shocking due to the reputation of 
the Nazis, yet many soldiers did indeed express themselves quite honestly via letters. 
For many members of the Wehrmacht, the most important aspect of the conflict 
was those beside them. Guy Sajer expresses this emotion in an excerpt from his memoir: 
We felt like lost souls who had forgotten that men are made for something 
else,...that love can sometimes occur, that the earth can be productive and 
used for something other than burying the dead.... We were madmen, 
gesturing and moving without thought or hope.... Lindberg...had 
collapsed into a kind of stupor.... The Sudeten...had begun to 
tremble...and to vomit uncontrollably. Madness had invaded our group, 
and was gaining ground rapidly.... I saw...Hals leap to his machine gun 
and fire at the sky, which continued to pour down its rain of flame and 
metal. I also saw the [sergeant]...beat the ground with his clenched fist.... 
[I] shout[ed] curses and obscenities at the sky. I had reached the edge of 
the abyss.... When danger... continues indefinitely, it becomes 
unbearable.... After hours and then days of danger...one collapses into 
unbearable madness, and a crisis of nerves is only the beginning. Finally, 
one vomits and collapses, entirely brutalized and inert, as if death had 
already won.76 
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Sajer's vivid description of the physical and emotional impact of war presents an 
important insight into the thoughts of many soldiers. Another persona becomes exposed 
when faced with an extreme environment on a daily basis. 
Soldiers considered their comrades in arms the primary reason for enduring the 
enduring battles, bombardments, and hardships. The German army understood the 
importance of organization among the troops in terms of comradery. This systematic 
placement allowed for men to remain within their original training unit. In addition, once 
wounded, that individual would return to his unit rather than transferred into a brand new 
group of soldiers. Morale proved top priority, even if it required more bureaucratic 
paperwork. The bonds produced in this way ensured a stronger force at the front, which 
was more likely to remain dedicated to the war. As one soldier wrote, "Loyalty, mutual 
obligation, a willingness to sacrifice, pride, a sense of duty, even love - these constituted 
comradeship for the Landser." Hans Werner Woltersdorf explained, "My unit was my 
home, my family, which I had to protect." On a more philosophical level, Eberhard 
Wendebourg appreciated war because men came "to judge men not by their rank and 
position, name and honors, but only by their character and performance.... War teaches 
77 the true worth of men." Under stressful circumstances, people act in ways unnatural to 
their normal environment, such as Wendebourg suggests. Siegfried Knappe elucidates: 
In a combat situation, the soldier is under inhuman stress to begin with, 
and when he sees a friend he has been sharing his life with suddenly drop 
because he was shot in the back, it is too much. Men who share combat 
become brothers, and this brotherhood is so important to them that they 
would give their lives for one another. It is not just friendship, and it is 
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stronger than flag and country. 
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Unbelievable courage and heroism becomes natural when those closest to an individual 
are in danger. The immense bond that evolves during war causes individuals to act in 
ways they never before imagined. 
The life lessons learned under wartime conditions caused soldiers to carry their 
experiences throughout life. Karl Fuchs believed that his understanding would allow for 
continued relationships after the war: 
[A] great friendship binds us German soldiers together out here. It is this 
comradery [szc] and the support that we're able to give each other that is, 
in my opinion, the secret behind our incredible successes and victories. 
This loyalty and devotion to the cause again and again was the decisive 
factor in many a battle...and this comradeship has been one of the most 
magnificent experiences out here. This loyalty is the essence of the 
German fighting spirit. We can depend on each other unconditionally.... 
Let this loyalty which I've experienced out here in comradeship be the 
70 
foundation of our future life. 
After the war, numerous soldiers held comradery in high regards. A strong sense of 
belonging enabled many soldiers to survive the war due to the emotional ties to their 
fellow soldiers. Due to the catastrophe that now plagues Nazi Germany, it is difficult to 
imagine that the soldiers of the Wehrmacht were men. As Hans Woltersdorf admitted, 
'We threw ourselves into national tasks with National Socialist idealism, redeemed 
ourselves.' Anti-Semitism, anti-communism, Lebensraum—these central tenets of 
Nazism were all inextricably linked with the handsets conception of duty, with his place 
OA 
and role within the vast machinery of war." A complicated infrastructure of Nazi 
ideology and survival tested the men. 
The Wehrmacht proved a worthy foe to Allied forces during the course of the 
Second World War. Determination to rid Europe of Bolshevism and evil fueled the 
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fanaticism for many soldiers until the last moments of the war. Germany united as a 
nation under Adolf Hitler and was determined not to repeat the events surrounding the 
First World War. The war embarked on by Hitler and the Nazis claimed millions of 
German lives, yet these men wholeheartedly felt they were acting on behalf of Europe 
and Germany. 
44 
Chapter 3: 
Verbrechen der Wehrmacht ("Crimes of the Wehrmacht") 
People who hated me would pursue me with vindictiveness, seeing in my past only 
cupidity and culpable error. Others might someday understand that men can love 
the same virtues on both sides of a conflict, and that pain is international. -Guy 
Sajer81 
All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing. -Edmund 
Burke 
The truth must be repeated over and over again; because error is repeatedly 
preached among us, and not only by individuals, but by the masses. In periodicals 
and cyclopedias, in schools and universities- everywhere, in fact, error prevails, 
and is quite easy in the feeling that it has a decided majority on its side. Often, 
82 too, people teach truth and error together, and stick to the latter. —Goethe 
In the description of the Brianvillers trail [1772] this sentence: 'The greatest 
crimes, far from being suspected, cannot even be imagined.' That is quite true and 
derives from the fact that as the magnitude of the crime increases, the more it 
rises above the instinctive. The more intelligent it becomes, the more the evidence 
83 disappears. -Ernst Junger, October 16, 1943 
When examining the Second World War, the crimes of the Wehrmacht are often 
neglected by scholars. Recently, historians have unearthed evidence concerning the 
atrocities of the Second World War. A common understanding is to place sole blame 
upon the SS and Einsatzgruppen. However, these extreme groups of the Third Reich 
constituted a relatively small percentage of those who did indeed commit murderous fury 
upon civilian populations throughout the Eastern portions of Europe. When the crimes of 
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Nazi Germany are recalled in our modern society, the inclination is to only remember the 
millions of Jews that were executed; however, the crimes of the Wehrmacht also included 
military personnel, such as the American soldiers at Malmedy, as well as civilians in 
occupied regions. No better understanding of the men can be attained than the letters 
written during their tour of duty. 
Crimes were not strictly ordered against enemy soldiers and civilians. As the war 
progressed and the situation quickly deteriorated, an interesting amount of draconian 
measures were felt by those who fought for the Third Reich itself. Members of the 
Wehrmacht were subjected to brutal punishments by military leaders, such as the deadly 
penal battalions. This perversion of discipline created a drop in morale for the men who 
knew that the war was already lost. In essence, the generals and Adolf Hitler, through 
their fanaticism and desperation sacrificed German soldiers for a cause that was doomed 
after the battle of Kursk in mid 1943. 
Letters of the Wehrmacht provide first-hand accounts of opinions and beliefs of 
the soldiers on the front line of battles. There have been two prominent works written 
about the men fighting on the Eastern Front: Stephen Fritz's Frontsoldaten and Omer 
Bartov's Hitler's Army. Both evaluate the intricate functions of the Nazi military and the 
soldiers themselves. Many scholars and historians appear more interested in the brutal 
nature of the SS, or Schutzstaffel. While this facet is important, there existed stark 
differences between the SS and Wehrmacht throughout their ideologies and backgrounds. 
The SS was deeply involved in the actions of the Holocaust, such as guards at the 
concentration camps; they also accounted for the elite fighting units on the front line 
46 
working alongside the Wehrmacht. Were the men of the Wehrmacht cold-blooded killers, 
or were they simply serving their nation's belligerent actions? 
Because of Germany's humiliating defeat after World War I, an overwhelming 
sense of hopelessness and demoralization entered the German mass psyche. After this 
defeat, morale was lost throughout the German people giving way to malleability of the 
mind through propaganda. What was necessary for the Germans was for them to feel a 
"sense of being part of a great mythic force [that] can be extremely important for 
genocide." Even the feeling of being affiliated with a united purpose does not excuse 
the accountability of those Germans involved in the myriad cases of mass murder. The 
fact that the past threatened national morale does not excuse the behavior of those who 
killed innocent civilians as well as prisoners of war. By searching for an answer to unite a 
nation in its time of weakness, Hitler and the Nazi party were successful in persuading 
the German military into committing the eventual slaughter of millions. 
In addition to the vast number of civilians killed by the Nazi regime, the 
casualties among the Wehrmacht were startling. Operation Barbarossa proved costly in 
terms of losses. In July 1942 approximately 40,000 German soldiers were either killed or 
missing in action. This number would increase to over 60,000 during the next month.85 
Hitler's over confidence in his earlier successes in France in 1940 did not adequately 
prepare him for the realities of the harsh Eastern Front. The logistics of replacing the 
staggering levels of manpower losses greatly impacted the German war machine. In the 
first six months of Barbarossa, Germany suffered approximately 750,000 casualties 
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which would become over one million by the end of March 1942.86 These losses not only 
hurt the overarching strength of the Wehrmacht but also crippled the high morale of 
Wehrmacht exhibited in the Second World War previous to 1941. 
Perversion of Discipline 
Military discipline throughout the Wehrmacht enables a better understanding of 
the events that unfolded as the war progressed, especially when explaining the ensuing 
atrocities committed by the army. The war in Russia experienced a level of fighting that 
demanded obedience and loyalty from the soldiers of the German army. Interestingly, the 
established system of discipline experienced a shift from acceptable to a level of brutality 
towards German soldiers. The draconian disciplinary actions help explain the murderous 
actions of the Wehrmacht towards Russian POWs and civilians. 
When Hitler gained power in 1933, the Wehrmacht effectively became a tool of 
Nazi ideology. This suggests that the military worked closely beside the Nazi regime. 
During the First World War, military discipline was relatively lenient. With the 
introduction of the Nazis, this all changed. More emphasis was thus placed upon political 
crimes intertwined with military discipline. Desertion and Wehrkraftzersetzung 
("undermining the fighting spirit of the troops") were among the political crimes that 
many soldiers were accused. At the end of the war, approximately 75-80 percent of the 
OJ 
soldiers executed had been deemed guilty of these political crimes. 
German soldiers had reason to fear repercussions for minor infractions as the war 
progressed. Within the Wehrmacht, approximately 15,000 to 20,000 German soldiers 
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were executed for political crimes of desertion or Wehrkraftzersetzung (undermining the 
war effort). In addition, several thousand men were assigned to penal battalions, which 
proved to be a virtual death sentence. As Niall Ferguson explains: 
[S]uch draconian measures became increasingly important on the Eastern 
Front when very high casualty rates (up to 300 per cent of the original 
strength of some divisions) prevented the formation of 'primary group' 
loyalties and desertion rates began to rise. Phrases like 'most severe 
punishment' and 'ruthless use of all means' became routine euphemisms 
for summary executions. By the end of the war, German Landsers faced a 
stark choice: 'Death by a bullet from the enemy or by the "thugs" of the 
SS'. As one German deserter who made it to the Russian lines explained 
in October 1942, the reason more of his comrades did not surrender was 
fear 'that if they deserted their families would be punished, that if they 
were seen trying to cross over they would be shot, and that if they were 
oo 
caught they would be executed. 
Such predicaments greatly impacted soldiers' emotional state when fighting an already 
brutal campaign in foreign territory. While many men fought to preserve Germany and 
their families, fear that their actions would directly impact not only themselves but loved 
ones created a fighting force of desperate men determined to persevere. 
In times of war the military must retain order in the ranks of enlisted men to carry 
out the primary objective. However, there remains a vital equilibrium in order to ensure 
an effective fighting force without resorting to draconian measures of discipline. The 
Wehrmacht understood the importance of the creation of a primary group of soldiers who 
fought together, yet as the war progressed and casualties mounted it became more 
difficult to sustain this primary group. Draconian measures were in place to legitimize 
Nazi ideology upon the soldiers as well as to simply keep the army intact. As a result of 
abuse from their superiors, soldiers soon placed their physical and psychological burdens 
upon the civilian population. Through the soldiers' actions, as Omer Bartov suggests, the 
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men were receptive to the ideological indoctrination and willing to implement Nazi 
policies.89 In the Nazi state, ideology proved more vital to the war effort than the fighting 
man. To a certain degree, harsh discipline helped create the brutal atrocities to which 
Nazi Germany has been credited. 
This perversion of discipline did not always exist in such a brutal fashion. In fact, 
the first two years of combat, normal discipline was relied upon. The turning point began 
during the difficult fighting in the east during 1942. 1942 is significant primarily because 
it was during this time that the German army first experienced difficulty when facing 
their Russian foe. Therefore, when times were good normal discipline reigned supreme. It 
was not until desperation with the war against Russia and constant Allied bombing raids 
over German cities did the Wehrmacht begin enforcing draconian measures. In addition, 
the Russian civilian populations as well as prisoners of war were treated accordingly. The 
levels of cruelty directed toward civilians from German soldiers were properly dealt with, 
meaning appropriate punishments for improper actions towards nonmilitary combatants. 
This is not to suggest that crimes against civilian populations did not occur though. With 
the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, the true racial conflict was initiated. 
Ideological warfare successfully trumped traditional rules of war. When the primary 
objective of ones military is the complete annihilation of an entire race, rules and 
acceptable behavior are no longer relevant factors. The fact remains that the Polish 
people were viewed as inferior to the Germans; this translated to the prejudiced 
perspective of Germany's enemies. 
Wehrmacht soldiers fought a fierce war against the Allied forces and much of the 
reason for this was due to the fear of reprimand from their commanders. Under such 
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circumstances, soldiers were held to high standards to complete difficult orders in the 
heat of battle. The consequence of the fear was the brutalization of the soldiers by their 
commanders. As the frustration for the war effort grew, so did the abuse of civilian 
populations. These occurrences slowly became integrated into the daily activities of the 
soldiers, which ultimately meshed prejudice, fear, and brutality together.90 Collateral 
damage involving civilians and prisoners of war was an acceptable risk in the minds of 
the Nazi leaders in Berlin. In addition, the eradication of the Slavic race was an 
underlined objective of Hitler's war aims, so if soldiers took out dissatisfactions on the 
enemy's population this was viewed as acceptable. 
The Polish campaign effectively set the tone for Operation Barbarossa in 1941. 
War in Russia meant the destruction of the Slavic population. The rules of war became 
null and void in the war of racial ideology. The idea of a murderous war clearly set the 
stage for the true perversion of discipline. How can an army maintain order and military 
conduct while condoning blatant murder of civilians and POWs? In effect, the bloody and 
discriminate German campaign in Russia bordered on complete anarchy by which men 
could commit murder with no reprisal whatsoever. 
By September 19, 1939, the army's commander in chief issued a leaflet entitled 
the "Leaflet for the Conduct of German Soldiers in the Occupied Territory of Poland". 
This statement warned of the presence of enemies of Germany, referring to civilians who 
were not "members of the German race". In addition, the commander in chief of the army 
stated that "the behavior toward Jews needs no special mention for the soldiers of the 
National Socialist Reich."91 The question that remains so difficult to answer is how could 
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military discipline remain in an already distorted ideological Nazi-controlled state? Truly, 
Nazi ideology had permeated the fabric of the Wehrmacht as early as the fall of 1939. 
Poland presented the German soldier with adequate time to become accustomed to the 
murderous rampage that was largely accepted as a war of extermination. This was soon 
extended to Russia as common military practice, which even extended to large groups of 
noncombatants. These civilians were deemed inferior as well as enemies based solely on 
the basis of racist and political criteria.92 
Even though Operation Barbarossa constituted a lack of normal military 
discipline, the 1939 invasion of Poland began the true perversion of discipline. German 
soldiers were notified on November 8, 1939, just little more than two months since the 
beginning of the Polish invasion, that men found guilty of desertion, plunder, and 
disobedience would suffer severe punishments including the death penalty. When the 
Second World War came to a close, approximately 13,000 to 15,000 soldiers of the 
Q-} 
Wehrmacht were executed on ideological-political grounds. When a territory is 
occupied, the necessity for military discipline is required; however, when the invading 
force has a set of ideological standards predetermined, rules become further from the 
accepted reality. The Wehrmacht set a course that condoned the vicious actions of the 
Nazi regime and SS while severely punishing soldiers for any of the aforementioned 
transgressions. 
The Western Front and Eastern Front present stark differences in terms of 
discipline. In the Western theater, crimes, such as theft, murder, and rape, perpetrated 
toward noncombatants were sufficiently judged. However, in the Eastern theater, these 
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similar crimes were largely ignored and even encouraged. The primary reason for such 
differences was due to the racial implications dictated by the Nazi regime. Slavic people 
were viewed as Untermenschen and believed inferior to the pure German race. It was 
extremely rare for German soldiers who killed or mistreated these Untermenschen to be 
punished for their transgressions. From the beginning, Hitler made it clear that this 
racially inferior group of people should be exterminated. Unless they were Jewish, 
Western Europeans were spared from the fate set forth toward the Russians in the East. 
An example of how lightly soldiers tried for crimes against Russian civilians is presented 
in a report of an unnamed corporal. Private H.K. states: 
[I]n June 1940 the case of a corporal, 'the father of five small children,' 
who raped 'a highly pregnant woman,' raped a woman over age fifty, and 
attempted to rape two others—'25 June from midnight until 1:00 A.M.!' 
Although the eventual punishment was not as severe as the case warranted 
(the rapist received two year' imprisonment), what astonished Private 
H.K. at the time was that 'the soldier in question already had an attempted 
rape in Poland behind him' and, far from being punished, had instead been 
promoted in rank. In another example of selective discipline, a Landser 
who had killed a Jewish woman in Russia received only six months' 
imprisonment for manslaughter.94 
Had this offense been committed in France, the sentence would have been dramatically 
different. The only time that punishment was ordered was only to maintain military 
discipline.95 
Another example of the relatively light sentencing was explained in the example 
of Major B., who had killed Russian POWs. In 1942, Major B. had shot, bayoneted or 
clubbed to death several Russian POWs after they had clearly surrendered. In this 
example, there were no Jews involved in the offense, only soldiers of the Red Army 
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including a woman. When Major B. was court-martialed, he was given a two-year 
sentence for four counts of homicide and insubordination at the front. Interestingly, Hitler 
annulled the sentence and dismissed the case against the perpetrator arguing for his 
innocence claiming a soldier experiencing the stressful conditions of the front line felt the 
"urge to kill" as a matter of "faith and inner conviction". Furthermore, Hitler noted "that 
virile individuals could not be criticized when, convinced of the uniqueness of the fateful 
struggle of the German people against the Bolshevik world enemy, they rejected all the 
commandments of humanity."96 Military discipline was severely hampered at the Eastern 
Front due to the fact that these types of crimes were strongly encouraged by the Nazi 
regime. 
The Germans were not alone in their extreme measures of harsh military 
discipline. Josef Stalin's Red Army instilled a level of fear into Russian soldiers via 
Order Number 227, also known as "Not a Step Back". This order issued to Soviet 
commanders instructed them to shoot any Russian soldier who attempted to retreat from 
battle. More specifically, the order issued on July 28, 1942 stated the following: 
We can no longer tolerate commanders, commissars and political officers 
whose units leave their positions at will. We can no longer tolerate the fact 
that commanders, commissars and political officers allow several cowards 
to run the show at the battlefield, that the panic-mongers carry away other 
soldiers in their retreat and open the way to the enemy. Panic-mongers and 
cowards are to be exterminated on the spot. 
From now on the iron law of discipline for every officer, soldier 
[and] political officer should be - not a single step back without order 
from higher command. Company, battalion, regiment and division 
commanders, as well as the commissars and political officers of 
corresponding ranks, who retreat without order from above, are traitors to 
the Motherland. They should be treated as traitors to the Motherland. This 
07 is the call of our Motherland. 
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Stalin understood that Russia may well be overwhelmed by the advancing German army 
and therefore could not under any circumstance back down during any military 
encounter. Yet, this murderous perspective inflicted much strain upon the average soldier 
fighting for Russia. 
After examining the German system of discipline, it appears evident that the 
Soviets imitated their enemy's draconian measures. Weakness demonstrated from 
officers faced certain court-martial by designated squads on the order of Stalin. Penal 
battalions and executions became commonplace in the Soviet camp as it did among the 
QO 
German ranks. Fighting in the east proved to spawn violence from a high level of fear, 
not only for the self-preservation of one's life, but also for the lives of loved ones. 
Traditional warfare was abandoned and replaced with violence, namely racial and ethnic, 
on a truly barbaric scale not yet experienced in twentieth century Europe. 
By 1944, harsher measures were established by the Wehrmacht in an attempt to 
keep soldiers at their front-line posts. The sense of sheer desperation was present in an 
order Hitler issued to the Stalingrad front in February: 
I have found out that during the retreats and evacuations ordered in the last 
few weeks, there have been some unpleasant and unruly scenes...This is 
unbearable...The reason for this is that commanders do not make use of 
all [disciplinary] measures...The harder the times, all the tougher should 
be the measures by which the commander enforces his will. I therefore 
demand that every commanding officer and NCO, or in extraordinary 
situations every courageous man, will enforce the execution of orders, if 
necessary by the force of arms, and will immediately open fire in case of 
insubordination. This is not only his right, but also his duty." 
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During this time, it was vital that the Wehrmacht maintain a strong front against the ever-
pressing Russian Army that prepared to cross into the recently acquired German territory. 
Yet, many soldiers of the Wehrmacht understood that the war effort was beginning to 
fail, and the high command could do little to boost morale at a decisive point during the 
war. 
To a certain degree, the soldiers of the Wehrmacht were transformed by the 
combination of horrifying battles in Russia and their own commanders. It was this 
perversion of discipline that effectively numbed soldiers to the brutality of the genocide 
surrounding them at the Eastern Front. There are pictures of men smiling while civilians 
lay murdered in the background. Celebrations of the ideological brutality appear to pacify 
the men under the extreme pressure from commanders. Brutality bred violence, evident 
by the actions of the soldiers toward civilians. 
Perversion of military discipline effectively lowered morale and effectiveness. In 
Johann Voss' memoir, he notes an instance where a German penal battalion was clearing 
a minefield by hand. Voss horrifically explains: 
A group of four were standing by the exit, strangely separated, the hoods 
of their anoraks drawn over their helmets. They carried no weapons, but 
each had fastened to his chest several kilograms of explosives. They were 
a detachment from the Regiment's penal platoon and were given the 
opportunity to redeem themselves in combat. These were men who had 
committed some infraction of military discipline, such as laxity while on 
guard duty, drunkenness, insubordination, or some offense in the rear, 
such as the misappropriation of government property or harassment of a 
girl. Their mission was to pick up the mines to make a path across our own 
mine belt and to clear the way fro the demolition team in front of the 
enemy bunker line. At that moment, I found their presence, their mission, 
and their unarmed status deeply disturbing, as one could sense the grim 
enforcement of military discipline. Their presence added to the gloom in 
the bunker.100 
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As this example demonstrates, soldiers similar to Voss were punished for minor 
infractions with deadly tasks in hopes of redeeming themselves. Penal battalions cast a 
dark shadow over each soldier at the front, effectively increasing fear of their 
commanders and hampering the fighting spirit to protect Germany. 
The Wehrmacht's role in atrocities 
To better understand the situation of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front requires 
one to examine the outrageous casualty figures. By March 1942, two and a half years 
since the Germans invaded Poland, the Ostheer Division on the Eastern Front had 
sustained close to one million casualties. This was roughly one third of the total recruits. 
In order to compensate for such losses, the Weimar's Reichswehr was forced to recruit 
officers at a quicker rate. This caused unqualified men to be sent into the front line, 
surrounded by men who had been fighting hard for close to three years. Thus, many of 
the soldiers were now inexperienced and lacking the proper training for the harsh 
conditions of the Russian campaign. As one battalion stated, "we have too many 
casualties. The old spirit is lacking."101 The Blitzkrieg spirit of 1939 was beginning to 
fade from memory of the soldiers. 
Perversion of discipline throughout the Wehrmacht essentially prepared many 
soldiers to perform the Nazi regime's ethnic cleansing agenda. Beginning in basic 
training, the men were taught to ruthlessly deal with the enemies of Germany, regardless 
if they were civilians, partisans, or Russian soldiers. How could the average German 
soldier execute unarmed POWs and civilians so indiscriminately? The fact remains that 
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the Wehrmacht did indeed cooperate in atrocities further adding to the Nazi regime's 
murderous plan. 
The average soldier who committed crimes against POWs and civilians presents 
interesting firsthand accounts into the topic of atrocities during the Second World War. 
These men lived a harsh and demanding life on the front lines as death surrounded them 
on a daily basis. One unnamed soldier on November 17, 1944 wrote how the war 
"happens in our proximity. Nevertheless, we have good hope that we can hold the 
positions until our counterstrike comes. Then you will see what happens with our 
opponents. We are naturally prepared for everything here."102 Yet, as Stephen Fritz 
suggests, these men willingly killed for the goals of the Nazi regime. As one Landser 
noted in this diary: "There is no bitterer death...than a hero's death.... Is the hero's death, 
then, the ideal of this world?"103In the analysis of this paper, the role of the soldiers 
surpasses the simplistic role of criminals. More importantly, what drove these men to 
commit crimes remains more pertinent to fully understand the outcome of their actions.104 
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Another soldier, writing on July 28, 1941, explained "recently things have been totally 
crazy.... All the prisoners I encounter are killed, there's no two ways about it. This has 
been our motto in the infantry for some time now."105 From this account, it seems that 
soldiers were quickly accustomed to immediately execute Russian soldiers upon capture. 
Around 80 percent of enlisted German soldiers served on the Eastern Front. When 
examining the Wehrmacht's correspondence, one comes to realize that they were soldiers 
dealing with suffering, horrible front line conditions, fatigue, and incredible amounts of 
stress. One soldier wrote from the front late in the war that "one must resign oneself. 
Each man is used for the defense of German soil. But... first the enemy must conquer the 
mountains."106 It is important to remember that the men of the Wehrmacht were human 
beings who suffered on the front line as others before them. Guy Sajer emotionally 
explains: 
[W]e began to grasp what had happened...We tried to blot out the memory 
of the... tanks driving heavily over that moving mass of human flesh... We 
suddenly felt gripped by something horrible, which made our skins 
crawl...For me, these memories produced a loss of physical sensation, 
almost as if my personality had split,...because I knew that such things 
don't happen to young men who have led normal lives... '[That's] how it 
welfare are especially to be safeguarded. Resources and services for the population may only be damaged 
on the orders of superior officers with allowances made for restitution. 
8. Neutral territory may not be included in a military operation. It may neither be trespassed upon nor flown 
over. 
9. Should a German soldier be taken prisoner, if asked, he may only give his name and service rank. Under 
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economic conditions on the German side. He may not let himself be led into giving such information by 
promises nor threats. 
10. Actions contrary to orders while in service is a criminal offense. Violations of the enemy against 
numbers 1-8 of the above guidelines are to be reported. Retaliation is only permitted under orders from 
higher military authority. 
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is, and all there is'...Something hideous had entered our spirits, to remain 
107 
and haunt us forever. 
These men were emotionally scarred from the horrible accounts of bloody battle. Fear of 
the unknown future plagued many soldiers' thoughts. Dr. Horst Rocholl explained his 
fear in a letter written on November 21, 1942: "We have not seen the enemy yet.... How 108 • 
large the hostile force is, I do not know." To dismiss the Wehrmacht as soulless killers 
is unjustified, yet these men experienced the same gruesome images of war similar to 
other fighting men during the Second World War. 
The Wehrmacht officials knew what was expected of their forces during the 
course of the war. The fact that they cooperated with the illegalities of the Nazi regime, 
illustrates their guilt and knowledge of murder they condoned. Furthermore, orders from 
the top ranking military officials encouraged the murders of civilians and prisoners of 
war. In the perverse world of Nazi Germany, military officials reminded the soldiers of 
honor of the German military, which were now stained with the blood of millions. 
Interestingly, orders for mass murder and direct obstructions of the Geneva Convention 
were masked with euphemisms. The Wehrmacht initiated a war of survival and 
annihilation of the enemy, which included civilians. The Wehrmacht not only accepted 
Hitler's war of annihilation but also encouraged this mindset among the troops. 
During the fighting on the Eastern Front, the supply lines began to run thin. Lack 
of materiel resulted with the Wehrmacht entering into stalemate trench warfare. It is 
evident through letters from family members that they knew of the scarcity of 
accommodations available for the average soldier. In a letter to Karl Wohlfarth, his 
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family inquired: "The place you are now is, as you wrote, a Kaff ["dump" or "hole"]. It 
that a small village at the front? What do you have for accommodations or privacy? And 
how is the food supply?"109 Conditions were indeed horrible and greatly resembled those 
of the First World War's Western Front. One soldier explained the living conditions 
when he stated "since we have no beds, we remained exempted from quartering. As 
soldiers, we had to accept our situation."110 A common myth about the German military 
during the Second World War was that they were diehard soldiers. However, soldiers 
actually experienced a great deal of apathy (geistig immer Stumpfer), manpower 
shortages, and a tremendous amount of psychological disorders on the Eastern Front.111 
Quoting the chronicler of the elite Grossdeutschland Division: 
Man becomes an animal. He must destroy, in order to live. There is 
nothing heroic on this battlefield...The battle returns here to its most 
primeval, animal-like form; whoever does not see well, fires too slowly, 
fails to hear the crawling on the ground in front of him as the enemy 
approaches, he will be sent under...The battle here is no assault with 112 
'hurrah' cries over a field of flowers. 
Could this first-hand account of conditions account for the violence commonly associated 
with the Wehrmacht? One soldier wrote in June 1940 that "war is and will remain a 
condition of existence. A state, a national community, appears to need periods of 
fighting, in order to preserve its values and to fulfill its tasks; otherwise it must surrender 113 them by becoming powerless and weak." In essence, the soldier's life, according to this 
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particular source, is a natural course of existence for all mankind. Every nation fights to 
preserve its cultural identity from invaders. 
Although the majority of emphasis in this paper is placed upon the Russian 
theater of war, Poland truly marked the beginning of violations of warfare from the 
Wehrmacht. The First World War witnessed relatively decent treatment of POWs and 
noncombatants, adhering to the Geneva Conventions. After the war concluded in 1945, 
however, Wehrmacht officials insisted that the majority of soldiers had followed the rules 
of war. These same officials blamed the fanatics of the National Socialist Party who, as 
they exclaimed, were the real criminals. Yet, as more information has been uncovered in 
the past decades, evidence suggests that atrocities were far more widespread than the 
Allies realized. On September 9, 1939, Colonel Wessel commanding the third battalion 
of the Fifteenth Motorized Infantry Regiment ordered the execution of three hundred 
Polish soldiers. This example dismisses common explanations that stress of combat 
resulted in senseless brutality on the battlefield. After the war, Polish researchers 
discovered approximately fifty similar incidents.114 The fact is that murderous actions 
continued throughout the war conducted by passive leaders of the Wehrmacht. This 
analysis demonstrates the far-reaching implication of the Wehrmacht's involvement in 
atrocities, which were not unique incidents. The invasion of Poland marked the turning 
point for the conduct of German soldiers in the field and in civilian areas. 
As the war progressed and became a more desperate fight against Russia, Hitler 
directed a murderous order to the Wehrmacht on October 18, 1942. This order instituted 
the execution of enemy soldiers as policy of the German military. This included "men 
captured in special operations, the personnel of so-called commando units, were to be 
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summarily executed, even if they were in uniform. There is no doubt that this order was 
carried out: in January 1945, uniformed American soldiers sent to the Balkans who were 
captured were transported to the Mauthausen camp in Austria and shot."115 Could 
desperation, due to the fact that the war was not progressing as planned, have pushed 
Hitler and senior officers to issue these statements condoning murder? This might offer 
one explanation, yet this brutal mentality, as mentioned earlier, was enforced earlier 
during the Polish campaign in September 1939. 
The murderous campaign that ensued in Poland set the precedent for the 
remainder of the Second World War by the Wehrmacht. In October 1939, Hitler 
informed senior Nazi officials that order was not the main objective of the Polish 
campaign; rather, chaos was to run rampant throughout the country. The East was to 
become an area of relocation and murder of ethnically inferior populations. Haider, the 
Chief of the General Staff, believed "it was the intention of the Fiihrer and Goring to 
destroy and eliminate the Polish people". Hitler realized no legal restrictions would exist 
between the German and Slavic races, resulting in a murderous campaign.116 Thus, it 
would only be logical for Hitler to approach the situation in Russia similarly to Poland. 
France also experienced its share of atrocities by the Wehrmacht, yet they are 
minor when compared to the Russian Front. On May 13, 1940, Sedan, France was the 
location of a massacre of ten soldiers who had surrendered to German forces. Even 
though this incident is negligible when comparing it to the Holocaust, it still presents yet 
another incident of clear-cut violations of warfare and military discipline by a 
professional military force. Another atrocity took place on December 17, 1944 at 
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Malmedy, Belgium, where American soldiers of Battery B of the 285th Field Artillery 
Observation Battalion were executed by Obersturmbannfiihrer Jochen Peiper's men. On 
January 13, 1945, American soldiers recovered seventy-two partially frozen bodies. 
Testimonies of survivors stated that Peiper had ordered the aforementioned executions of 
the POWs.117 
Crete offers an interesting illustration of German mistreatment of civilians. When 
the German airborne and mountain troops landed in Crete May 1941, General Ringel 
ordered draconian actions directed against the civilians. On May 13, 1941, General 
Ringel ordered his troops to punish any civilians guilty of hostility against German 
troops. Castelli, a village in Crete, demonstrates the true brutality of German soldiers. On 
May 24, two hundred civilians were executed for their supposed belligerent actions. 
Later, on June 3, German forces captured and burned the town of Kandanos also 
118 
murdering more than 150 residents. On another occasion in Greece in 1943, civilians 
were massacred by German forces. A soldier from this event who served in the elite 1st 
Mountain Division was questioned in 1971 concerning this event: "[M]ost of the soldiers 
did not agree with this action...Many said openly that it was nothing but a disgrace 
[Schweinerei] to shoot unarmed civilians. Others, rather fewer, took the view that they 
were all a potential enemy so long as they supported the partisans against us soldiers. The 
argument was so heated that I might almost speak of a mutiny."119 These three examples 
demonstrate that atrocities were not limited only to SS or Einsatzgruppen units. In 
addition, Russian civilians were not the only victims of German hostilities. 
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Hitler determined in the early planning stages of Operation Barbarossa that few 
rules would bind the soldiers fighting in Russia as was the case in Poland. Addressing his 
top generals on March 30, 1941, Hitler referred to the war in Russia as a war of 
extermination. Distributed on May 19, 1941, the so-called "Guidelines for the Conduct of 
Troops in Russia" required "ruthless and vigorous measures against the Bolshevik 
1 70 
inciters, guerrillas, saboteurs [and] Jews." Drafted by the Army High Command and 
issued by the Armed Forces High command on June 6, 1944, the "Guidelines for the 
Treatment of Political Commissars" required the execution of any captured political 
commissars. The order stated: 
It must be expected that the treatment of our prisoners by the political 
commissars of all types, who are the true pillars of resistance, will be 
cruel, inhuman, and dictated by hate.... Therefore, if captured during 
combat or while offering resistance they must on principle by shot 
immediately. This applies to commissars of every type and position, even 121 
if they are only suspected of resistance, sabotage, or instigation thereto. 
This perverse justification set forth by Hitler transmitted throughout the entire 
Wehrmacht as the appropriate method of warfare. In an OSS memorandum from October 
19, 1941, the "orders to the German army are to completely destroy Leningrad even if 
that city surrenders...since Hitler believes this procedure necessary. Due to the slowness 
of the campaign in Russia...Hitler has given drastic orders regarding the prosecution of 
the campaign, which has resulted in many cruelties and unnecessarily high 
122 
casualties...[which] are said to be disliked among the German people." The war of 
ideologies knew no bounds of legalities or mercy. 
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Similar to Poland, German soldiers were briefed on the appropriate conduct 
during Operation Barbarossa. The approximately three million soldiers received an order 
entitled "Guidelines for the Conduct of the Troops in Russia" shortly before the invasion 
on June 22, 1941. This pamphlet portrayed Bolshevism as a "mortal enemy of the 
National Socialist German people." Furthermore, the campaign against Bolshevism 
required German soldiers "to crack down hard" and "completely eliminate all resistance, 
both active and passive." In order to achieve goals set forth by Hitler and the Nazi 
regime, it was vital to add a certain level of ambiguity to murderous orders. This was 
done to maintain a certain degree of military discipline while permitting the soldiers a 
free hand in mass killings of noncombatants. General Hoepner, commander of Fourth 
Panzer Group, issued an order entitled "Conduct of Operations" on May 2, 1941 that 
stated: 
A. Fundamental principles. The war against Russia is an important part of 
the German people's battle for existence. It is the old fight of Germans 
versus Slavs, the defense of European culture against the Muscovite -
asiatic flood; and the repulse of Jewish Bolshevism. This war must 
have as its goal the destruction of today's Russia and for this reason it 
must be conducted with unheard-of harshness. Every clash must, in its 
conception and execution, be guided by the iron will to completely and 
mercilessly annihilate the enemy. In particular, there is to be no mercy 
for the carriers of the current Russian-Bolshevik system.124 
Even before Operation Barbarossa launched, military leaders predetermined a brutal war 
against Russia. The fight against Bolshevism thrust the Wehrmacht to accept Hitler's 
foresight and ultimate goal of eradicating opponents of National Socialism. 
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More than two months before Operation Barbarossa was launched, Hitler gave a 
speech to 250 generals of the German military. On March 30, 1941, Hitler denounced 
Bolshevism, declaring that it was "identified with asocial criminality" and that the future 
conflict would be a "war of extermination," focusing on the elimination of both 
Bolshevist commissars and the Communist intelligentsia. He instructed the German 
armed forces to "forget the concept of comradeship between soldiers. This war will be 
very different from the war in the West. In the East, harshness today means leniency in 
125 
the future." Thus, the war in Russia consisted strictly of ideological aims. 
How could professionally trained German soldiers condone these draconian 
measures directed toward the Red Army? Rationalization of the brutality proved vital in 
terms of self-assurance and legality. The desperation of the ideological war between 
Germany and Russia presented a demented justification to atrocities committed by 
soldiers supported by the Nazi regime in Berlin. Private Fred Fallnbigl wrote in July 
1941, "Now I know what war really means. But I also know that we had been forced into 
the war against the Soviet Union. For God have mercy on us, had we waited, or had these 
beasts come to us. For them even the most horrible death is still too good. I am glad that I 19 f\ 
can be here to put an end to this genocidal system." This individual truly believed that 
Germany did not initiate the conflict with Russia; however, a noble quality was assigned 
to German soldiers liberating innocent Russians from their oppressive Bolshevik leaders. 
Soldiers under the implemented directives of the Nazi regime and top Wehrmacht 
officials were bound to feel desperate and terrified. As one member of the GD Division 
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wrote, "Orders are not given any more.... Leadership has reverted to its original 
127 
form.. ..[This is] a battle for survival." 
The legality of war-time atrocities was an issue addressed by Nazi High 
Command early in the war. Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, head of the Oberkommand 
der Wehrmacht (OKW) issued an order in May 1941 concerning the forthcoming conflict 
in Russia. Keitel defined the struggle against Russia would indeed be a war against 
Bolshevism and Jews, where the Wehrmacht should mercilessly pursue these enemies of 
Germany. In effect, Keitel absolved German soldiers from any legal issues that might 
arise as a result from their actions. By legalizing murder, the Wehrmacht marched down a 
path aimed at the destruction of civilians, Red Army soldiers, and other vaguely 
described enemies of Germany. 
The Geneva Conventions, as it stood in 1939, presented certain protections to 
civilians who were in the path of military action. However, there were exceptions, such 
as any nation that did not agree to the Geneva Conventions was not protected. 
Technically, the rules of war only applied to countries that embraced the Geneva 
Convention. This technicality would later affect proceedings at Nuremburg at the 
conclusion of the Second World War. Russia did not sign the 1929 Geneva Conventions, 
so they were not protected under the stipulations of international law. Nevertheless, this 
does not condone the German mistreatment of Russian civilians; instead, it does offer a 
perverse defense to the German actions in Russia. Furthermore, the Russian regime under 
Stalin was notorious for committing atrocities against its own people, especially during 
the Five Year Plan and Collectivization. 
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The mass atrocities committed by the Wehrmacht toward Russian civilians caused 
many soldiers to view the future with dread if the current campaign failed. Guy Sajer 
explains: "If we should lose tomorrow, those of us still alive...will be judged without 
mercy...accused of an infinity of murder...spared nothing." Another soldier, who had 
witnessed the senseless slaughter of thousands of Jews in Lithuania, agreed with Sajer by 
stating quite briefly: "May God grant us victory because if they get their revenge, we're 
in for a hard time." The fact that the Nazi campaign consisted of such blatant murder, it 
is no wonder that many soldiers knew their fate even before the war came to an official 
conclusion in May 1945. Albert Rodenbusch of the 635th Training Regiment involved in 
an anti-partisan campaign in Belorussia explained an interesting circumstance: 
The people from the village provided us with heated rooms and gave us 
food, so we were very surprised when the company commander later 
ordered us to burn down the village and arrest the village people...Our 
company commander ordered us to occupy the village and to kill on sight 
anyone offering resistance or attempting to flee....We shot about 70 
people. Among them also women, old people and children. And then we 
burnt down the village. From the first village we took 14 head of cattle 
19Q 
and from the second village 10 head of cattle. 
If the German Army desired cooperation from the Russian people, burning their homes 
and indiscriminately murdering innocent bystanders was not the ideal strategy. In doing 
so, the Wehrmacht fueled antipathy throughout Russia strengthening resentment and 
resistance. 
Even Russian soldiers, who knew of their government's maltreatment of its own 
people, were astounded in the indiscriminate killing of civilians by the German army. 
One such Soviet prisoner enlightened German interrogators with the following statement: 
"We have badly mistreated our [own] people, in fact so bad that it was almost impossible 
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to treat them worse. [But] you Germans have managed to do that.. .Therefore we will win 
the war." Even the Soviet Army's newspaper recounted this sentiment. Ilya Ehrenburg 
wrote in the Red Star army newspaper: "Do not count days, do not count miles. Count 
only the number of Germans you have killed. Kill the German - this is your mother's 
prayer. Kill the German - this is the cry of your Russian earth. Do not waver. Do not let 
up. Kill." From this excerpt of Soviet propaganda, the Red Army appears to offer a strong 
sense of murderous retaliation for the German atrocities that have afflicted their soldiers 
and people. Once the Pandora's Box of barbarism was opened by the Germans, there was 
no relenting on either side. Were the Soviets justified in their approach to their German 
counterparts? Fight fire with fire was the mentality of the Russians, which they enforced 
as policy against the Germans, providing members of the Wehrmacht with plenty to fear. 
Zinaida Pytkina, a SMERSH interrogator, remembered how she executed a German 
officer: 
It was joy for me. The Germans didn't ask us to spare them and I was 
angry...When we were retreating we lost so many 17-, 18-year olds. Do I 
have to be sorry for the German after that? This was my mood...As a 
member of the Communist Party, I saw in front of me a man who could 
have killed my relatives...I would have cut off his head if I had been 
asked to. One person less, I thought. Ask him how many people he killed 
- he did not think about this?130 
With the introduction of a murderous Nazi ideology, the Russians felt it was their duty to 
retaliate in the similar fashion, as expressed by Pytkina. 
The situation of Russian civilians proved deadly with the invading German forces. 
Josef Knaim described a typical scene from the Eastern Front in 1941: 
One day as I was marching through the village, I heard rustling in one of 
the houses and went to investigate. A young woman was searching 
through a bunch of old clothes, probably looking for something to eat. The 
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residents of this village, Kodorow, were ordered to leave within one hour 
so that they could hardly take any of their stuff with them. They gave us 
the order to shoot every civilian we meet here. This woman was terrified 
to death and pale as chalk. I indicated to her she could continue but she 
took off running. I did not shoot.131 
Agricultural sectors in Russia aided the Wehrmacht and the German people, but left the 
Russians who worked the land without food. General Georg von Kiichler, head of the 
Eighteenth Army, received correspondence from Eduard Wagner which stated: "Every 
supply train from the homeland cuts back on foodstuffs there. It is better that our people 
have something and the Russians starve." It was deemed forbidden to feed the Russian 
civilian population. General von Kiickler later reminded that the local civilians "belong to 
a racially foreign, hostile sort." After this order, Eighteenth Army drove thousands of 
starving civilians out of the combat zone and into other regions out of the German-
controlled territory. The important fact in this example is that the civilians in these areas 
were already short of food, and had no chance for survival.132 According to Nazi 
ideology, Russian civilians were viewed as Untermenschen and deemed to a life of 
slavery or death. 
The perverse disciplinary actions taken toward civilian populations throughout 
Russia after Barbarossa launched allowed for myriads of murders. Michael Zimmermann 
elaborates on the punishments for injure or death to German soldiers: 
Now, for every German soldier or 'ethnic German' (Volksdeutscher) 
killed, 100 hostages would be shot; for every German soldier or 'ethnic 
German' wounded, 50 hostages were to be executed. The designated 
victims were males aged between 14 and 70. The executions were to be 
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carried out wherever possible by the same units that had incurred losses in 
clashes with the partisans.133 
Death followed the advancement of the Wehrmacht throughout Eastern Europe. On 
October 16, 1941, General Harald Turner, commander of the military administrative 
staff, suggested that an additional 2,200 "hostages" should be executed for ten German 
soldiers who were killed by Tito's partisans in Serbia. The next day, General Turner 
wrote to his friend SS Lieutenant General Richard Hildebrandt in Danzig: 
About five weeks ago, I lined the first of 600 [Serbs] up against the wall. 
Since then we've liquidated another 2,000 in a mopping-up operation. In 
another mop-up we killed about 1,000 more. And in the meantime, over 
the past eight days, I've had 2,000 Jews and 200 Gypsies shot. According 
to the ration 1:100 for German soldiers murdered in a barbaric manner. 
Another 2,200 are to be shot in the coming eight days, also almost only 
Jews. This is far from pleasant work! But it's necessary, we've got to 
make clear to people what it means to dare attack even a single German 
soldier. Besides, this is also the fastest way to solve the Jewish question.134 
Retaliation on an unfathomable scale was the quick solution on the front line. In addition, 
the Wehrmacht further aided in the liquidation of Jews. 
While most of High Command was content with the mass executions taking 
place, some commanders felt ashamed of the dirty business that had entered into their 
ranks of men. The commander of XLVIII Panzer Corps stated to his soldiers after only 
three days into Operation Barbarossa that "senseless shootings of both prisoners and 
civilians have taken place. A Russian soldier who has been taken prisoner while wearing 
a uniform, and after he put up a brave fight, has the right to decent treatment." Within 
five days, the same commander restated his disapproval for the actions of his men by 
stating: "Still more shootings of prisoners and deserters have been observed, conducted in 
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an irresponsible, senseless and criminal manner. This is murder." As much as he 
disliked the actions of his men, the military was too far into the ideological belief to back 
down from their primary mission of eliminating the enemy by brutal methods. 
Partisans, also referred to as guerrillas (Freischarler), presented yet another 
excuse for the Germans to execute large numbers of Russian civilians. Soldiers were 
ordered on June 22, 1941, the first day of Barbarossa, not to consider partisans as POWs; 
rather, these insurgents were to be "sentenced by an officer on the spot."136 What this 
insinuated was the immediate execution without trial or imprisonment. These ghastly 
orders to murder civilians effectively brutalized the consciousness of the average German 
soldier. Albert Rodenbusch, from the 635th Training Regiment, was involved in an anti-
partisan campaign in Belorussia: 
On the evening of 29 December 1942 we started our operation in a village. 
There were no partisans in this village. The people from the village 
provided us with heated rooms and gave us food, so we were very 
surprised when the company commander later ordered us to burn down the 
village and arrest the village people. So 50 inhabitants were taken 
prisoner.... We were then moved on to another village. It was about 10 or 
11 kilometers away. On our arrival we came under fire from rifles. Our 
company commander ordered us to occupy the village and to kill on sight 
anyone offering resistance or attempting to flee.... We shot about 70 
people. Among them also women, old people and children. And then we 
burnt down the village. From the first village we took 14 head of cattle 
and from the second village 10 head of cattle. We then proceeded to the 
third village. We didn't come across any partisans there. But we still burnt 
down the village and shot around 50 people. Even women and children. 
And then we moved on to the fourth village and did exactly the same as 
we had done in the other villages. There we shot about 100 people, burnt 
down the village and made 80 arrests. We took them with us. After we had 
destroyed all these villages we moved on towards Osipovichi. On our way 
137 there we combed the woods in search of partisans. 
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Civilians were always suspected of partisan activity, resulting in the deaths of countless 
innocent Russians who were not resisting Wehrmacht forces. The Grossdeutschland 
Division clarified to its troops in October 1942 that "men of all ages, good-looking 
women and particularly young girls and lads and even children," were being employed as 
enemy agents; children were supplied with unlikely "stories," such as that they were 
looking for their parents, disguising the fact they were a spy. The 12th Infantry tried to 
dissuade its men from fraternizing with Russian women, claiming they were "mostly 
Jewish females...whose Jewish origin cannot be seen." 138 If the men chose to ignore 
these warnings, surely they would contract a venereal disease, since the Russians were 
thought to be an unclean race of individuals. Although German soldiers continued to 
consort with Russian women, the fact remains that these warnings and orders aided the 
soldiers in viewing civilians as true Untermenschen, not worthy of humane treatment. 
The murderous routine of everyday activities was recounted by numerous 
Wehrmacht soldiers while serving on the Russian Front. Private H.M., a member of an 
intelligence unit, recalled how: 
[A] partisan group blew up our vehicles... [and]...shot the agricultural 
administrator and a corporal assigned to him in their quarters...Early 
yesterday morning 40 men were shot on the edge of the city...Naturally 
there were a number of innocent people who had to give up their 
lives...One didn't waste a lot of time on this and just shot the ones who 
139 
happened to be around. 
The indifference expressed in such accounts demonstrates the perversion of conscience of 
the average German soldier. Claus Hansmann details the proceedings of the execution of 
Russian partisans: 
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In a gray, war-torn street in Kharkov. Agitated, expectant faces in pale 
misery. Businesslike, the men of the field police emerge and tie with oft-
practiced skill seven nooses on the balcony railing and then disappear 
behind the door of the dark room...The first human package, tied up, is 
carried outside. The limbs are tightly bound..., a cloth covers his face. The 
hemp neckband is placed around his neck, hands are tied tight, he is put on 
the balustrade and the blindfold is removed from his eyes. For an instant 
you see glaring eyeballs, like those of an escaped horse, then wearily he 
closes his eyelids, almost relaxed, never to open them again. He now 
slides slowly downward, his weight pulls the noose tight, his muscles 
begin their hopeless battle. The body works mightily, twitches, and within 
the fetters a bit of life struggles to its end. It's quick; one after the other 
are brought out, put on the railing...Each one bears a placard on his chest 
proclaiming his crime...: Partisans and just punishment...Sometimes one 
of them sticks out his tongue as if in unconscious mockery and 
immoderate amounts of spittle drip down on the street... Then a few laugh, 
jokes meant to reach those yet above.140 
Such cold-blooded murders were viewed as normal to the average soldier who witnessed 
such carnage. As one soldier explained regarding the constant explosions and death 
surrounding him on a daily basis: "You see, one simply changes due to the given state of 
affairs and then moves on!"141 Acceptance of daily routines and activities were met with 
similar indifference from many German soldiers. As solders, the men were required to 
adapt quickly to their circumstances and deal adequately with the situation. 
Partisan attacks claimed the lives of many German soldiers on the Eastern Front. 
Whenever German troops were killed in these attacks, draconian punishments were 
distributed to the nearby civilian population. On November 9, 1941 Walther von 
Reichenau issued an order after one such attack claimed the life of a regimental 
commander. The order stated: 
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All captured partisans of either sex, in uniform or civilian clothes, are to 
be hanged in public. Any resistance attending their capture or transport is 
to be broken with the harshest means. 
All villages and farmsteads in which partisans are housed or cared 
for are to be called to account through the requisition of all foodstuffs, 
burning of houses, shooting of hostages and hanging of the guilty, when it 
cannot be indisputably established that the population defended itself 
against the partisans and suffered losses thereby.1 2 
Similar retributions were recalled throughout the campaign in Russia. In other instances, 
the Wehrmacht aided the murderous Einsatzgruppen forces with great fervor. The 
Wehrmacht knew that the actions of the Einsatzgruppen were not "within the scope of 
accepted behavior in warfare."143 Einsatzgruppe A reported in late 1941 that Wehrmacht 
forces had shot nineteen thousand Jews in northern Belorussia in December of the 
aforementioned year. In addition, aid from the Wehrmacht continued by transporting 
prisoners and cordoning off shooting sites.144 
The Wehrmacht could not claim ignorance to the overarching goals of the Nazi 
regime, due to the fact that orders were presented to soldiers to hand over political 
prisoners and POWs to the SS Einsatzgruppen forces. By handing over prisoners to the 
Einsatzgruppen units, the Wehrmacht was knowingly sending thousands to their deaths. 
As the chief of Security Police and the SD in Berlin noted on August 20, 1941: 
The relationship with the German Army is as cordial as it was previously. 
In particular, Army circles show a steadily growing interest in and 
understanding of tasks and matters concerning the work of the security 
Police. This could be observed particularly during the executions. On the 
other hand, the Army itself endeavors to further the tasks relating to the 
Security Police. Thus, all offices of the Einsatzgruppe are continually 
receiving reports from the Army concerning arrested communist officials 
and Jews.145 
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While the Wehrmacht did not technically pull the trigger in numerous circumstances, 
they blindly cooperated in blatant atrocities of the regime. Army Quartermaster-General 
Eduard Wagner stated that "politically intolerable and suspicious elements, commissars 
and agitators" were to be treated in the aforementioned fashion.146 In a further aggressive 
decision, Nazi High Command ordered in September 1941 that any Soviet troops who 
had been overrun but then reorganized themselves should be regarded as partisans and 
executed with haste. This order from the top was expressed much more rigidly by front-
line commanders by stating soldiers were "totally to eliminate any active or passive 
resistance' among prisoners by making 'immediate use of weapons'. General Erich 
Hoepner, the commander of Panzer Group 4, took his orders to mean: 
'[E]very military action must be guided in planning and execution by an 
iron will to exterminate the enemy mercilessly and totally...no adherents 
of the present Russian-Bolshevik system are to be spared.' The 
commander of the 12th Infantry Division told subordinate officers: 
'Prisoners behind the front-line...Shoot as a general principle! Every 
soldier shoots any Russian found behind the front-line who has not been 
taken prisoner in battle.'147 
In essence, the free license to kill was issued to German soldiers with strong prejudice. 
Much emphasis was placed on the killing of prisoners of war by the commanders 
of the Wehrmacht, but some soldiers had different views than that of the regime. To kill 
indiscriminately meant a loss of potential Russian intelligence sources. One such soldier 
who agreed with this analysis was Wolfgang Horn. Although he admitted to shooting 
"cowardly" Russians if they were slow to raise their hands in surrender, he was 
astonished to follow his lieutenant's decision to execute prisoners. As Horn states, it was 
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not only "unchivalrous" but also "stupid" because fellow Russian soldiers might have 
witnessed the lack of mercy demonstrated by the Germans causing them to fight that 
much harder in the future. Another soldier, Alfred Rosenberg, understood the potential 
retributions by the enemy. He prophesized "an obvious consequence of [the] politically 
and militarily unwise treatment [of prisoners]...not only the weakening of the will to 
1 A Q 
desert but a truly deadly fear of falling into German captivity." Outright executions of 
prisoners would have an adverse effect on the current situation on the front line. Officers 
of the 18th Panzer Division also concurred with Rosenberg: "Red Army soldiers...are 
more afraid of falling prisoner than of the possibility of dying on the battlefield."149 Even 
the commander of the elite Grossdeutschland Division petitioned his men to "understand 
that the ultimate result of the maltreatment or shooting of POWs after they had given 
themselves up in battle would be...a stiffening of the enemy's resistance, because every 
Red Army soldier fears German captivity."150 Yet, these concerns fell largely on deaf 
ears. Senseless executions appeared to proceed unheeded and ultimately became a way of 
life for the soldiers on the Russian Front. This is no better expressed than in the following 
statement by an unnamed German soldier: "We take some prisoners, we shoot them, all 
in a day's work."151 This perverse mindset created total anarchy when understanding the 
dilemma of POWs. 
If the Germans were willing to execute at will Russian prisoners, then what 
stopped the Russians from treating Germans POWs in the precise manner? Compounding 
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fear from fear became the norm as the fighting intensified. A leaflet issued to German 
soldiers stated: 
Notice: Watch Out! Destroy after Informing the Troops: The Soviet 
Union, that we strike, has always waged war treacherously and with 
unimaginable cruelty, as befits the character of Bolshevism. To know their 
methods is to be forearmed against them. Regard everyone with extreme 
suspicion. Make adjustments for the following list of their methods of war; 
you must not be surprised and then you will find the ways and means to 
counter these: 
1 Every kind of gas war... 
2 Poisoning of wells, food stuffs, and meat... 
3 Mixing grains with poisons. Biological warfare (plague, cholera, 
typhus)... 
4 Parachuting saboteurs dressed as civilians... 
5 Red Army soldiers will surrender and then attack, take up the fight 
again.... 
6 Ambush small detachments or singular soldiers... 
7 Using cattle or residents as cover for Red Army troops and insurgents... 
8 Target windows showing light... 
9 Set traps for all kinds of motorized vehicles... 
10 Treat prisoners sadistically. Every Soldier must know that falling 
prisoner in the hands of the Red Army means cruel torture and death!152 
What this ultimately created was a constant state of fear of capture from German soldiers. 
Retaliation ran rampant among the ranks of the Wehrmacht. Fighting to the last man 
standing and to the last round of ammunition became the true doctrine of the average 
German soldier on the Eastern Front. The average soldier was extremely fearful of 
surrendering to the Russians for fear of reprisal. Thus, the only option to the desperate 
German soldier was to maintain their current position. As Gunter Koschorrek explains, 
the Soviets did not "treat their prisoners in accordance with the terms of the Geneva 
Convention...We have fought against the Soviets - we can imagine what awaits us in 
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Siberia."' This perspective was not limited to a few soldiers; as the war continued, this 
belief became doctrine. 
The treatment of Soviet prisoners greatly differed from their Western European 
counterparts. In the brutal Vernichtungskrieg, or "war of annihilation", Germans and 
Russians fought to the death, even after soldiers on either side capitulated. In this war of 
annihilation, the SS and Wehrmacht cooperated in the early stages of Operation 
Barbarossa to establish a backdrop of murder condoned by the Nazi state. Soldiers on the 
front were ordered to shoot captured Soviet commissars, while the High Command of the 
Wehrmacht objected little. Russian prisoners of war were starved to death or forced 
marched until they appeared "more like the skeletons of animals than humans."154 Within 
the first six months of Operation Barbarossa, an estimated two million Soviet POWs had 
starved to death in German captivity. 
The abuse and murder of Russian prisoners proved a recurring theme from the 
beginning of Operation Barbarossa. Not only was this method so common among 
German soldiers, but it was also well known to their Soviet enemy. By early 1942, the 
German 12th Infantry Division warned its troops that Soviet soldiers were "more afraid of 
falling prisoner than of a possible death on the battlefield.... Since November last 
year.. .only a few deserters have come over to us and during battles fierce resistance was 
put up and only a few prisoners taken."155 Due to the far-reaching murderous rampage of 
the Wehrmacht, it was nearly impossible to maintain any level of secrecy of their deeds 
from the enemy. The backlash of such a pogrom of sorts resulted in a tougher enemy on 
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the battlefield who sincerely believed it was better to be killed in action rather than taken 
prisoner and starved to death or outright executed. 
The Wehrmacht acquired approximately 5,700,000 Russian prisoners during the 
Second World War. Of these, roughly 3,300,000 died in captivity, specifically during the 
first year of Operation Barbarossa. In other words, the POWs starved to death due to the 
inefficient provisions the Wehrmacht provided for feeding, housing and transporting the 
immense numbers of captives. The Gross Deutschland Division stated in April, 1943 that 
as a result of prisoner treatment, there was "a stiffening of the enemy's resistance because 
every Red Army soldier fears German captivity'."156 As mentioned earlier, the situation 
for a Russian POW resulted in the strengthening of enemy resistance on the battlefield for 
fear of becoming a prisoner of German forces. A vicious cycle of retribution heightened 
the unwillingness of German soldiers to take Russian prisoners, escalating the violence 
on the battlefield. 
The method by which the Wehrmacht dealt with Russian POWs was blatant 
murder. 12th Infantry's commander stated: "Prisoners behind the front-line...Shoot as a 
general principle! Every soldier shoots any Russian found behind the front-line who has 
not been taken prisoner in battle." On June 25, 1941, the commander of XLVII Panzer 
Corps stated in an order to his men: "I have observed that senseless shootings of both 
POWs and civilians have taken place. A Russian soldier who has been taken prisoner 
while wearing a uniform, and after he had put up a brave fight, has the right to decent 
treatment." This same commander goes on to make a rather ideological statement 
regarding the mission of Germany and National Socialism: "We want to free the civilian 
population from the yoke of Bolshevism and we need their labor force." In essence, this 
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was no implication of a liberating force for the Russian populace; rather, civilians were 
destined to become slaves for the good of Germany. However, as the commander later 
determines regarding the lives of Soviet political leaders: "This instruction does not 
change anything regarding the Fiihrer's order on the ruthless action to be taken against 
partisans and Bolshevik commissars." To free the Russians from Bolshevism required the 
liquidation of political officers, partisans, and "racially undesirable elements" referring to 
Jews.157 In effect, the ideological goals of Hitler had successfully infiltrated the 
commanding officers of the Wehrmacht by the early stages of Operation Barbarossa. 
Some soldiers felt deeply disturbed by their current situation in Russia when faced 
with the immensity of death surrounding them. Lieutenant A.B. of railroad construction 
company 115 wrote in October 1942: 
At the moment I am experiencing horrible days... Every day 30 of my 
prisoners die, or I must allow them to be shot. It is certainly a picture of 
cruelty...The prisoners, only partially clothed, partly without coats, could 
no longer get dry. The food is not sufficient, and so they collapse one after 
the other...When one sees what a human life really means, then an inner 
transformation in your own thinking happens. A bullet, a word, and a life 
is no more. What is a human life?' In the war in Russia, certainly, precious 
little.158 
The feeling of hopelessness expressed by the Lieutenant demonstrates his distaste for his 
orders, yet he continues his dirty work. From the perspective of the soldier pulling the 
trigger and ending a human life, Guy Sajer elaborates: "It isn't easy to kill a man in cold 
blood...unless one is entirely heartless or, as I was, numb with fear."159 Stephen Fritz 
explains that "indeed, it almost seemed that acts of cruelty performed in the midst of 
personal fury were necessary for one's own well-being, to purge the constant fear and 
157
 Bartov, Hitler's Army. 84-85. 
158
 Fritz, 51-52. 
159
 Sajer, 299. 
82 
'refresh' oneself psychologically. Atrocities often took place under conditions of severe 
physical and psychological strain."160 Due to the circumstances of organized chaos 
orchestrated by the Nazi hierarchy in Russia, murder was encouraged and viewed as a 
way of life. 
Treatment of Russian prisoners of war emphasized a high degree of harshness. 
Eugen Miiller issued an order in July 1941 on Walther von Brauchitsch s behalf which 
detailed the treatment of POWs which stated: 
The prisoner of war who is obedient and willing to work is to be treated 
decently. Anyone who acts against this regulation is to be punished in 
accordance with his offense. 
It is in keeping with the standing and dignity of the German army 
that every German soldier preserve the distance and the attitude toward 
Russian prisoners of war that takes into account the fierceness an the 
inhuman brutality of the Russians in combat. Any leniency or even an 
attempt to curry favor is to be punished most harshly. The feeling of pride 
and superiority must remain recognizable at all times.161 
This order effectively created an environment of nervous tension for the guards as well as 
the authority to execute first without any hesitation. 
Russian POWs did not stand much of a chance of surviving their captivity. It is 
suggested than an average of six thousand Soviet prisoners died each day during the first 
six months of Operation Barbarossa, resulting in over two million deaths by February 
1942 or 65 percent.162 Amazingly, these statistics presents the first six to seven months of 
Operation Barbarossa! By January 1942, the war in Russia was only just getting started, 
with more than three grueling years of warfare. To elaborate, conditions did not improve 
for Russian soldiers as the war prolonged. 
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A genocidal tendency of the Nazi regime toward Russian POWs was present 
during Operation Barbarossa. The Nazis believed most Slavic populations as racially 
inferior, but more worthy of exploitative slave labor. As Karel Berkhoff suggests, 
Ukrainians POWs were often released, particularly in 1941 for their labor. However, 
those Slavs categorized as Russian were "infected" with Bolshevism and therefore 
associated as Jews and direct enemies of Germany. Berkhoff states that "Germans who 
considered treating 'the Russian' as a human being were warned that 'any leniency or 
I 
even chatting' would be punished severely." Fraternizing with the Russian enemy was 
met with draconian threats from German High Command. 
Conditions for POWs at the camps consisted of insufficient food and housing. 
Especially in the later portions of the war, if POWs were fed in the camps then the 
German people were suffering as well from this shortage of food. In addition, the 
ideological goal of Hitler was the liquidation of the Russian Bolsheviks. Stated in another 
way, only the minimum nourishment was allotted to prisoners in the hopes that they 
would ultimately die. With this mindset, it is no wonder that so many millions of Russian 
POWs starved to death while in German captivity. On September 16, 1941, Reich 
Minister of the Economy Hermann Goring ordered that the productivity of the 
"Bolshevik" prisoners should ultimately "determine their upkeep."164 The direct result of 
such a statement was the farther reduction of rations for POWs. 
The average soldier was entwined in a brutal world, mostly created by the OKW 
officials. After weeks, months, and years of witnessing ruthless violence, the soldiers of 
the Wehrmacht became molded into killing machines lacking the most basic of human 
Berkhoff, Karel C., "The 'Russian' Prisoners of War in Nazi-Ruled Ukraine as Victims of Genocidal 
Massacre," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 15, no. 1 (2001): 2-3, 5. 
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emotions. Stephen Fritz believes that average Landsers were not outraged by Field 
Marshall Keitel's endorsement of murder. As Fritz further explains: 
The world was seething with death, and its proximity evidently stifled 
many a soldier's compassion. War became a job, casual labor, common 
work, and whom or how one killed didn't seem to make a great difference. 
Furthermore, the rank and file of the Wehrmacht were probably more 
thoroughly Nazified than has heretofore been acknowledged; indeed, 
average Landser were consistently among Hitler's strongest supporters. 
As a consequence, their letters and diaries disclose, there existed among 
the troops in Russia such a striking level of agreement with the Nazi 
regime's view of the Bolshevik enemy and the sort of treatment that 
should be dealt them that many soldiers willingly participated in 
murderous actions.165 
Even more acutely described are the personal thoughts of Private H. in July 1941 of the 
progress of Operation Barbarossa: "We're drawing ever closer to Moscow... Everywhere 
there is the same picture of destruction... All of whatever Commissars etc. [sic] are taken 
prisoner or grabbed are shot immediately. The Russians don't do it any differently. A 
cruel war here."166 What is so surprising about this excerpt is how calm and accepting the 
soldier's attitude toward the atrocities committed by his own army. 
The ideological war that ensued was well ingrained upon the minds of most 
Wehrmacht soldiers. Joseph Surmely wrote on November 20, 1944 "I really have no time 
for thinking. This is the routine from 7 to 7 o'clock [each day]. Thus one is fully used for 
the final victory."167 For this particular soldier, the final victory was worth the immense 
time spent defending Germany from enemy forces. There is little remorse or personal 
outrage at the orders presented that accounted to murder. Stephen Fritz views this 
indifference as a subtle "expression of support for the ideological goals of the Hitler 
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regime." Along these similar lines, Matthias Jung describes the treatment of Russian 
civilians after partisans killed eighteen German soldiers: "The whole place, everything 
[was destroyed]! Totally! The civilians who had done it, all the civilians who were in the 
place. In each corner stood a machine gun, and then all the houses were set on fire and 
whoever came out—In my opinion with justice!" Justified retribution for an unidentified 
guerrilla enemy? Blatant executions of noncombatants were not a scene out of the 
ordinary. In another example, Fritz Harenberg recalls a brutal scene in Sarajevo. At a 
Jewish cemetery near his lodgings, "there arrived among us the Waffen-SS...and the 
Gestapo. And then somebody revealed to the Gestapo that buried in the Jewish cemetery 
were money and valuable things. The Gestapo drove the Jews together, they had to dig it 
168 
up. Hauled a lot out of there, found a lot." From this entry, it is clear that these Jews 
were excavating valuables for the Nazis, yet Harenberg accepted this as business and 
little more. However, did he necessarily condone this behavior or could it be possible that 
he felt inadequate to question the proceedings? Geoffrey Megargee suggests that 
"German officers...valued obedience and loyalty, as do officers in most armies; they did 
not lightly question their orders or assume authority to which they were not entitled."169 
Silence from soldiers continued as did myriads more of atrocities. 
Some Wehrmacht soldiers felt inclined to murder Jews without a direct order to 
do so on several occasion. Although the military allowed, and even encouraged murder of 
Russian POWs and civilians, Wehrmacht authorities often had to punish soldier who 
participated in the murder of Jews without authorization. The XXX Corps of the 11th 
Army on August 2, 1941, states: 
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Special commando units have been charged with this task. Unfortunately, 
however, in one locality, members of troops units were involved in 
implementing such an operation. For the future, I am issuing the following 
order: Only soldiers expressly commanded to do so may participate in 
such operations. Participation as an onlooker is also hereby prohibited for 
170 
all members of forces under my command. 
The chaotic environment of violence that Hitler envisioned came into fruition as soon as 
Barbarossa exploded into Russia on June 22, 1941. Allowing soldiers to indiscriminately 
murder civilians and POWs created a chaotic background for some soldiers to fully 
express their bloodlust for Jews. 
To reestablish order in a legally chaotic atmosphere was nearly impossible, which 
helps explain why so many orders were issued by high-ranking military officials 
concerning the actions of Wehrmacht soldiers. On September 1, 1941, the commander of 
the Rear Army Area South issued a surreptitious order that stated: 
Attacks by members of the Wehrmacht against the civilian population are 
increasing. Individual soldiers and subordinate commanders are 
undertaking confiscations on their own initiative or entering private homes 
under flimsy pretext, appropriating property belonging to the civilian 
population. Recently, there have also been cases in which soldiers and 
even officers have, on their own initiative, carried out executions of Jews 
or participated in such shootings. The tasks of the Wehrmacht in the rear 
areas are clearly defined. Any independent action that goes beyond these 
tasks undermines the military discipline and prestige of the Wehrmacht, 
inducing lack of discipline among the ranks... Consequently, any 
unauthorized shooting of inhabitants, including Jews, by individual 
soldiers and any participation in executive measures by SS and police 
forces should at least be punished by disciplinary measures as a form of 171 insubordination, and by court-martial where deemed necessary. 
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It is difficult to establish whether the measures taken by the OKW was to establish 
discipline or rather to keep silent the crimes committed by the regime. In August 1941, 
Sixth Army High Command stated: 
There are instances where off-duty soldiers have volunteered their services 
to the SD to assist in the implementation of executions, or have attended 
such measures as onlookers and have taken photographs. The Army 
Supreme Command has ordered the following: 'Participation by army 
soldiers as onlookers or active participants in executions not ordered by a 
military superior is forbidden. Any previous photographs of such 
executions are to be confiscated by disciplinary officers and destroyed. 
They are prohibited in future. Soldiers who act against this order are to be 
punished for breach of discipline.'172 
It is clear that photographic evidence of executions or services not commanded by 
soldiers' officers were commonplace enough to warrant a direct warning against such 
actions. 
Psychological analysis aids in understanding why the soldiers of the Wehrmacht 
participated in atrocities. Peter Loewenberg suggests "there is ample evidence that this 
generation of German youth was more inclined toward violent and aggressive, or what 
173 
psychoanalysts call 'acting-out,' behavior than previous generations." Could it be 
possible that post-war Germany produced this particular generation of Germans? The 
younger German soldiers followed orders and fervently believed in the Fiihrer, not 
questioning the ideology of Nazi Germany. Michael Mann proposes that "among the 
front line Wehrmacht soldiers who murdered civilians and POWs, we might merely find 
the cruelty of arrogant conquerors or the ferocious over-reaction common among 
desperate, frightened troops embroiled in a savage war."174 
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The Wehrmacht effectively established a close relationship to Hitler and his 
primary goals of annihilation. Benjamin Segalowitz's article "The Wehrmacht's Guilt" 
explains the relationship between Hitler and the Wehrmacht: 
With remarkable skill he [Hitler] knew how to make the Army partner in 
his secrets, to let it profit from him, and finally to turn it into a partner in 
the criminal and evil deeds that he perpetrated and to paralyze its moral 
ability to oppose him. There is no doubt, however, that Hitler preferred to 
achieve his evil purposes with the help of people who were close to and 
resembled him, such as the booted men of the S.A. or the S.S., and he also 
found it useful to allow the Wehrmacht to seem to have clean hands. So 
long as Hitler succeeded, the leaders of the Wehrmacht gave him a free 
I T f 
hand, doing nothing to stop him from carrying out his evil deeds. 
Therefore, the Wehrmacht aided Hitler without question or hesitation. In addition, the 
leaders of the Wehrmacht and to a degree even the average soldier, escaped the war's 
conclusion with the illusion of separation from the extremist Nazi state. Along similar 
lines, the Wehrmacht enforced the goals of the regime's anti-Semitic laws in Jewish 
populations. The Wehrmacht helped register and isolate the Jews, stole their possessions, 
relocated them into ghettos, and established concentration camps. Whether they were 
aware of the eventual outcome of murder, the Wehrmacht created an atmosphere which 
176 
was prepared for the liquidation of Jews. 
An issue that affected many German soldiers was unit loyalty. However, the 
Germans were bound together by a sense of national pride and brotherhood. But why and 
how did the German soldier justify fighting for the Nazi machine? Aside from the Nazi 
propaganda aimed directly at the German people, the soldiers of the Wehrmacht appear to 
have fought for the soldier next to him at the front line. Immense comradeship led many 
Germans to fight so hard on the front lines. Due to the tremendous casualty rate in the 
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East as well as the declining primary group of soldiers, many new recruits were thrown in 
the mix with seasoned veterans. This created, as the war prolonged in Russia, tension and 
no true sense of a family unit. 
Soldiers who had experienced the rigorous training before the war were among 
the earliest casualties. These men are often referred to as the primary group due to their 
ferocity and dedication to Germany in the early portion of the war. As this class of troops 
became fewer due to battlefield casualties, new recruits were quickly, and often poorly, 
trained to replenish the drive into Russia. One German company commander, Friedrich 
Reinhold Haag, stated: "I have experienced again how difficult it is to lead a company 
into a battle and to sacrifice men while hardly knowing any of them. Then they fall right 
next to you and one of them cries perhaps: 'Herr Leutnant, be sure to write home'- and 
you don't even know what his name is."177 How could the morale remain high when 
soldiers and their officers did not know each other? This dramatically altered the already 
tense environment of the front line. Camaraderie, which was vital to the Wehrmacht 
soldiers, deteriorated as casualties continually mounted. 
The situation in which the Germans created for themselves emanated a stronger 
sense of comradery among the ranks of soldiers. Soldiers on the Russian Front were 
forced to stay together due to the situation created early in the campaign as well as the 
fact that they were isolated in the vastness of Russian territory. An unnamed soldier 
wrote simply that "cannon thunder is our daily companion."178 There was nowhere to flee 
the horrors of the brutalities of the Eastern Front. As the chronicler of the Gross 
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Deutschland Division explained, "It is the courage of the desperate [writes the chronicler 
of the GD], trying to defend what has already been won, the fear of falling alive into the 
hands of the enemy, and the instinct of self-preservation, which are the reasons for the 
willingness of the men fighting in the East to make this sacrifice. They do not give up. As 
expressed by the aforementioned chronicler, the basic fight for survival and fear of 
capture created a new notion of the soldier. Desperation of the war led to the acceptance 
of death and destruction, always driving towards an ideological goal. 
91 
Chapter 4: 
Propaganda Directed Towards Millions of German Soldiers 
To blame individuals is to forget that politicians are the expressions of public 
179 
moods which are the masses' collective dreams. -Hugh Thomas 
Whether they are named Scheidemann and Wels, whether Dernburg or Koch, 
whether Bell and Marx, Streseman and Riesser, whether Hergt and Westarp- they 
are the same men we know from the time before the war, when they failed to 
recognize the essentials of life for the German people; we know them from the 
war years, when they failed in the will to leadership and victory; we know them 
from the years of revolution, when they failed in character as well as in ability, in 
the need of an heroic hour, which, if it had found great men, would have been a 
great hour for the German people- who, however, became small and mean 
because its leading men were small and mean.l&0 
The average German soldier was effectively indoctrinated by Nazi propaganda be 
the time he enlisted in the military. Leaflets and other orders were specifically presented 
to the officers in order to combat negative sentiment of the progression of the war as well 
as the war aims of the Third Reich. It proved vital to the Nazi regime to constantly 
bombard the Landser with anti-Bolshevik lectures in the hopes of instilling the immense 
hatred of their Eastern enemies. Operation Barbarossa was necessary to the much needed 
Lebensraum that would benefit generations of Germans and extend the boundaries of the 
Third Reich. The vision of a necessary conflict against the Bolshevist foe created the 
illusion that German soldiers were fighting for all of Europe as well. The firm belief that 
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the German soldier was a freedom fighter of sorts for all of Western Europe provided a 
great sense of honor and accomplishment in the face of a devastating war. 
The events of the First World War effectively presented the Nazi regime with a 
strong ideological platform. The feeling of deception by Allied Forces gave the Germans 
a strong motivation for victory. This feeling of betrayal warranted, in the mind of Nazi 
supporters, the future conflict with Russia, France, and Britain. Due to the way in which 
the First World War ended, the Germans did not feel defeated. Instead, they felt the 
Allies cheated them of victory. In addition, there was no true defeat of Germany after 
four long years of trench warfare. Therefore, the Nazis created an agenda aimed primarily 
at those who brought about the upheaval throughout Germany during the 1920s. 
Anti-Semitism coincided with Nazism ever since the early 1930s. The average 
Wehrmacht soldier had been indoctrinated close to a decade preceding the Second World 
War to believe that Bolshevism was a Jewish phenomenon aimed at the destruction of 
Europe. Therefore, the ultimate goal was the annihilation of Jews to destroy Bolshevism. 
An unnamed soldier fighting on the Eastern Front in July 1941 explained: "This time an 
end will certainly be put to this God-hating power...evidence of Jewish, Bolshevik 
atrocities, the likes of which I have hardly believed possible.... You can well imagine 
181 
that this cries for revenge, which we certainly also take." One soldier, Wilhelm Pruller, 
expressed this sentiment by stating "The political doctrine of Bolshevism...is but a purely 
political act of world Jewry.... And just as the Talmud teaches nothing except murder 
and destruction, so Bolshevism knows but one science: murder and destruction, cruel and 
182 barbaric murder." Medical corporal Paul Lenz agreed by explaining rather bluntly, 
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"Only a Jew can be a Bolshevik...for this blood-sucker there can be nothing nicer than to 
1 
be a Bolshevik.... Wherever one spits one finds a Jew." These exaggerated claims 
unfortunately were direct responses to the years of anti-Semitism preached by Hitler and 
the Nazi party. 
Hitler imagined from the start that the campaign in Russia would be one of 
violence. Therefore, Nazi propaganda blatantly encouraged extensive use of violence. 
Hitler, speaking to the Propaganda Ministry in July 1941, stated the need for images of 
Russian cruelty towards German prisoners to be shown in newsreels throughout Germany 
1 84 
to portray the enemy as brutal and inhumane. As Hitler had anticipated, the war in 
Russia would explode into a "great racial war" to the death. An estimated 600,000 Soviet 
POWs were executed by the German forces in the first few weeks of Operation 
Barbarossa. By the end of the first winter, approximately two million Russian prisoners 
were dead. This tremendous death count was a direct correlation to the propaganda 
machine in Berlin. Many Wehrmacht soldiers executed surrendering enemy troops 
simply because they did not desire to accept their surrender. Those prisoners that were 
taken by the Germans were usually shot shortly after their capture. Any Red Army 
soldiers who were not executed were unfortunate enough to be imprisoned in camps 
inadequate to sustain human life, where diseases and starvation claimed millions of lives 
by the end of the war. Stories of such treatment moved rapidly throughout the Russian 
ranks, which in turn created a much more fierce resistance force to German occupation. 
Wehrmacht soldiers' dedication to Nazi Germany has presented a difficult issue 
for historians due to the convoluted image perceived by German generals at the war's 
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conclusion. Were the average German soldiers indoctrinated by Nazi propaganda or did 
they believe in fighting the good fight for their homeland and family? Surrender was not 
considered an honorable option for the German soldier. After his capture in December 
1941, Lieutenant Rudolf Kohlhoff enlightened American psychologist and interrogator 
Saul Padover about the possible defeat of Germany: 
But I tell you Germany is not going to be defeated. I don't know how long 
it will take to achieve victory, but it will be achieved. I am convinced of it, 
or I would not have fought. I have never entertained thoughts of losing. I 
could not tell you how victory will come but it will. Our generals must 
have good reason to fight on. They believe in the Endsieg [final victory]. 
Otherwise they would not sacrifice German blood...The Wehrmacht will 
never give up. It did not give up in the last war either. Only the civilians 
gave up and betrayed the army. I tell you, the Americans will never reach 
the Rhine. We will fight to the end. We will fight for every city, town and 
village. If necessary we will see the whole Reich destroyed and the 
population killed. As a gunner, I know that it is not a pleasant feeling to 
have to destroy German homes and kill German civilians, but for the 
185 
defense of the German Fatherland I consider it necessary. 
This shocking response presents an extreme position by a German soldier who was not 
content with losing. Final victory would be won at any cost, according to Lieutenant 
Kohlhoff. Another prisoner explained to Padover that he was "deeply humiliated for 
having permitted himself to be captured" and deeply believed he "should have died on 
the field of honor." German soldiers were indoctrinated early in their training and even 
while in combat, which contributed to their diehard attitude. 
German youth of the 1920s viewed Hitler as a father figure with a level of loyalty 
which never faltered throughout the Nazi reign. As Gerhard Rempel explains, "thousands 
were absorbed by his dynamic movement before 1933, and millions joined his party after 
he became chancellor...In a broad sense, all Germans were affected by the Nazi 
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movement between 1933 and 1945, even though their thoughts and daily lives may not 
1 87 
have been entirely determined by official ideology and policy." The necessity of the 
German youth was vital in completing the goals of the Nazi regime. As Hitler made clear 
to Hermann Rauschning in 1933: 
I am beginning with the young. We older ones are used up... We are rotten 
to the marrow. We have no unrestrained instincts left. We are cowardly 
and sentimental. We are bearing the burden of a humiliating past, and have 
in our blood the dull recollection of serfdom and servility. But my 
magnificent youngsters! Are there finer ones anywhere in the world? Look 
these young men and boys! What material! With them I can make a new 
world.188 
Hitler intended from the beginning of his political career to utilize the youth of Germany. 
He understood that young, impressionable minds were more susceptible to his extreme 
political ideology rather than the older generation. The post World War I generation aged 
ten to eighteen were initiated into the Hitler Youth [Hitler Jugend] where they began 
their indoctrination of national socialism. Loewenberg explains the disposition of 
children born during the First World War and the personas created out of this stressful 
situation: 
[I]t is postulated that a direct relationship existed between the deprivation 
German children experienced in World War I and the response of these 
children and adolescents to the anxieties aroused by the Great Depression 
of the early 1930s. This relationship is psychodynamic: the war generation 
had weakened egos and superegos, meaning that the members of this 
generation turned readily to programs based on facile solutions and 
violence when they met new frustrations during the depression. They then 
reverted to earlier phase-specific fixations in their child development 
marked by rage, sadism, and the defensive idealization of their absent 
parents, especially the father. These elements made this age cohort 
particularly susceptible to the appeal of a mass movement utilizing the 
crudest devices of projection and displacement in its ideology. Above all it 
prepared the young voters of Germany for submission to a total, 
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charismatic leader. But fantasy is always in the end less satisfying than 
mundane reality. Ironically, instead of finding the idealized father they, 
with Hitler as their leader, plunged Germany and Europe headlong into a 
series of deprivations many times worse than those of World War I. Thus, 
the repetition was to seek the glory of identification with the absent 
soldier-father, but like all quests for a fantasied past, it had to fail. Hitler 
and National Socialism were so much a repetition and fulfillment of the 
traumatic childhoods of the generations of World War I that the attempt to 
undo that war and those childhoods was to become a political program. As 
a result the regressive illusion of Nazism ended in a repetition of misery at 
the front and starvation at home made worse by destroyed cities, 
i on 
irremediable guilt, and millions of new orphans. 
It is important to understand that the HJ was under control of the Nazi party, without any 
outside influence, providing leaders complete control over the young German minds. 
These children received a uniform and were even sworn in to the program.190 The success 
of the Hitler Youth was evident in the dedication of these average Germans during the 
later portions of the Second World War and in their enthusiasm for ultimate victory. 
The goals of the Hitler Youth lay in their ability to build upon the romanticism of 
youth, rhetoric, and flattery. As Ulrich Greifelt, Himmler's chief of staff at RKFDV 
[Reichskommissar fur die Festigung Deutschen Folks turns, or "National Commissariat for 
the Strengthening of Germandom"] headquarters in Berlin, wrote: "Never before did 
our...youth receive a greater and pleasanter task...Never before...was the task in the 
German East of such a fateful magnitude and clarity." Along similar lines, a spokesman 
for Arthur Greiser, governor of the Warthegau, expressed: 
It is the task of youth to open the eyes of the young generation to the racial 
necessity of our eastern policy and to put in their hands by education the 
necessary weapons for a clear and uncompromising attitude in the ethnic 
struggle. Only the young generation, which carries within itself the 
characteristics for an effective eastern polity and has the toughness to 
endure, can pursue this struggle in the German East to successful 
conclusion. The youth of Germany has the means to make a decisive 
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contribution, through communal education, to the recovery of German 
blood, which is in danger of being suppressed by hostile races.191 
Therefore, the efficient legacy of Hitler and the Nazi regime was to proliferate in later 
generations of Germans via the current Hitler Youth members. The Hitler Youth defined 
its role to "prevent the dissolution of German blood among foreign nationalities; [to] win 
back German blood which has been dissipated among foreign nationalities; [to] support 
the reception measures in the new regions of the East."192 The objective of the Hitler 
Youth coincided with the goals of the Nazi regime. 
Propaganda pamphlets infiltrated the Hitler Youth, bombarding the members with 
a myriad of illustrious depictions of Nazi ideology and Hitler. These guides presented the 
reader with a recapitulation of significant events beginning with the Beer Hall Putsch in 
1923. Next, honor, loyalty, obedience, discipline, camaraderie, and sacrifice were 
stressed for the virtuous German male. In addition, sections were designated for anti-
Semitic harangues, blaming Jews for all the world's problems. This booklet would 
conclude with the rough blueprints for Eastern Europe's resemblance of a new social 
order designated for Germans.193 Without the complete obedience of the German youth, 
Hitler would have had difficulty recruiting individuals to fight his ideological war against 
Russia. Physical fitness programs, created during the 1930s, paved the way for 
preliminary military training among the ranks of the Hitler Youth. SS trainers entered 
WELs [Wehrertiichtigungslager ("Premilitary Training Camps")] to train the boys of the 
HJ. At these camps, indoctrination and military drilling were carried out. We fight, we 
sacrifice, we triumph, proved the ultimate propaganda excerpt for the Nazis. In these 
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axioms, future soldiers learned the sacrifice expected of each individual of a fighting unit. 
The Nazis were able to capitalize upon the young Germans' sense of idealism. The 
innocence of youth caused an entire generation of Germans to become incensed with 
Nazi ideals, which SS recruiters used to their advantage. 
The generation of Germans who grew up during Hitler's reign was a byproduct of 
the First World War. Many of these children grew up without a father figure or absence 
of parental guidance, a father who survived the war only to return home defeated, lack of 
sufficient food and nourishment, and a general chaotic political environment.194 These 
characteristics of this particular generation enabled Hitler to take advantage of the 
extreme post-war circumstances that plagued Germany during the 1920s and early 1930s. 
Peter Loewenberg states: 
[Psychological symptoms of regression to phases of ego functioning 
'fixed' by the traumata of a childhood in war included responding to 
internal personal stress with externalized violence, projecting all negative 
antinational or antisocial qualities onto foreign and ethnic individuals and 
groups, and meeting frustrations that would otherwise be tolerated with 
patience and rationally approached for solutions with a necessity for 
immediate gratification.195 
Due to their childhood experiences and environment, these particular Germans were more 
prone to the encouraged murderous behavior of the Nazi regime, which was precisely 
what Hitler had intended in order to complete his goals in Russia and in Europe. 
The issue of surrender proved difficult for German soldiers who had sworn an 
oath to Hitler and Germany that they would do no such thing on the battlefield. As the 
Wehrmacht Oath of August 2, 1934 clearly states: "I swear by God this sacred oath that I 
shall render unconditional obedience to Adolf Hitler, the Fiihrer of the German Reich, 
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supreme commander of the armed forces, and that I shall at all times be prepared, as a 
brave soldier, to give my life for this oath."196 It is important to notice that nowhere in the 
Wehrmacht Oath is there mention of surrender. This was due to the conception that such 
an action was viewed as treasonous to the Fiihrer and Germany. In April 1945, one 
veteran of the Eastern Front, Giinter Koschorrek stated "in this endgame, some brain-
damaged troop leaders... [would] follow Hitler's orders to the letter and fight to the last 
round of ammunition."197 Unfortunately, Koschorrek was indeed among the minority of 
soldiers who sincerely felt this way, while others continued to fight to the death even in 
the last months of the war. The hopelessness that filled the minds of the average German 
soldier was prevalent during the final stages of the war. In late November 1944, Joseph 
Surmely explained somberly: "Nobody knows what the next morning will bring. If we 
will still be able to stop the enemy...that is the question.... Do we have to flee and where 
1 QR 
then?" When surrounded by enemy forces, Martin Poppel, an experienced paratrooper, 
found the option of surrender difficult even in April 1945: 
I discussed the situation with the last Unteroffizier. The Fiihrer order was 
very much in my mind: 'If a superior officer no longer appears in a 
position to lead, he is to hand over command to the nearest rank below.' 
Personally, I was ready to surrender - me, who had been a paratrooper 
from the very first day of the war. Yet although the struggle was 
completely hopeless, men came to me in tears. 'As paratroopers, how will 
we be able to look our wives in the face, if we surrender voluntarily.' A 
phenomenon, incredible...Then, after long silence, they said that if the 
'Old Man'...thought we should surrender, then they would follow me. 
[Poppel was 24.]199 
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In this incredible testimony, Poppel no doubt felt the strain of dedication to a lost cause 
as well as fear of reprimand for abandoning his post. 
If a member of the Wehrmacht chose to surrender, there were ample warnings by 
Nazi propaganda regarding the Russian enemy. To a certain degree, the caution of 
surrender and promises of death were indeed warranted when remembering the horrible 
treatment of Soviet POWs by German forces. Many German soldiers believed that to 
surrender meant certain death at the hands of the Russians. Therefore, it was more logical 
to fight to the bitter end rather than face imprisonment and unavoidable execution. The 
irony in this thinking is that the Germans began the merciless killing of POWs. Yet, after 
years of implementing the strict policy of prisoner killing, some soldiers began to fear the 
inevitable retribution that would surely await them. Guy Sajer recalled his reaction after 
killing Russians: 
[Later] we began to grasp what had happened...We suddenly felt gripped 
by something horrible, which made our skins crawl...For me, these 
memories produced a loss of physical sensation, almost as if my 
personality had split...because I knew that such things don't happen to 
young men who have led normal lives... 
'We really were shits to kill those Popovs [Russians]...' [Hals said.] 
He was clearly desperately troubled by the same things that troubled me. 
'[That's] how it is, and all there is,' I answered...Something hideous had 
entered our spirits, to remain and haunt us forever.200 
The fact that Sajer and his comrade felt remorse for killing Russian soldiers who 
surrendered suggests that he knew the Russians would more than likely react in a similar 
fashion when faced with surrendering German troops. 
Surrender also proved difficult for German civilians who had been indoctrinated 
by the Nazi regime about the hardships that would follow if Russia overtook Germany. In 
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a report from G. Edward Buxton at the OSS, he explained via a source in Bern the 
perspective of the average German citizen toward unconditional surrender: 
Here is what is reported to me as the views of a German woman who is a 
servant in a private family. This person imagines...that the chaos she saw 
in Germany after the last was will be repeated, plus the inflation in which 
her family lost everything. In addition, she sees the Jews returning to take 
over her brother's business; she sees Russians everywhere, and joins with 
them the bad elements in her own village, who, after the war, were first 
Communists, then Nazis, and ultimately Gestapo.... It is not so much her 
pride as a German which makes her oppose unconditional surrender, as it 
is the practical certainty which she feels that under such circumstances it 
would really be better to be dead. She is personally quite sick of Goebbels' 
propaganda, but, like a vast number of women in Germany, she feels that 
her country's only hope is to cling like death to Hitler and to pray that he 
may find a way to save the Fatherland.201 
Essentially, the propaganda that bombarded Germans for so many years drove many 
individuals to sincerely believe that there was no room for surrender. There was only 
hope in Hitler and his ability to relieve the suffering of the German people from an 
advancing Russian army. 
The primary objective of propaganda is to present a set of specific conceptions of 
the enemy that manipulates the truth to generate feelings of hatred. Nazi propaganda 
worked relentlessly to manufacture a false idea of the Russian people so that German 
soldiers could commit to the ideology of Hitler. Karl Fuchs described the Russian enemy 
in August 1941: 
There is no troop morale and they are at best cannon fodder...they are 
nothing but a bunch of assholes! Everyone, even the last doubter, knows 
today that the battle against these subhumans, who've been whipped into a 
frenzy by the Jews, was not only necessary but came in the nick of time... 
202 Our Fiihrer has saved Europe from certain chaos. 
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Since the primary goal of Nazi Germany was the enslavement and ultimate annihilation 
of the Slavic race, propaganda pamphlets attacked the enemy of Nazism. Furthermore, 
the purpose of such images of Russia was to "inculcate in German soldiers, both 
members of SS units and the regular troops in Russia, attitudes that would enable them to 
carry out the program of racial ideology whose core elements consisted of the 'final 
203 
solution' and a German empire in the East." The defamation of the enemy creates a 
sense of purpose and hatred in the hearts and minds of those fighting for Nazi ideology. 
Racial ideology was the primary drive for the invasion of Russia in June 1941. As 
Walter von Reichenau, commander of the 6th Army, explained on October 10, 1941: 
Regarding the conduct of the troops toward the Bolshevik system many 
unclear ideas still remain.... Thereby the troops too have tasks, which go 
beyond the conventional unilateral soldierly tradition [Soldatentum]. In the 
East, the soldier is not only a fighter according to the rules of warfare, but 
also a carrier of an inexorable racial conception [volkischen Idee] and the 
avenger of all the bestialities which have been committed against the 
Germans and related races.204 
The leaders of the Wehrmacht believed in their Fiihrer's view of Slavic people and thus 
promoted the ideology throughout the ranks of their men. Had the leaders of the military 
disagreed, there would have been more resistance to killing of noncombatants and POWs. 
General von Manstein, commander of the Eleventh Army, stated to his soldiers on 
November 20, 1941: 
The Jewish-Bolshevist system must be eradicated once and for all. It must 
never be allowed to intrude on our European sphere again.... [German 
soldiers acted] as bearers of an ethnic message and to avenge all the acts 
of brutality committed against them and the German people.... Soldiers 
must show understanding for the necessity of harsh measures against Jews 
[referring to the actions of the SS Einsatzgruppen], who have been the 
moving force behind Bolshevist terror and must pay the penalty for it. 
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These measures are also necessary to suppress uprisings, which in most 
205 
cases are instigated by Jews, at the first sign of unrest.' 
General von Manstein clearly supports the murderous actions of the Nazi regime as well 
as defends the brutal methods that are currently taking place among German troops. Time 
and again, German High Command feels the need to rationalize Hitler's war of genocide 
against Russia. Even more important than the physical fighting was the psychological 
impact of Nazi propaganda upon soldiers to give justice to the blatant atrocities taking 
place on a daily basis. Earlier, in October 1941, Field Marshal Walter von Reichenau, 
commander of the Sixth Army, felt the urgency to clarify the extent of force deemed 
acceptable. He states: 
The most important goal of the campaign against the Jewish-Bolshevist 
system is the complete destruction of its grip on power and the elimination 
of Asian influence from our European cultural sphere. This means that 
soldiers will have to carry out missions that go beyond the traditional one-
sided military duties. Here in the East our soldiers must not only engage in 
battle according to the rules of war, but also be the bearers of a relentless 
ethnic message and ruthlessly avenge the bestialities committed against us 
and ethnically related peoples.... Hence soldiers must fully accept the 
necessity for the harsh but just expiation exacted from Jewish 
Untermenschen. This punishment serves the further purpose of 
suppressing uprisings behind the German front lines, which experience has 
shown are always instigated by Jews.... [The mission of German soldiers 
was] ruthlessly to eliminate the treachery and brutality of non-German 
individuals and thereby secure the lives of German military personnel in 
Russia.206 
In both of the aforementioned examples, high-ranking German military leaders felt 
inclined to defend the actions of the Einsatzgruppen as well as the actions deemed 
necessary of the average German soldier. The Nazis attempted to place as much distance 
between the perpetrators and victims in the hope that no concerns would arise concerning 
their questionable actions. 
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The effectiveness of the Propaganda Ministry in Nazi Germany was proven by the 
myriad of executions of enemy soldiers and civilians. The fact that there were numerous 
atrocities committed by the German military, SS and Einsatzgruppen included, gives 
testament to the gruesome reality of success of ideological propaganda upon the soldiers' 
psyches. Even in defeat, the Nazi propaganda machine was able to transform it into a 
successful victory for Germany, as exemplified in the military defeat at Stalingrad in 
1943. 
Due to the violence associated with fascism, death was celebrated. As Guy Sajer 
recalls Hauptmann Wesreidau, captain of Sajer and the Grossdeutschland division, stating 
to his men: 
That's why you're fighting... You're nothing more than animals on the 
defensive, even when you're obligated to take the offensive. So be brave: 
life is war, and war is life. Liberty doesn't exist...Germany is a great 
country...Today, our difficulties are immense. The system in which we 
more of less believe is every bit as good as the slogans on the other side. 
Even if we don't always approve of what we have to do, we must carry out 
orders for the sake of our country, our comrades, and our families, against 
whom the other half of the world is fighting in the name of truth and 
justice. We are now embarked on a risky enterprise, with no assurance of 
safety. We are advancing an idea of unity which is neither rich nor easily 
digestible, but the vast majority of the German people accept it and adhere 
to it, forging and forming it in an admirable collective effort. This is where 
we are now risking everything. We are tying, taking due account of the 
attitudes of society, to change the face of the world, hoping to revive the 
ancient virtues buried under the layers of filth bequeathed to us by our 
forebears. We can expect no reward for this effort. We are loathed 
everywhere: if we should lose tomorrow those of us still alive after so 
much suffering will be judged without justice. We shall be accused of an 
infinity of murder, as if everywhere, and at all times, men at war did not 
behave in the same way. Those who have an interest in putting an end to 
our ideals will ridicule everything we believe in. We shall be spared 
nothing. Even the tombs of our heroes will be destroyed, only preserving-
as a gesture of respect toward the dead- a few which contain figures of 
doubtful heroism, who were never fully committed to our cause. With our 
deaths, all the prodigies of heroism which our daily circumstances require 
of us, and the memory of our comrades, dead and alive, and our 
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communion of spirits, our fears and our hopes, will vanish, and our history 
will never be told. Future generations will speak only of an idiotic, 
unqualified sacrifice. Whether you wanted it or not, you are now part of 
this undertaking, and nothing which follows can equal the efforts you have 
made.207 
The willingness to accept one's own mortality and inevitable death was the message 
many soldiers received on the front line. In addition, Hauptmann Wesreidau defends the 
brutality of the campaign and even acknowledges the crimes that will ultimately befall 
Germany. These men were ready and committed to die for Germany and Hitler's plight 
for the destruction of Soviet Russia. 
Germans sincerely believed they were embarking on a mission to save all of 
Europe from Bolshevism. Colonel-General Hermann Hoth, commander of the 17th Army, 
stated on November 25, 1941: 
It has become increasingly clear to us this summer, that here in the East 
spiritually unbridgeable conceptions are fighting each other: German sense 
of honor and race, and a soldierly tradition of many centuries, against an 
Asiatic mode of thinking and primitive instincts, whipped up by a small 
number of mostly Jewish intellectuals... More than ever we are filled with 
the thought of a new era, in which the strength of the German people's 
racial superiority and achievements entrusts it with the leadership of 
Europe. We clearly recognize our mission to save European culture from 
the advancing Asiatic barbarism. We now know that we have to fight 
against an incensed and tough opponent. This battle can only end with the 
208 
destruction of one or the other; a compromise is out of the question. 
Camouflaging a campaign of annihilation with a noble cause to save European culture 
presented Germans with a sense of a greater cause. This effectively shifted focus off of 
the brutal reality of Hitler's agenda to murder millions. If Germany accepted defeat at the 
hands of the Soviet Army, a global apocalypse would definitely ensue. This mindset 
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enacted the hardened soldiers of the Wehrmacht, who desperately fought for a convoluted 
cause. 
Illustrated as Untermenschen and not believed worthy of living, the Russians 
faced a grim future when confronted by the Wehrmacht. In mid-July 1941 a Wehrmacht 
NCO wrote home from the Eastern Front about the situation: 
The German people owes a great debt to our Fiihrer, for had these beasts, 
who are our enemies here, come to Germany, such murders would have 
taken place that the world has never seen before...What we have seen, no 
newspaper can describe. It borders on the unbelievable, even the Middle 
Ages do not compare with what has occurred here. And when one reads 
the 'Sturmef and looks at the pictures, that is only a weak illustration of 
what we see here and the crimes committed here by the Jews. Believe me, 
even the most sensational newspaper reports are only a fraction of what is 
happening here.209 
Clearly, this soldier was heavily influenced by the bombardment of Nazi propaganda. To 
discover this mindset in a letter from the front causes great concern when examining the 
Wehrmacht. If one NCO passionately believed this way, can it be assumed that many 
more soldiers agreed with this inference? The sad reality was that he was not in the 
minority. Hitler campaigned and preached a tremendous hatred of all Slavic people since 
the early 1930s, ultimately converting his message to policy. The primary reason for 
dehumanization of the enemy enabled the German soldier to murder without remorse. 
The concept of Untermenschen was vital when attempting to gain support for a primarily 
ideological war. The more that German soldiers believed they were fighting against a 
truly evil adversary, murder would surely become an accepted and even encouraged 
method. 
The concept of Untermenschen distorted the psyches of Wehrmacht soldiers, 
supposedly oblivious to the atrocities their fellow brethren committed from the beginning 
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of September 1939. A Wehrmacht major, who passed through the Warsaw ghetto, 
commented on the Jew's inhumanity rather than the German's criminal actions toward 
Jews: 
The conditions in the ghetto can hardly be described...The Jew does 
business here with the others also on the street. In the morning, as I drove 
through in my car, I saw numerous corpses, among them those of children, 
covered anyhow with paper weighed down with stones. The other Jews 
pass by them indifferently, the primitive 'corpse-carts' come and take 
away these 'remainders' with which no more business can be done. The 
ghetto is blocked by walls, barbed-wire, and so forth...Dirt, stench and 
910 
noise are the main signs of the ghetto. 
Amazingly, this individual of considerable rank did not stop to conceive that fellow 
Germans were at the root cause of these peoples' suffering. In essence, the complete 
indoctrination of the aforementioned examples demonstrates the extent to which Nazi 
propaganda was successful in distorting reality. 
Hitler illustrated a grandiose struggle for Germany in which the German soldier 
was the best suited to deal with Bolshevism and Jewish influence. According to Hitler, 
the German soldier 
is the first representative of life in this struggle [for existence], for he has 
always been the best selection of those people who by their life's mission 
and -when necessary—by their loss of life have ensured the life of the 
others in this and thereby in the next world.. .No one who has not added to 
tradition by his own life and action may speak of tradition... Whatever is 
to be with the life and destiny of the individual, supreme to all of them is 
the existence and future of the whole... for us all has been revealed what 
so many will still certainly have to fight for in the near future: the German 
Volkl The world wishes our dissolution. Our answer can only be the 
renewed oath to the greatest community of all times. Their aim is German 
disunity. Our creed [Glaubensbekenntnis] - German unity. Their hope is 
the success of capitalist interests, and our will is THE NATIONAL 
SOCIALIST VOLKSGEMEINSCHAFT ["Community"]!211 
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The German soldier was destined for a greater cause on behalf of the Volk and the 
continuation of the Aryan race. This high level of indoctrination greatly impacted the 
average soldier, which blurred horrendous atrocities. Along these lines of justification for 
the war, the officer corps' news-sheet, Mitteilungen fur das Offizierkorps, urged 
commnaders in April 1942 to understand that: 
[i]n the struggle against the capitalism and imperialism of the English and 
the Americans and against the world-revolutionary theses of the 
Bolsheviks the weapons of the Wehrmacht alone will not achieve 
victory...[which can be gained] only...when the people...confronts the 
political and ideological theses of the enemy with better political 
concepts...[S]uch an attitude...is based on the German people's 
unshakable sense of loyalty to Fiihrer, Volk and Fatherland, the kind of 
loyalty which remains absolutely firm in the face of all crises and knows 
no skepticism...Not only are the economic and power-political bases of 
our life critically threatened, but the whole spiritual life of the nation, the 
ethical basis of our cultural and religious concept of the world, truly 
everything which is great and holy for German men in life and death, all is 
threatened at the core if we fail to master the enemy...Have the officers 
burnt this so deeply into their men's hearts, that each of them knows and 
sees fully and clearly against what devilish game in the world he has been 
called into action?...We know that the Devil has been set loose against our 
land...we are filled with the responsibility to God to defend the land 
which had been given us, to save His property and to multiply it, and 
therefore we mobilize not only our weapons...but also the weapons of the 
soul...The military-spiritual [wehrgeistige, or ideological] leadership of 
the soldiers has been added to the officers' duties, because political 
determination and soldierly feats are a single unity and are indissolubly 
bound to each other. The more German soldiers are aware of the full 
extent of the mortal danger which threatens them, the greater will be the 
conviction and the toughness with which they will confront the dynamics 
of the Bolshevik revolution with the whole strength of soul and will of 
National Socialist Germany...In the war, as the Fiihrer has said...the 
nations are being judged in the Godly court of the Almighty. He who 
survives this trial will be seen as worthy of molding a new life on 
earth... What a task!...The officers of the Fiihrer, and the German soldiers 
whom they lead, a sworn community of the best men of the German 
blood, carried on by the love, the work and the belief of the German 
people, are marching to the decision. There beyond hell is burning. May it 
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charge! We shall still win! 
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This example of influential religious ideological propaganda created a noble situation for 
those Germans fighting the good fight for the glory of God, Germany, and Fiihrer. 
Additionally, demonizing the Russian Bolsheviks exemplified the good versus evil 
struggle. 
When the war transformed into a defensive campaign after Stalingrad and Kursk, 
the desperation of the propaganda machine was expressed. In January 1945, the 4th 
Panzer Division issued a "Front-Credo" (Frontbekenntnis) to its soldiers, which 
embodied the National Socialist Weltanschauung ("world view") and blended it with a 
pseudo-religious statement of belief: 
I PROFESS—in view of my oath to the flag—my front 
comradeship to my division. 
I AM DETERMINED to give my whole strength, my blood and 
my life in the present decisive battle for the life of my people. 
NEVER will I abandon my weapons... 
I BELIEVE in Germany. I will also do all in my powers to 
preserve and to strengthen the spiritual power of resistance of the German 
people at the front and in the homeland by speech and deed. 
I BELIEVE in the German people united by National Socialism 
and in the victory of its just cause. 
I BELIEVE as a National Socialist soldier in my Fiihrer Adolf 
Hitler.213 
Nazi ideology became the accepted death sentence to those soldiers who embraced this 
oath. One soldier, Alfred Trost, wrote in December 1944: "For the sixth time we are 
committed to the war. One of the hardest years of struggle lies behind us once again. At 
all fronts the fight has inconceivably increased."214 Sheer desperation was evident in this 
statement as defeat loomed on the horizon. Additionally, Nazi propaganda was designed 
to create a false sense of assurance for the German people. The Office of Strategic 
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Services explained how "the propaganda machine is...making every effort to encourage 
optimism among the masses, even going so far as announcing victories of the German 
army before they have...occurred."215 These critical claims were vital when the war 
began its downfall after 1942. 
Most German soldiers believed in the worthy war in which they were engaged. 
Hitler was successful in creating enemies, which presented many Germans to believe that 
the entire world was intent on the destruction of Germany. Rolf Hoffmann wrote in 
February 1945: 
You must know to come to terms with your lot, even if it is tragic.... 
Everything has an end, even the war.... Then we will again construct a 
worthy existence. As Eichendorff said: 'As long as I breathe, I'm not 
given up for lost.' So it is with our beloved Fatherland. We have held out 
for six long years against a world of enemies; we knew only battle and 
work and battle again. Do we deserve in the end to be smashed and 
destroyed? We want to trust in the Lord God, that He has not deserted our 
German people and will give back to it at the end of this mighty struggle 
its right to life on this earth. That means waiting until a better future is 
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granted us. 
Interestingly, this particular soldier believed that God was on the side of Germany, yet 
Nazi Germany had attempted to destroy organized Christianity. 
In order to gain support for the war against Russia, Hitler created the illusion that 
Germany was under assault from the Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy that would surely 
destroy all of Europe. The day after Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, Corporal 
A.N. wrote, "Now Jewry has declared war on us along the whole line...All that are in 
bondage to the Jews stand in a front against us. The Marxists fight shoulder to shoulder 
with high finance as before 1933 in Germany.... Through our preventive attack, we again 
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have the Reds by the nose.... We ourselves know exactly what is at stake in this game. 
The insinuation in the final sentence of the corporal's letter suggests the deadly wave of 
Bolshevism that will destroy all of Europe if Russia is not completely destroyed. 
Corporal K.G. elaborates, "The great task that has placed us in battle against Bolshevism 
lies in the destruction of eternal Judaism.... When you see what the Jew has brought 
about here in Russia, only then can you begin to understand why the Fiihrer began this 
struggle against Judaism. What sort of misfortunes would have been visited upon our 
Fatherland, if this bestial people had gotten the upper hand?"217 It is astonishing that so 
many average Wehrmacht soldiers could have believed so unabashedly in a myth of 
Jewish Bolshevism, when in reality, it was deep-seeded in racial hatred. 
Among the soldiers, a general fear of Bolshevism was prevalent due to the 
extensive propaganda network throughout the ranks. Corporal W.F. quite frankly stated 
in November 1941 that "a complete destruction [of Bolshevism] is...required... [for] if 
these bestial hordes of soldiers were to fall upon Germany all would be gone that is 
71 R 
German." Another soldier, Karl Fuchs, sounding more like a propaganda pamphlet, 
expressed his hatred for the Russian POWs: "Hardly ever do you see the face of a person 
who seems rational and intelligent. They all look emaciated and the wild, half-crazy look 
in their eyes makes them look like imbeciles. [How] could these scoundrels, led by Jews 71 Q 
and criminals, want to imprint their stamp on Europe?" Fuchs' appeared astounded that 
these so-called criminals could actually believe they could control the European 
continent. How could these soldiers truly believe in the lies propagated by Hitler? These 
troops sincerely believed they were a Godsend for Russians, yet they continually 
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executed thousands, if not millions, in the first year of Operation Barbarossa. Hitler was 
viewed as the savior of Germany and all of Europe. As one soldier commented, "Indeed, 
the fighting was tough...[but] to those in the homeland we soldiers can only say that 
Adolf Hitler has saved Germany and thereby the whole of Europe from the Red 
790 
Army." When ideologies clash, the outcome is the inevitable destruction of one or the 
other, with little room for compromise. 
More examples of a stern belief in the Nazi regime's cause were present in 
soldiers' correspondence from the front. One Landser exclaimed: "This [battle] is for a 
new ideology, a new belief, a new life!" Private K.B. stated in April 1940 confidently 
explained: "We know what ideals we fight for." Hans August Vowinckel followed up 
Private K.B.'s statement, reiterating in December 1940, that "Our people stands in a great 
struggle for its existence and for its mission. We must fight for the meaning, for the 
giving of meaning to this struggle.... Where our people fights for its existence, that is for 
us destiny, simple destiny." Along a similar string of consciousness, Karl Fuchs remarked 
in May 1941, "An individual is comparatively insignificant in war and yet, individual 
sacrifice in the struggle for an ideal is not in vain.... We are fighting for the existence of 
our entire people, of our Volk.... Our vision must be for the future because we are 
engaged in a struggle that will assure us of the well-being of our...nation." Martin Poppel 
noted in his diary, "Our joy in living and lust for life are stronger now than they've ever 
been, but each of us is ready to sacrifice his life for the holy Fatherland. This Fatherland 
is my faith, and my only hope."221 The amount of fervor present in these quotations 
exposes the true dedication to the Nazi regime and ideology. The fact is that the majority 
220
 Fritz, 197. 
221
 Ibid., 211. 
113 
of Wehrmacht soldiers were either indoctrinated over an extended amount of time or 
simply believed they were fighting a noble cause worthy of sacrifice. 
When examining the men of the Wehrmacht, it is important to realize that they 
did not view themselves as criminals; rather, they saw themselves as good men fighting 
for the good of German if not the entire world. Alfons Heck, a former Hitler Youth leader 
and soldier, later acknowledged: "1 never once during the Hitler years thought of myself 
as anything but a decent, honorable young German." How could it be possible that any 
sane human being would allow themselves to commit the horrendous atrocities that 
became infamous during the course of the Second World War? When the dark secrets 
were exposed at the war's conclusion, many soldiers experienced a convenient amnesia, 
believing they committed no crimes whatsoever. Denial controlled the thoughts of 
veterans who could not properly cope with their actions as young men. Many of these 
men believed wholeheartedly that they were serving their country to preserve Germany. 
If they were to believe that there actions had indeed been evil and barbaric, all purpose 
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and sacrifice of their comrades would become frivolous. To a certain degree, the 
average soldier felt bitter and betrayed by Hitler at the war's conclusion. Yet, it remains 
difficult to examine this controversial topic when so many of these supposedly innocent 
men did indeed murder millions. As Siegfried Knappe expressed in his memoirs: 
Losing the war...preyed on my mind.... Being captured had always been a 
real possibility,...but surrendering our country?... I felt stunned now, 
almost as if I were in someone else's bad dream. The war had shattered 
my life and left only a deep void.... It was a feeling of deep desperation.... 
I spent much of those first three weeks [in captivity] going over 
Germany's experience of the previous six years. Where had we gone so 
wrong? ...I felt that Germany's claim to the Rhineland, the Sudetenland, 
and the Polish Corridor had been justified.... Hitler annexed Austria as a 
result of a plebiscite by the Austrian people. I felt that our invasion of 
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France had been justified because France had declared war on us.... It was 
only now beginning to dawn on me that our treatment of other nations had 
been arrogant, that the only justification we had felt necessary was our 
own.... I had unquestioningly accepted the brutal philosophy that might 
makes right; the arrogance of our national behavior had not even occurred 
to me at the time.... What had begun, at least in our minds, as an effort to 
correct the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles had escalated far beyond 
anything that any of us could have imagined. In retrospect, I realized that 
I, and countless others like me, had helped Hitler start and fight a world 
war of conquest that had left tens of millions of people dead and destroyed 
our own country. I wondered now whether I would ever have questioned 
these things if we had won the war. I had to conclude that it was unlikely. 
This was lesson taught by defeat, not by victory. 
Memoirs present the author with time to analyze and critique past actions and beliefs. As 
Knappe realizes, although too late, the claims of Nazi propaganda had betrayed their 
confidence in Hitler and the belief that soldiers as himself were fighting a noble effort to 
halt the spread of Bolshevism. 
The effect Nazi propaganda had upon the average German soldier as well as the 
German people remains incredibly controversial. Daniel Goldhagen believes 
"eliminationist anti-Semitism was a German cultural cognitive model that predated Nazi 
political power, a committed anti-Nazi could be a committed, passionate racial anti-
Semite. Killing the Jews was for many a deed done not for Nazism but for Germany."224 
This claim has outraged many veterans and Germans alike in the sense that it is a broad 
analysis and judgment of an entire nation. Interestingly, though, is the fact that popular 
opinion did in fact drive Nazi policies. As Goldhagen explains: 
[T]he Nazis backed down when faced with serious, widespread popular 
opposition. Had the Nazis been faced with a German populace who saw 
Jews as ordinary human beings, and German Jews as their brothers and 
sisters, then it is hard to imagine that the Nazis would have proceeded, or 
would have been able to proceed, with the extermination of the Jews. If 
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they somehow had been able to go forward, then the probability that the 
assault would have unfolded as it did, and that Germans would have killed 
so many Jews, is extremely low. The probability that it would have 
produced so much German cruelty and exterminatory zeal is zero. A 
German population roused against the elimination and extermination of 
225 
the Jews most likely would have stayed the regime's hand. 
In other words, had the German populace taken a firm stand against the annihilation of 
Jews, the Holocaust might have been avoided. 
Apathy and regret of conceivably being blamed, German society as a whole did 
nothing to even speak out against ruthless degradation and even massacre of the Jewish 
community. It is simple to place the entirety of blame upon Nazi officials who decided to 
force this on the people of Germany, but the citizens and even the members of Police 
Battalion 101 are also to be held liable. The average German should be accountable as 
well, for "those with knowledge who kept it to themselves, those who kept Nazi society 
working efficiently, those acquiescing in the anti-Jewish measures and the visible 
maltreatment and eventual disappearance of the Jews" have ultimately assisted the Nazis 
in their ultimate goal of attaining the perfect race.226 Perhaps hatred bred among Germans 
and the potential improvement of life was plenty to silently agree to these atrocities. 
People all over the German-controlled regions knew of the wrongdoings and, in short, did 
not attempt to alter the situation; rather, they assisted in the extermination as Eley 
conveys. Maybe the German citizens did not physically pull the trigger, but their 
complete apathy toward Jewish persecution leaves them holding much responsibility for 
the deaths of millions. 
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The people of Poland did attempt to oppose the Nazi regime by boycotting 
anything German. In addition, the Poles also created an underground court system that 
sentenced people with German affiliation to "pronounced judgments of infamy."227 The 
court commissioners did not sentence those offenders found guilty to death, but rather 
subjected the perpetrators to public ridicule by head-shavings for the women or floggings 
for the men. The resistance toward the German annexation unified the Poles by giving 
them hope in a desperate time of foreign occupation. Sabotage and malevolence to 
anything German was strongly encouraged and recommended. Acid and gas bombs were 
only some of the devises used to defy Germany, along with public ridicule of Hitler 
through satire also aided in the unification of the masses throughout Poland. Germans 
were born with a sense of loyalty to the state and were taught to loath any opposition. The 
Polish stand may have given the ordinary Germans motivation to do away with any anti-
German behavior. Furthermore, this rationale might have been the justification the Police 
Battalions needed to obliterate everything non-German. 
While Goldhagen remains a controversial individual, he does present an 
interesting point nonetheless. Therefore, was there any resistance in Germany to the 
murderous Nazi policies? The solution required all opposition to Hitler and the Nazi 
Party arrested and placed into camps charged with political crimes, initiating an era of 
fear. This process began in 1933 as Hitler gained power in Germany, which quickly rid 
Germany of any potential resistance sectors.228 In a political system where public opinion 
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drove national policies, Hitler understood that it was imperative that he rid Germany of 
any direct opposition in order to pursue his goals unchallenged. 
Nazi ideology played a prominent role in the murders of millions of Jews. 
Interestingly, as Lozowick explains, "the same ideology which condemned the Jews to 
death demanded absolute obedience from the murderers. Once the murderers convinced 
themselves that the interpretation of reality inherent in the ideology was indeed accurate, 
• 990 
it may have been easier to act accordingly, to murder." The importance was that the 
end justified the means which required innocent blood to stain the hands of the SS and 
Wehrmacht. Benjamin Segalowitz proposes that the "German Army accommodated itself 
to the war of extermination that was waged in ideological guise."230 Nazi ideology was 
followed blindly and justified by the perpetrators as a necessity for ultimate victory. 
Germans, through years of Nazi propaganda, had been programmed to view the 
Jews as unworthy and unequal. "An enthusiasm to kill and remove the object provoking 
such fear" demonstrates the feelings of the Germans toward the Jews. By placing the 
enemy in such a twisted perspective, there originates a type of acceptance to such acts of 
violence that would result during the Nazi Third Reich. As Glass points out, "individuals 
serve an extermination process willingly because of belief in its legitimacy." Throughout 
years of paranoia distributed by the Nazi propaganda machine, many of these ordinary 
Germans believed they were truly serving their country and fellow comrades to make 
Germany greater for the pure race. Jews were perceived to be on the same level as lice, 
other grotesque insects and vermin that were threatening the German people and their 
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231 
way of life. If the Jew was seen as dirty, then the urgency to cleanse the streets proved 
enormous. Many Germans believed that the Jew was similar to that of a disease which 
must be contained before it had the opportunity of infecting society. Hitler believed that 
"the Aryan race had become ill, that it had been rendered ill by the Jewish infection."232 
This attitude toward the Jews categorized them into sub humans not worthy of German 
presence. By removing this impurity of society, Germans could feel more secure knowing 
the unworthy Jew was extracted from the Aryan genetic pool. 
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Chapter 5: 
Honor, Guilt, and the Myth of the Wehrmacht 
Its [the Wehrmacht] virtues were magnified, its faults minimized...[I]n the minds 
of a great many historians, the wholesale murders by the Hitler regime were 
almost totally the work of the SS. The regular army was simply a helpless 
233 bystander to a crime it could do nothing to prevent. -John Mosier 
Too many people learn about war with no inconvenience to themselves. They read 
about Verdun or Stalingrad without comprehension, sitting in a comfortable 
armchair, with their feet beside the fire, preparing to go about their business the 
next day, as usual. One should really read such accounts under compulsion, in 
discomfort, considering oneself fortunate not to be describing the events in a 
letter home, writing from a hole in the mud. One should read about war in the 
worst circumstances, when everything is going badly, remembering that the 
torments of peace are trivial, and not worth any white hairs. Nothing is really 
serious in the tranquility of peace; only an idiot could be really disturbed by a 
question of salary. One should read about war standing up, late at night, when 
one is tired, as I am writing about it now, at dawn, while my asthma attack wears 
o f f . And even now, in my sleepless exhaustion, how gentle and easy peace seems\ 
-Guy Sajer234 
When a criminal law is violated through the execution of an official order, the 
issuing officer is solely responsible. However, the subordinate who obeys the 
order is subject to punishment as a participant: 
1. if he exceeds the order he was given, or, 
2. if it was known to him that the superior's order concerned an act that had as its 
object a general or military crime or misdemeanor,235 
When the Second World War came to a conclusion in May 1945, Allied Forces 
discovered the horrors that Hitler's Third Reich inflicted throughout Europe. The 
Nuremberg Trials encouraged the myth that the SS and Einsatzgruppen were the true 
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culprits of genocide rather than the Wehrmacht. In essence, the Wehrmacht were allowed 
a free pass of sorts when explaining the criminal actions of the Nazi regime. The 
Hamburg Institute for Social Research released a controversial exhibition entitled The 
German Army and Genocide in March 1995. This presentation brought to light the fact 
that the Wehrmacht were not innocent or victims during the Second World War. As 
imagined, this exhibit was not received with open arms due to the fact that Germans had 
attempted to forget about their recent past and move on from the nightmare that was 
Hitler's reign. 
The German Army lived in a world of contradictions, such as the conception of 
honor. The brutal reality of the war presents an army full of dishonor for deeds that 
directly opposed the rules of war. The Eastern Front experienced the most intensive 
fighting where a mixture of perverse discipline and an encouragement of mass murders 
coincided. Yet, once this boundary was traversed there was no turning back. The 
Wehrmacht entered into a system of killing that was effectively orchestrated by the 
average German soldier. 
At the war's conclusion, a myriad of German veterans swore they knew nothing 
of the concentration camps or mass executions of civilians in occupied regions. Siegfried 
Knappe explains that "as a professional soldier, I could not escape my share of the guilt, 
because without us Hitler could not have done the horrible things he had done; but as a 
human being, I felt no guilt, because I had had no part in or knowledge of the things he 
had done." In Knappe's experience, he claimed to not have directly executed anyone, 
but does this dictate one's own guilt by association with a criminal organization? He is 
correct in stating that without the cooperation of the Wehrmacht, Hitler would have been 
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unable to have even attempted the war of annihilation. News of executions traveled 
quickly throughout the ranks of the Wehrmacht, leaving few soldiers unaware. Mosier 
states that "If much of the alleged resistance to Hitler was, in reality, nothing more than 
passive-aggressive behavior, much of the behavior of Wehrmacht personnel at lower 
levels can be termed its opposite: a passive acceptance of behavior that was wicked and 
in most cases illegal. Although often unable to judge the meaning of what they observed, 
237 
many soldiers were aware of what was happening." The problem remained in the 
fictionalized myth that the Wehrmacht were victims of Hitler; yet this passive 
bewilderment, if we are to believe that is what this was, inadvertently proved the guilt of 
the German military. 
Some historians believe that it was the minority of German soldiers who were 
truly guilty of any crimes. John Mosier explains that eyewitnesses did not fear for their 
lives, but there was "little that observers could do about what they saw...simply because 
the individual often feels helpless to do anything about wrongdoing when it is clearly 
•yn Q 
sanctioned by the institution itself." The average German soldier uninvolved would be 
left to complete their duties without interference because of the strong indoctrination of a 
domineering regime. To go against the commands of the Fiihrer displayed disobedience 
in a military that was solely based on the understanding of completing one's objective 
without question. 
Those Germans in the High Command could not escape their association with a 
criminal institution. Albert Speer stated in his memoirs that he effectively enabled and 
empowered Hitler although he was not technically guilty of any crimes: "[A]nd yet- I 
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drove with Hitler under those streamers and did not feel the baseness of the slogans being 
publicly displayed and sanctioned by the government. Once again: I suppose I did not 
even see the streamers...it even seems to me that my own 'purity,' my indolence, makes 
239 
me guiltier." If Speer's own guilt by association is any indication, then many of the 
soldiers who stood by while innocent civilians and unarmed POWs were executed are 
guilty in the pretext of their own inaction. 
The difficulties and stresses experienced by many soldiers on the front enabled 
many to lose any humane inhibitions concerning mass murder. In this environment, 
obedience was the ultimate ruler for these men, even if the orders were considered 
criminal in hindsight. It was this atmosphere that allowed so many perpetrators to 
abandon any responsibility and personal guilt for their actions. Through the chaos of war, 
acceptance of murder and death was thrust into the normal daily activities. One unnamed 
Landser wrote after the war, "[A]s good soldiers we had to fulfill our hard duty." 
Continuing along these same lines of thoughts, another soldier confessed, "I had 
unquestioningly accepted the brutal philosophy that might makes right."240 It must be 
explained that this perspective reflects the utmost brutality of the Eastern Front. Another 
veteran of the Wehrmacht stated in an interview after the war: 
I was...more inclined to say, alright, it 's not to your taste what they are 
expecting of you,...but if from the point of view of the state and our 
philosophy this is required, well for God's sake, you'll have to do your 
duty, you must summon up the necessary understanding to say that this 
just has to be done. Fulfilling your duty is very close to the spirit of 
sacrifice...There were things where you simply accepted that you have to 
participate, because the whole thing, the collective purpose, just requires i -241 you to do it. 
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In Russia, the rules of war were quickly abandoned by both sides who were equally 
determined to eliminate the opposing army. 
Many soldiers felt they did not commit the horrendous atrocities that Germany 
was accused of during the war. One such soldier, Martin Poppel, persisted: 
The vast majority of us were soldiers, often credulous soldiers, but not 
executioners and not monsters. We had been committed to Germany, but 
now we had to find new meaning in our lives. Each one of us would have 
to struggle alone for himself and his family, without being able to stand 
shoulder-to-shoulder with other soldiers, without the comradeship...to 
support us.... [PJersonal responsibility, which the Fiihrer took away from 
242 
us, could no longer be avoided. 
Poppel proposed that his fellow comrades were not murderers; rather, they acted in the 
best interest of Germany, which Hitler had recklessly manipulated. As news and reports 
of the brutal nature of the campaign became public, many of these soldiers were forced to 
deal with the repercussions of the Wehrmacht's collective involvement. A Wehrmacht 
veteran who was interviewed after the war explained, "Well for me, being a soldierly 
person means encountering another man with a clean and decent attitude, it means 
representing viewpoints which conform with universal moral laws. But soldierliness also 
means showing...courage..., not in the sense that you are brave if you kill your enemy 
before he kills you, but as a strong inner conviction towards problems you encounter in 
private and personal life."243 This insight from the veteran demonstrates how German 
soldiers believed they acted with honor and discipline during the course of the war, yet 
there is a tone of self-assurance. 
The news of the concentration camps and atrocities committed by the Nazi regime 
resonated within the psyches of German soldiers. Siegfried Knappe sorrowfully: 
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We had thought of our participation in the war as noble and honorable.... I 
was sickened by this news. I finally decided that my inability to come to 
terms with it was going to chip away at my mental and emotional 
strength... so I filed the issue away in a dark corner of my mind.... I had to 
accept the fact that it happened...but I did not have to like it or discuss 
it.... I could not escape my share of the guilt, because without us Hitler 
could not have done the horrible things he had done...but as a human 
being, I felt no guilt, because I had no part in or knowledge of the things 
he had done.244 
This appears as a common belief in soldiers' memoirs after the war.245 As mentioned 
earlier, this collective amnesia affected all participants in the German military. Yet, is it 
fair to judge all Germans for the actions of the minority, or, on the other hand, could this 
denial be attributed to psychological fear and pure disbelief? Another soldier, Alfons 
Heck pondered that: 
[A] civilized, humane people had allowed ourselves to become indifferent 
to brutality committed by our own government.... I developed a harsh 
resentment toward our elders, especially our educators. Not only had they 
allowed themselves to be deceived, they had delivered us, their children, 
into the cruel power of a new God.... Tragically, now, we are the other 
part of the Holocaust, the generation burdened with the enormity of 
Auschwitz. That is our life sentence, for we became the enthusiastic 
victims of our Fiihrer.246 
According to Fritz and Wette, it appears that many soldiers, such as Heck, became 
entwined with a unique victim complex. Claus Hansmann expressed his perception as a 
victim in the following statement: "We are no heroes.... Heroes? What are we? Poor, 
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mistreated, mutilated victims of a...nightmare." In essence, these men did not 
necessarily apologize for the actions of the Third Reich; rather, they chose to feel sorry 
for themselves as the generation misled by an evil dictator and regime. 
Who were these men who are now referred to as perpetrators? Daniel Goldhagen 
claims: 
A perpetrator is anyone who knowingly contributed in some intimate way 
to the mass slaughter of Jews, generally anyone who worked in an 
institution of genocidal killing. This includes all people who themselves 
took the lives of Jews, and all those who set the scene for the final lethal 
act, whose help was instrumental in bringing about the deaths of Jews. So 
anyone who shot Jews as part of a killing squad was a perpetrator. Those 
who rounded up these same Jews, deported them (with knowledge of their 
fate) to a killing location, or cordoned off the area where their compatriots 
shot them were also perpetrators, even if they themselves did not do the 
actual killing. Perpetrators include railroad engineers and administrators 
who knew that they were transporting Jews to their deaths. They include 
any Church officials who knew that their participation in the identification 
of Jews as non-Christians would lead to the deaths of the Jews. They 
include the by now proverbial 'desk-murderer' (Schreibtischtater), who 
himself may not have seen the victims yet whose paperwork lubricated the 
248 
wheels of deportation and destruction. 
Goldhagen makes the bold claim that anyone who enabled the execution of innocent 
civilians or POWs but did not technically pull the trigger was equally as guilty simply by 
their association with the Nazi regime. This troubling declaration effectively incriminates 
all those Germans, Austrians, Lithuanians, and other collaborators who aided the fighting 
force of Nazi Germany. Our perceptions of these killers requires a different perspective, 
one in which we understand that the men did not commit their crimes as robots. These 
individuals had families, were part of society, and performed daily routines of life. 
Recognizing these facts allows for a clearer comprehension of the perpetrators instead of 
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labeling them as simplistic cogs of Nazi Germany. In addition, these men were capable of 
having a conscious and thus understood the difference between right and wrong. 
To those German soldiers who sincerely believed they did not commit any crimes, 
an interesting belief surfaces. Guy Sajer, during his training with the elite 
Grossdeutschland Division, stated in his memoirs: 
Two thousand miles to the west, people were complaining because at 
certain hours it was impossible to find anything to drink at the Paris 
bistros. It still makes me laugh to hear how bitterly this abstinence made 
them suffer. Throughout the war, one of the biggest German mistakes was 
to treat German soldiers even worse than prisoners, instead of allowing us 
to rape and steal- crimes which we were condemned for in the end, 
249 
anyway. 
Sajer thus takes a strong stand against the supposed guilt that he and his fellow comrades 
were accused. In a twist of bitter hopelessness, he adamantly denies the crimes that were 
attributed to German soldiers after the war's conclusion. Yet, on one occasion when 
faced against partisan forces, Sajer explains a horrific scene that allows the reader to gain 
insight into the mind of the average German soldier: 
Our Paks were now concentrating their fire on the area immediately 
surrounding the factory, and the job of cleaning up the people running 
from the gasoline dump was left to us. The fore-sight of my gun often 
disappeared in a swiftly moving Russian silhouette. A light pressure on the 
trigger, a puff of smoke, which for an instant veiled the end of my 
weapon, and my Mauser looked for another victim. Will I be forgiven? 
Was I responsible? That young muzhik, already wounded several times, 
more bewildered than anything else by the lethal uproar whose purpose 
was an obscure to him as it was to me, who stayed in my sights a moment 
too long and then tuned ashen and clutched his breast with both hands 
before making a half turn and falling face down onto the ground- shall I 
ever deserve pardon for that? Can I ever forget?250 
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The remorse Sajer clearly feels is evident through his constant begging for forgiveness 
for his actions. Similar occurrences played out on a daily basis for the majority of 
German soldiers stationed in Russia. 
The prospect of guilt weighed especially heavy upon those men involved with the 
SS. Throughout the war, SS units worked closely with the Wehrmacht. Johann Voss, a 
member of the Waffen-SS, reflected on his impressions of the concentration camps: "In 
the agonizing hours, especially at night, when haunted by those pictures, I realize all 
these people have been held in the custody of men who wore the uniform I wore myself, 
and that from then on the silver runes will symbolize the guilt for what has been 
251 
unearthed and still might come to light." Even though he never served in the 
concentration camps, fellow comrades in the Waffen-SS did. Interestingly, as the war 
came to an end and the allegations were doled out to the leaders of Nazi Germany, Voss 
makes a bold suggestion: 
Now, today, I see more clearly how things will go. Aside from the 
political and military leadership of the Reich, the whole SS, including the 
combat units of the Waffen-SS, will be indicted as a criminal organization, 
charged with various war crimes. I don't fully grasp the meaning of all 
those accusations, but I understand that we will all be held responsible for 
the terrible things that have become known. The members of these 
organizations will be prosecuted and convicted according to the provisions 
of the Charter of the Tribunal. So, it is official now: we are regarded as a 252 
gang of criminals. 
From his analysis, the victim complex becomes apparent rather quickly in his own words. 
Almost in disbelief, Voss knows in his heart that the Third Reich was indeed guilty of the 
horrendous crimes associated with them, yet he stumbles into a sense of self-pity. Even 
more disheartening is his later analysis of his own past: 
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Again, as so many times before, I return to my memories of our past, a 
past which is, they say, our burden of guilt and shame. In spite of all the 
terrible reports connected with our name, however, I cling to my 
memories with affection and without regret. They are, indeed, my comfort 
and refuge, almost a sanctuary where I am safe: safe from drowning in the 
sea of hatred and accusations; safe from the loss of self-respect and pride; 
safe from that ultimate surrender. For there is nothing monstrous in my 
memories of our unit's past, no acts of crime or shameful deeds, or even 
knowledge of the wicked deeds. What I have seen is the commitment of 
youth who, in good faith, believed that Bolshevism was their common foe; 
a cause that in their eyes was noble, even greater than mere patriotism 
because it united young patriots from many countries of Europe. Their 
selflessness knew no bounds, not even the boundary of death, as if the fate 
of Europe was depending on them, on the individual volunteers as well as 
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on their combat groups and on the unit as a whole. 
This denial orchestrated by Voss was not an isolated occurrence. Many of the veterans 
chose to blame others and feel victimized by the criminal regime to which they were 
associated. 
The concept of honor among the German military during the Second World War 
presents a difficult area. Although there is much primary evidence to suggest brutal 
atrocities toward civilians and POWs, memoirs written many years after the war's 
conclusion presents a skewed version of events. Johann Voss explains that "[w]e rated 
loyalty very high among the human virtues; it was embossed on our belt buckles: 'Meine 
Ehre Heisst Treue,' or 'My Honor Is My Loyalty.'"254 He further explains his service and 
his perception of honor among himself and comrades: 
As I recall my time with the battalion on Russian territory, I can't think of 
any actions which could have tarnished our battalion's honor. It is also my 
firm belief that this notion is true of the other units. Like all the comrades I 
knew, I was proud to serve with this division. Was it only good luck? 
Would we have acted dishonorably if confronted with more difficult 
situations other than plain combat where friend and foe were clearly 
distinguished? I don't know. I think our sense of honor wasn't much 
different from the sense of honor of any normal military unit. Nor did we 
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look down on the Russian soldier; how could we in the face of the battle 
of Sennozero or, for that matter, the bold encircling maneuver we had just 
experienced? I think the volunteers' only ambition was to excel as good 
soldiers. What we probably had on both sides were human beings who 
didn't want to die young, who loved and were loved, and who were ready 
to achieve something good in so far as they understood it.255 
In this excerpt from his memoir Black Edelweiss, Voss claims that he acted in an 
appropriate manor dictated by military regulations. Was this the truth or has the truth 
become blurred in light of the Nuremberg proceedings? As Voss explains after the former 
indictment of the SS: 
Coincidentally, early this month after a ten-month trial, the International 
Military Tribunal has pronounced its verdict and found the Waffen-SS, as 
part of the Allgemeine SS, guilty of being a criminal organization. So 
they've done it! So, under the law of the victors, the volunteers were a 
gang of criminals, and their dead have died in disgrace. Even those who 
were in combat all the time are still held responsible for crimes that 
happened elsewhere behind the lines, crimes that many survivors of their 
combat tours find difficult to accept as fact even today. The court, 
however, has stated that the knowledge of the crimes was general, that the 
criminal program of the organization was so widely known and implied a 
slaughter of such a colossal extent that their criminal activities must have 
been widely known by those who volunteered. Such is the construct of 
1 C/T 
their culpability in the findings of the IMT. 
Therefore, the crimes of Nazi Germany indicted all those who served under the 
banner of the armed forces. More importantly, Voss states that "the verdict is meant to 
rob us of our honor, the very last value of which a defeated enemy can be deprived. 'Ehre 
verloren, alles verloren.' ('Honor lost, all lost.') Unconditional surrender was not 
enough; humiliation had to be added to make their victory complete."257 Former soldiers 
would not wish to admit guilt that would in turn harm their sense of wellbeing as well as 
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that of their comrades who died in combat. Major Rudolf- Christoph von Gersdorff s 
report from December 1941 stated: 
In all conversations of any length with officers, I was asked about the 
shootings of Jews, without having made any reference to them myself. I 
gained the impression that the officer corps is generally opposed, one 
could almost say, to the shooting of Jews, prisoners, and political 
commissars. In the case of the commissars it is mainly because killing 
them increases the strength of the enemy's resistance. The shootings are 
regarded as bringing dishonor on the German army, and on the officer 
corps in particular. Officers brought up the question of responsibility for 
them, in stronger or less strong language depending on the individual's 
temperament and disposition. I was able to ascertain that the existing facts 
have become known in full, and that the officers at the front discuss them 
far more than was to be assumed.258 
From this statement, it is possible to deduce that soldiers did indeed know of the 
atrocities committed on a daily basis from their comrades. However, honor was still 
maintained as a high prestige among soldiers on the front, yet this was tarnished as a 
result of their bloody actions toward POWs and civilians. 
The families of soldiers presented members of the Wehrmacht with a motive for 
revenge. The bombing conducted by the Allies weighed heavily upon the average 
German soldier who was helpless to aid his family and friends. In a letter to Klaus 
Willems, the author states: "All life is in disorder. We had to move to the ditches at the 
barrack. Before we were there, we could have been killed by the bombs.... Fortunately 
-y r Q 
no bombs fell." In another example, Karl Wohlfarth's family wrote to him of the 
terrible news concerning the aftermath of an air raid: "We just saw in the newspaper the 
attack yesterday on Braunschweig was a very strong Terrorangriff ["terror attack", which 
described bombings] with apparently very heavy damage and many victims; [there] are 
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many dead and thousands of people are homeless." Upon hearing news of the 
conditions at home, soldiers were surely disheartened and strengthened to fight harder 
against enemy forces. 
If we are to believe that the average German soldier realized the brutality of the 
regime, this would more than likely cause a tremendous strain on their psyches. Kurt 
Yogeler stated: 
The world has seen many great, even violent wars, but probably at no time 
in its existence has there been a war that can be compared with this current 
one in Eastern Europe...The poor, unhappy Russian people! Its distress is 
unspeakable and its misery heart-rending...This era...knows nothing more 
of humanity. Brutal power is the characteristic of our century...What an 
unfortunate war is this human slaughter in Eastern Europe! A crime 
against humanity!261 
Another soldier, Heinz Kiichler, explained the horrendous condition of the Eastern Front 
stating "all evidence of humanity appears to have disappeared in deed and in heart and in 
conscience." Other soldiers commented upon the bombings of German cities where their 
families resided. Johannes Huebner stated simply, "Death is the wages of sin." Harry 
Mielert agreed with this Huebner: "The quintessence appears to me to be that there is a 
punishment for a person...who does evil to others." Private L.B. morbidly noted that 
"None will remain unpunished by this war, each will get his just desert, in the homeland 
969 
as at the front."ZDZ Alfred Trost wrote "the homeland became the front than in the past 
war...still victims were added at lives and property...afflicted by hostile air terror." 
From these memoir and letter entries it becomes evident that the average German soldier 
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knew that the actions of Germany were illegal and that they would ultimately suffer a 
great reprisal from their enemies. 
The Myth of "Clean Hands" 
Answers to the extent of criminalization of the German Armed Forces remained 
difficult for many decades after the Second World War's conclusion. Until fairly 
recently, historians and scholars alike have begun to unearth compelling evidence that the 
Wehrmacht was not as innocent as may have been perceived during the Cold War era. 
Wolfram Wette states that the beginning of the legend of the Wehrmacht's "Clean 
Hands" began with Grand Admiral Karl Donitz's (Hitler's successor) "Wehrmacht 
Report," published on May 9, 1945. Donitz writes: 
Since midnight the guns have been silent on all fronts. On the orders of the 
Grand Admiral the Wehrmacht has called a halt to the fighting, which had 
no prospect of success. This marks the end of almost six years of heroic 
struggle. Those years brought us great victories but also grave defeats. In 
the end the Wehrmacht succumbed honorably to a vastly great force. 
German soldiers fought bravely for their country, remaining loyal 
to their oath and performing acts of valor that will never be forgotten. 
They were supported until the end by those on the home front, who gave 
their all and made enormous sacrifices. 
The unparalleled achievement of those at the front and at home 
will be justly acknowledged by the later judgment of history. 
Nor will our opponents fail to show respect for the achievements 
and sacrifices of German fighting men on land, at sea, and in the air. 
Every soldier can thus stand proud and tall as he lays down his arms and 
can set to work with courage and confidence, in the darkest hours of our 
history, for the everlasting life of our people. 
The Wehrmacht pays homage in this dark hour to its comrades 
felled by the enemy. The fallen demand our unconditional loyalty, 
devotion, and discipline toward the fatherland, now bleeding from 
countless wounds.254 
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In remembering fallen comrades, the belief that the Wehrmacht were serving their 
country and not the Nazi regime served the purpose of dissociation from the atrocities of 
the Second World War. 
After the conclusion of the war, the Allies set up a Historical Division to 
document the history of the Second World War. Ex-German officers, working from July 
1945 to November 1961, produced roughly two hundred thousand written pages for the 
United States government describing the actions of the Wehrmacht which are now held in 
V f 
the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. However, crimes of the 
Wehrmacht were covered up with aid by Allies and ex-Wehrmacht leaders. During this 
time, communism threatened the United States and the rest of the democratic world. 
Thus, former Wehrmacht leaders were able to capitalize on the Cold War and express 
their original dislike for the Soviet Union. By explaining to their American captors, the 
ex-Wehrmacht generals were able to create a more self-serving view of themselves 
during the Second World War. 
Former high-ranking officers of the Wehrmacht were thus presented with the 
opportunity to produce a legend with disregard to the facts of the war. Field Marshal von 
Kiichler instructed his colleagues to follow a strict set of guidelines when writing their 
accounts of the war. Von Kiichler stated: "It is German deeds, seen from the German 
standpoint, that are to be recorded; this will constitute a memorial to our troops.... [N]o 
criticism of measures ordered by the leadership was permitted; no one could be 
'incriminated in any way,' and the achievements of the Wehrmacht were to be 
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appropriately highlighted."266 The convenient amnesia that many veterans suffered was 
thus born out of lies created by the Wehrmacht commanders. Former Gerneral Geyr von 
Schweppenburg boldly stated that it was even possible "to allow one or the other piece of 
incriminating evidence that could have been used at the Nuremberg trial to disappear. 
'yen 
The Americans even helped out." In a twist of fate, the authors of the Wehrmacht's 
actions were presented freedom from censorship when scripting the actions of the 
German army during the war. 
Other than the obvious reason of omission of guilt, why did the ex-Wehrmacht 
generals and officers feel the need to blur the historical record? As Wette explains, "the 
desire to cling to perceptions of a 'clean' Wehrmacht that had fought bravely and 
effectively was connected directly with German career soldiers' self-image, since the 
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military...tends to derive its legitimacy...from history." Manfred Messerschmidt, chief 
historian at the Military History Research Institute, exposed the myth of the Wehrmacht, 
receiving much criticism from veterans' organizations throughout Germany. The veterans 
claimed Messerschmidt damaged the German military's honor as well as the reputation of 
the millions of German soldiers. General Secretary Korber of the Federation of German 
Veterans' Organizations publicly stated that no such extermination campaign existed. He 
also stated that this behavior was extremely rare and not as widespread as Messerschmidt 
claimed. Korber explained further, "No one disputes that during the Second World War 
soldiers of the Wehrmacht committed crimes.... When such acts became known they 
usually led to sentencing of the offender by a court. If such regrettable instances are 
generalized and ascribed to the Wehrmacht as a whole...it amounts to discrimination.... 
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Defaming German soldiers in general means the defamation of more than 11 million 
Jfii Q 
German men, many of whom sacrificed their lives or their health for our fatherland." 
The national amnesia of the Second World War was difficult to break through for 
Germans. It appears that veterans tended to dismiss claims such as Messerschmidt by 
claiming a general defamation to the honor of the dead. Yet, it appears that many of these 
same veterans display intense emotions concerning their actions of more than sixty years 
ago. Why would these men wish to have the truth of the Wehrmacht silenced? The 
answer lies in the fact that their pasts are a dark chapter in German history and the 
twentieth century to which none wish to revisit. 
The German collective memory of the Third Reich became warped after the war. 
As Omer Bartov explains, 
The distorted features of the tortured and butchered served as evidence of 
their own, rather than of their murderers' inhumanity; the sense of moral 
outrage and physical disgust they aroused produced a powerful desire for 
revenge, which by a process of inversion was directed at the victims rather 
than the perpetrators, that is, the 'other' rather than oneself, for it was their 
presence which had made such atrocities necessary, their evident 
inhumanity which had revealed one's own barbarity. Hence, only by 
physically annihilating the victims and erasing their memory could one 
salvage one's won humanity.270 
Much of this distortion came from years of propaganda that aimed at dehumanizing the 
enemy to create a necessity for their destruction. It was only after Germany's defeat that 
many veterans finally realized the criminal actions of the Nazi regime. One individual 
who served as a junior officer in Poland and Russia stated forty years after the war: 
"Well, of course, what they [the Nazis, rather than "us," the Wehrmacht] did to the Jews 
was revolting. But we were told over and over again that it was a necessary evil...No, I 
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must admit, at the time I had no idea we had fallen into the hands of criminals. I didn't 
771 
realize that until much later, after it was all over." Even in the years after the war, this 
particular individual still associates the criminal actions specifically with the Nazis, 
conveniently deleting himself from the situation. 
Without the help of the Wehrmacht, Hitler could never have unleashed the hellish 
treatment of civilians and POWs. The myth propagated by ex-Wehrmacht generals 
popularized the claim that it was the SS and the hardcore Nazis who committed the 
criminal directives during the war. This falsehood withstood almost five decades of the 
twentieth century until historians began analyzing letters and correspondence from ex-
Wehrmacht soldiers. The fact that Nazi propaganda had completely infiltrated the 
Wehrmacht emphasizes the reality that more soldiers knew what was occurring on the 
front lines. Megargee stresses the essential information that Hitler could never have 
wreaked so much death and destruction if it was not for the aid of the Wehrmacht. 
When the papers were submitted to the United States Army, the Wehrmacht 
generals and officers had successfully omitted any reference to war crimes committed by 
their military. In this way, they had the final word on the Wehrmacht's performance 
during the war, creating a far different perception of reality. With no mention of criminal 
activities, the popular myth of "clean hands" became an accepted truth of history. Pride 
and defiance proved too great for these men to admit the instances of their military's 
illegal conduct during the war. As Wood explains: 
They [high-ranking German POWs] decried the 'defamation' of the 
Wehrmacht in postwar Germany and pointed to their 1934 oath of 
obedience to the Fiihrer in explaining their powerlessness to counteract 
Hitler's foolish decisions. It is also possible to find evidence in these 
reports that the impending war crimes tribunals weighed heavily upon 
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what was written in these manuscripts.... The inescapable conclusion 
indicated by these reports is that even after 1945, when the magnitude of 
Germany's crimes should have been dawning on the authors, they 
steadfastly refused to examine their own roles in supporting the state that 
979 
perpetrated these crimes. 
Whether it was for fear of imprisonment or incrimination upon the millions of Germans 
killed in action, the authors were able to convolute the truth and save themselves any 
further embarrassment after a military defeat. 
272
 Wood, 136. 
138 
Conclusion 
The Wehrmacht was in fact an invaluable asset to Hitler during the course of the 
Second World War. Without the unquestioning loyalty and dedication from the soldiers, 
the Nazis could never have waged war throughout Europe. The German Army was the 
backbone of the German war machine, yet for the most part they were equally as 
indoctrinated in Nazi ideology as members of the elite SS divisions. This conclusion may 
indeed be shocking, but there is ample evidence via letters and memoirs that suggest this 
result. The primary reason this is difficult to accept is due to the rewriting of history by 
the Wehrmacht generals and leaders at the conclusion of the war. They chose to place 
emphasis upon the fanatical Nazis, the SS, and the Einsatzgruppen so that their military 
record would appear clean. Therefore, the myth of innocence emerged which remained 
for decades until the 1990s. 
Much of the reason Hitler was able to gain so much support throughout Germany 
dealt with his ability to blame the Allied powers for the turbulent times during the 1920s. 
When Hitler obtained power in 1933 an entire generation of Germans entered into the 
Hitler Youth programs which indoctrinated them for service to Nazi Germany. These 
individuals admired Hitler as a father figure and willingly accepted his views on 
Bolsheviks, Jews, and the Allies. The final product was individuals who believed in the 
annihilation of Jews, Slavs, and anyone else who was not of pure Aryan race. After years 
of indoctrination and propaganda directed toward an entire generation, it is not surprising 
that so many Germans would later commit horrible atrocities against the Polish, Russian 
and other European populations. 
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A primary argument of Omer Bartov, John Mosier, and Niall Ferguson explains 
that the men of the Wehrmacht were not innocent at all. Landsers actively embraced and 
believed in Nazi ideals and goals. As Bartov concludes, the soldiers "fought for Nazism 
and everything that it stood for." When understanding German history during the 
twentieth century, it becomes clear that it would have been almost impossible for an 
average German not to participate in Nazi activities. Due to the idealistic and noble 
causes Hitler placed before all of Germany, it was normal for many average soldiers not 
to doubt their role in extinguishing the threat of Bolshevism from the Soviet Union. In 
destroying the evil hordes from the East, German soldiers were encouraged by their 
commanders to deal swiftly and ruthlessly with those classified as Untermenschen. 
Presently, historians and researchers are able to obtain orders from Hitler and Wehrmacht 
leaders that state the necessity to approach Operation Barbarossa with extreme prejudice 
274 
and without mercy toward the Jewish-Bolshevik threat. Due to this incriminating 
evidence, it becomes much more difficult to view the Wehrmacht in a more positive 
perspective. 
It is difficult to argue on the side of innocence for the majority of German 
soldiers. The difficult truth is that many of these individuals either witnessed or actively 
participated in executions of civilians, Jews, and POWs. From the available historical 
sources, many eyewitnesses claim to have viewed such heinous acts but refused to act in 
defense of those suffering at the hands of their comrades. Yet, even after stating this, it is 
vital to understand that these men were indeed human beings instead of soulless 
murderers. These men had families and faced death on a daily basis on the Eastern Front. 
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This is not to excuse them but rather to form a more complete understanding for the 
circumstances surrounding German soldiers during the war. However, this analysis 
allows researchers and historians to gain more insight into the situation for soldiers of the 
Wehrmacht. 
The Wehrmacht was indeed guilty of crimes against civilians, prisoners of war, 
partisans, Jews, and anyone else considered as Untermenschen. Letters from the front 
demonstrate the immensity of hatred directed at those individuals not accepted by Nazi 
Germany. These sources present direct evidence of opinions and actions directed at the 
time which are invaluable to historians. Memoirs, on the other hand, present the soldiers' 
opinions long after the conclusion after the war and the criminal trials at Nuremberg. The 
authors of these works rarely incriminate the German military on the grounds of a 
complex social amnesia that appeared to inflict many veterans after the war. Memoirs 
also allow the men to change facts to create a more positive perspective of events they 
experienced, creating a myth all their own. 
Through his painstaking evaluation of the German soldiers in Russia, Stephen 
Fritz concludes that these men were indoctrinated within their ranks. He admits that they 
fought courageously in the face of brutal conditions, yet the fact does remain that the 
average soldier in the Wehrmacht was Nazified. Fritz's research is interesting in that 
he attempts to empathize with the average German combatant by examining several men 
at a grass-roots level. However, he ultimately comes to the similar conclusion of Bartov, 
Mosier, Wette, and other authors that the average Wehrmacht soldier was more 
indoctrinated than was originally accepted by the historical community. 
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Most families throughout Germany sent at least one soldier to the front. These 
soldiers returned with brutal images of war as well as a distorted image of military 
discipline. As Bartov and Wolfram Wette discuss, these attributes ultimately added to the 
general German national amnesia when discussing the Second World War. The murdered 
and mistreated victims of brutality during the Russian campaign were widely forgotten, 
replaced by a victim complex developed by German veterans who later cried foul from 
the Nazi government. When former Wehrmacht generals were permitted to write their 
accounts of the German military during the Second World War, they chose to blame the 
SS and Einsatzgruppen forces. Thus, these ex-generals effectively altered the historical 
record for decades until the early 1990s. The realities of events from the war were finally 
revealed in the controversial exhibit from the Hamburg Institute for Social Research 
entitled The German Army and Genocide released in March 1995. With photographic and 
written evidence, there was much guilt associated with the average German soldier. This 
display deeply upset veterans as well as Germans as a whole, who had not accepted the 
bitter truth of the Second World War. 
During the initial stages of this research, I was unknowingly well-associated with 
the myth of the clean hands of the Wehrmacht. However, the more research I conducted, 
the more disturbing and incriminating evidence was uncovered. It is impossible to 
disagree with the true historical record as understood at this juncture in time. The 
Wehrmacht were indeed guilty of horrendous crimes against Russian POWs, civilians, 
Jews, and anyone else described as Untermenschen. Yet, the immensity of this topic 
allows for the work to never end, especially with the reluctance of many to accept the fact 
that Germany did in fact commit crimes against humanity. The letters involved in this 
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analysis represent a minute amount of the total material written during the course of the 
Second World War. Debates present an interesting forum in which historians and 
members of the public can discuss this difficult issue. Through these conversations 
hopefully more individuals will understand the necessity of learning about this difficult 
time period in Germany's recent history. 
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Appendix 1 
War Crimes Definition According to OSS: 
Problems Concerning the Treatment of War Criminals, September 28,1944 
Definition of "War Crime" 
...A war criminal would...be a person who had violated the rules of warfare. Such a 
definition would present operational difficulties, because practice among nations has not 
crystallized sufficiently to remove the possibility for disputes as to the contents of the 
definition. Further, if positive international law alone were to serve as the substantive law 
for the purposes of punishment of war criminals, it would be impossible to punish the 
superior officers and, in many cases, even those who have committed the crimes. It 
would seem, therefore, that such a definition would not efficiently serve the purposes of 
the United Nations as expressed in the Statement. 
Need for a Policy Directive. In order to secure more adequate definitions of the persons 
to be treated as war criminals, it may therefore be desirable to have a policy directive 
fixing the offenses which are to be treated as war crimes...It is therefore suggested that 
this basis would make possible a policy directive clearly establishing the following acts 
as war crimes: 
a. shooting hostages; 
b. forcible deportation of civilian population; 
c. spoliation of civilian population, as by expropriations, pillage, etc.; 
d. maltreatment of prisoners of war or civilian internees; 
e. collective reprisals, such as the killing of the inhabitants of a town or other 
groups, who have been made collectively responsible for an individual hostile 
act or the burning of villages for similar reasons (Lidice may be termed an 
example for such action); 
f. atrocities against whole groups in pursuance of a general program of 
annihilation, such as the massacre of Jews, the maltreatment of special 
categories of persons because of their political or religious convictions 
(Communists, Socialists, pacifists, Jehovah's Witnesses) or because of their 
standing in the community (intellectuals, for example). 
Such a directive, if issued by the United Nations, would make plain the scope 
which the United Nations intend to assign to war crimes and would afford an efficient 
basis for uniform tripartite action. 
B. Definition of War Criminal 
A large number of persons have been directly or indirectly involved in such 
crimes. Declarations hitherto issued by the United Nations do not sufficiently indicate the 
principles according to which responsibility of such individuals shall be established. 
1. Establishment of Responsibility. Under traditional legal procedure, punishment 
for crime is predicated upon the establishment of individual responsibility for the 
criminal act. By referring to persons who 'have been responsible for or have taken a 
consenting part in' war crimes, the Moscow Statement suggests a broader interpretation 
of the concept of responsibility than it has traditionally received. 
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The issue would thus seem to have become whether, in case of a massacre of Jews 
in a concentration camp, all the hierarchical superiors of the executing Gestapo squad, 
from the district Gestapo chief up to Himmler himself, as Reich Leader SS and Chief of 
the German Police, may be held responsible, even when no specific order for the 
commission of the act can be found. Or again, whether, in case of the shooting of 
hostages, the superior officers up to the Army High Command may be held responsible, 
even though no specific confirmation of the order is found. 
The answer, if any, would seem to lie, not in the traditional channels through 
which criminal responsibility is established but rather in the nature of the Nazi state. 
According to the peculiar structure of Nazi organization and to the 'leadership principle' 
which controls all relationship between members of official organizations, the 
hierarchical superior is responsible for whatever happens within the functional and 
territorial sphere of his jurisdiction. Hitler or his associates lay down fundamental 
policies but delegate full discretion in their execution to their subordinates in various 
fields. Since each subordinate has his own share in the elaboration and execution of a 
given policy, the plea that he had no knowledge of a specific act or the details of its 
execution or that he did not order it should not be available to him. 
In other countries such a defense would usually be valid, because acts of officials 
are lawful only if authorized by the law of the land, which establishes clear-cut standards 
for action. Consequently, any excess is attributable to the individual officer and not to his 
superiors. Under the Nazi system, however, in addition to the wide freedom of action left 
to subordinates as just stated, various agencies and organizations (for example, the SS), 
are exempt from legal limitations. No curbs are placed upon their activities. Under this 
combination of circumstances, the only admissible defense would seem to consist in the 
proof that the person against whom the charge is preferred did all in his power to prevent 
the act or its repetition or, in the case of administrative officers, that, having been unable 
to prevent the act, he resigned immediately after its commission. 
2. Superior Orders. It may be desirable to bring to justice not only the instigators 
of a crime but also those who took part in its immediate execution. The latter may, 
however, be expected to raise the defense that they acted under binding orders from their 
superiors. 
The plea of superior orders has been widely discussed in connection with military 
orders but little agreement has been achieved. While many army manuals, - among them, 
the American, - admit the plea without exception; others favor its admission only under 
narrowly defined conditions, if at all. 
Since the authoritarian structure of the Nazi regime makes individual resistance 
against orders more dangerous and consequently less to be expected than elsewhere, a 
general prohibition of the plea does not seem warranted. Such a plea should not be 
considered in the case of those who have a certain amount of discretion in the execution 
of a policy. It might, however, be pressed by persons who acted under specific orders 
which left no individual choice. The individual member of an army firing squad detailed 
to shoot hostages might well risk his life if he refused to obey. While the same 
justification might apply to members of Party formations, any policy statement issued by 
the United States or the United Nations might well require as a preliminary test whether 
or not the person in question enlisted voluntarily. In the case of the SS, it might be borne 
in mind that enlistment was voluntary until 1943. In case of voluntary enlistment, the 
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person might be presumed to have had full knowledge of the functions and practices of 
the organization and should not be allowed to avoid his share of responsibility. 
It may well be argued that crimes, such as the persecution of Jews or political 
opponents, committed in the execution of the general Nazi programs, should be 
considered as war crimes, even when committed against Axis nationals or stateless 
persons in Axis territory. It may not, however, be feasible for Allied municipal or 
military courts to try such cases. It is probably that such cases would most 
advantageously be brought before the reconstituted German courts. Punishment of Nazi 
crimes by German courts would, it is submitted, go far to prove to the German people and 
the whole world that Germany repudiates the crimes of its former leaders." 
Statement on Atrocities 
Signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin 
The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from 
many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which 
are being perpetrated by Hitlerite forces in many of the countries they have overrun and 
from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Nazi domination are 
no new thing, and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form 
of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being 
redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating powers and that in their desperation 
the recoiling Hitlerites and Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now 
evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes on the territory of the Soviet 
Union which is being liberated from Hitlerites and on French and Italian territory. 
Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied powers, speaking in the interests of the 
thirty-two United Nations, herby solemnly declare and give full warning of their 
declaration as follows: 
At the time of granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up 
in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have 
been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres 
and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were 
done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these 
liberated countries and of the free governments which will be therein. Lists will be 
compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard especially to 
invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and 
Greece, including Crete and other islands; to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Italy. 
Thus, Germans who take part in wholesale shooting of Italian officers or in the 
execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or 
who have shared in slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the 
Soviet Union which are no being swept clear of the enemy, will know they will be 
brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom 
they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbued their hands with innocent 
blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied 
powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their 
accusers in order that justice may be done. 
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The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals 
whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by 
joint decision of the governments of the Allies. 
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